Israel Matzav: Someone had better warn the Obumbler: Containment also takes force

Someone had better warn the Obumbler: Containment also takes force

The Obama administration has all but given up on stopping Iran from becoming a nuclear power. Because it believes that 'at best' striking Iran will only delay its becoming a nuclear power for some period of time, the naturally pacifist Obama prefers to throw in the towel and try to 'contain' a nuclear Iran.

I have discussed in the past why containment, the strategy that worked against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, is unlikely to work against Iran. I discussed it at length specifically in relation to the Obama administration's pacifism here. For those who have not read the two linked posts before, I urge you to read them, but the argument why containment won't work against Iran can be summed up in three sentences.

Containment is based upon a concept called mutually assured destruction, which means that once hit with a nuclear weapon, a country still has the capability to destroy its opponent. However, unlike the Cold War era Soviet Union, which cared about its population, the apocalyptic Iranian regime is indifferent to its own destruction and to the deaths of its citizens (as proven by the brutal manner in which it has treated them since June). Therefore, mutually assured destruction is not a sufficient deterrent and something more effective must be found.

Writing in the Washington Post, James Lindsay and Ray Takeyh argue that for the US to be able to contain Iran, it would need the same type of force - and probably even greater force - than would be needed to prevent Iran from going nuclear in the first place. In other words, the Obama administration's refusal to act decisively against Iran will not prevent a war. If anything, it will make that war more likely and will require even greater force, death and destruction to win.

Today, as Iranian hawks consolidate their power and the Revolutionary Guards emerge as a key pillar of the state, Tehran views nuclear weapons as the means to regional preeminence. A nuclear shield would give Iran freedom to project its power in the Middle East. Such an Iran is unlikely to be subtle about brandishing the nuclear card.

It would take considerable American political skill and will to contain such regional pretensions. Washington would need to be explicit about its red lines: no initiation of conventional warfare against other countries; no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, material or technologies; no stepped-up support for terrorist or subversive activities. Washington would need to be just as explicit about the consequences of crossing those lines: potential U.S. military retaliation by any and all means necessary.

Tehran would probably test U.S. resolve early on, believing that regional dynamics had shifted sharply in its favor. In that case, the United States would face a momentous credibility crisis because it had failed to stop Iran from going nuclear after persistently declaring that such an outcome was unacceptable. Even close U.S. allies would doubt Washington's security guarantees.

An emboldened Iran would test Washington in several ways. It would probably lend more support to Hezbollah and Hamas and encourage them to act more aggressively against Israel. It might step up subversive activities against the Gulf sheikdoms and demand that they evict U.S. troops from their territory.

A nuclear Iran could also be tempted to transfer nuclear materials and technologies to other countries. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has already declared that "Iran's nuclear achievements belong to all those countries thinking of peace and welfare, and we are prepared to provide these achievements to those who hate war and aggression." How would the United States respond to an Iran that transferred advanced centrifuges or nuclear weapon designs to its Syrian ally? Or if it gave fissile material to a terrorist group?

Such dangerous and destabilizing actions cannot be addressed by tough diplomatic talk or yet more U.N. Security Council resolutions. It can be addressed only by a willingness to respond with force. And in the curious logic that governs deterrence, a Tehran that believes Washington will retaliate will be less likely to act aggressively in the first place.

The challenges of making containment work make it far preferable that Iran stop -- or be stopped -- short of becoming a nuclear power.

What's left unsaid here is what I view as the most likely way in which Tehran will try to test Washington's mettle: An attempt to destroy Israel, God forbid. Based on their campaign rhetoric (and if anything, Obama in power has shown himself to be even more of a pacifist than he was during the campaign), Hillary Clinton would advocate retaliating with nukes, but only after Israel has been attacked. Obama didn't even go that far. He said that such an attack would be 'unacceptable,' and would lead him to take 'appropriate action.'

We are truly the canary in the coal mine. The mine is getting darker and the air passages are being blocked.

What could go wrong?

Israel Matzav: Someone had better warn the Obumbler: Containment also takes force