Jorge Drexler: El Pianista del Gueto de Varsovia
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Monday, 2 November 2009
RubinReports: And Now the Truth Becomes Clear: Hilary Clinton Announces that the Palestinians are the Obstacles to Peace
And Now the Truth Becomes Clear: Hilary Clinton Announces that the Palestinians are the Obstacles to Peace
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By Barry Rubin
Yesterday I discussed the significance of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s praise for Israel’s policy during her trip to Jerusalem, saying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had offered unprecedented concessions to get peace talks started again.
We don’t know what the plan is though there are hints that Israel agreed to stop all construction on the West Bank once the 3,000 apartment units now being constructed were completed and that this freeze would not apply to construction in east Jerusalem. This is indeed a major concession on Netanyahu’s part and once again puts the lie to the claim that he is inflexible or hard line (though no doubt we will still daily see this in media coverage).
This visit, however, also may be a major turning point in both U.S. policy and public perceptions of the problem regarding the peace process.
At the center of this stands the Number One Paradox of the issue, in some ways of all Middle Eastern politics: Why is it that although the Palestinians complain that they are suffering from a horrible occupation and not having a state of their own they are not in any hurry to make a peace agreement, end the “occupation,” and get a state.
The main answer is that the dominant Palestinian view is still the desire to win a total victory and wipe Israel off the map. The back-up stance is that any peace agreement must not block the continued pursuit of that goal. And the back-up position to that is to reject strong security guarantees, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, an unmilitarized Palestinian state, settlement of Palestinian refugees in Palestine, territorial compromise or exchanges, and indeed any concession whatsoever.
There are two implications of this:
--The Palestinians are at fault for the failure to achieve peace.
--There isn’t going to be any Israel-Palestinian peace in the near- or even medium-term future.
If you understand the preceding 176 words then you understand the issue comprehensively.
The president of the United States has said that he wants talks resumed immediately and believes it possible to make a breakthrough. The Palestinian leadership is thwarting him on both points. In other words, they are responsible for the failure of a major U.S. policy.
Following Clinton’s visit, Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders have restated their refusal even to talk with Israel. They also claim that Netanyahu is refusing to discuss some issues in the talks, though the Israeli prime minister has simply not made such statements. In fact, as the Washington Post reported, November 1:
“The Palestinian position, if anything, appears to have hardened in recent days, leaving Israel to portray itself as the more willing partner.”
Well, Israel is the more willing partner, isn’t it? That’s the point that breaks the apparent paradox of suffering Palestinians yearning for peace but being thwarted by Israeli intransigence.
One point in the Post article, however, is just flat wrong:
“Israel promised to halt settlements under previous international agreements, and Palestinian officials say they want those promises fulfilled.”
In fact, at the time it signed the original peace process agreement—often called the Oslo accord—in 1993, that’s 16 years ago—Israel put forward its interpretation of the agreement. It said that there would be no new Jewish settlements and no geographical expansion of existing settlements. But Israel made it clear that it would continue to build apartments on existing settlements. That position was not challenged by the Palestinians at the time and it has never held up talks before now.
Indeed, another Washington Post article of November 1, this one by Howard Schneider, pointed out—though only indirectly—why things got even worse:
“However, Obama's election raised expectations among Palestinians and throughout the Arab states that the peace process would yield quicker results from an administration willing to openly criticize Israel and, it seemed, elevate Palestinian interests.”
More than that, it was the Obama Administration which called for a total freeze, distances itself from Israel, and took other steps leading the PA and Arab states to believe that by being intransigent they could get Washington to deliver Israel on their own terms. In other words, while everyone is being too polite to say so, the Obama Administration was responsible for the situation deteriorating.
Here's how Netanyahu put it in his joint press conference with Clinton:
"The simple fact is this: We are willing to engage in peace talks immediately without pre-conditions. The other fact is that unfortunately the other side is not. It is asking and piling on pre-conditions that it never put on in the sixteen years that we've had the peace process since the enunciation of the Oslo Accords. There have not been these pre-conditions. It's a change of Palestinian policy...."
Now both Egypt and Jordan have come out in support of the PA position, also setting themselves on a collision course with Washington, that there should be no talks at all until all construction on settlements stops without exception, including anything now being completed and all building in east Jerusalem. There is no chance Israel is going to agree to that; there is no chance the Obama Administration will demand it.
And so we have come to the point where it is becoming clear even to those who have been ruled by wishful thinking that there is not going to be any peace and that the Palestinian-Arab side is responsible for this situation.
It is quite probable--and this is extremely important to understand--that there is nothing the Obama Administration can say or do in order to make them change their mind. After all, this is the ideal position from the standpoint of the PA, Egypt, Jordan, and others. Refuse to support talks, reap benefits by showing their militancy, and be able to blame it on Israel.
After all his efforts and alleged popularity, Obama has absolutely zero credit and no leverage in the Arabic-speaking world.
How is this going to affect Obama Administration policy and thinking?
By Barry Rubin
Yesterday I discussed the significance of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s praise for Israel’s policy during her trip to Jerusalem, saying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had offered unprecedented concessions to get peace talks started again.
We don’t know what the plan is though there are hints that Israel agreed to stop all construction on the West Bank once the 3,000 apartment units now being constructed were completed and that this freeze would not apply to construction in east Jerusalem. This is indeed a major concession on Netanyahu’s part and once again puts the lie to the claim that he is inflexible or hard line (though no doubt we will still daily see this in media coverage).
This visit, however, also may be a major turning point in both U.S. policy and public perceptions of the problem regarding the peace process.
At the center of this stands the Number One Paradox of the issue, in some ways of all Middle Eastern politics: Why is it that although the Palestinians complain that they are suffering from a horrible occupation and not having a state of their own they are not in any hurry to make a peace agreement, end the “occupation,” and get a state.
The main answer is that the dominant Palestinian view is still the desire to win a total victory and wipe Israel off the map. The back-up stance is that any peace agreement must not block the continued pursuit of that goal. And the back-up position to that is to reject strong security guarantees, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, an unmilitarized Palestinian state, settlement of Palestinian refugees in Palestine, territorial compromise or exchanges, and indeed any concession whatsoever.
There are two implications of this:
--The Palestinians are at fault for the failure to achieve peace.
--There isn’t going to be any Israel-Palestinian peace in the near- or even medium-term future.
If you understand the preceding 176 words then you understand the issue comprehensively.
The president of the United States has said that he wants talks resumed immediately and believes it possible to make a breakthrough. The Palestinian leadership is thwarting him on both points. In other words, they are responsible for the failure of a major U.S. policy.
Following Clinton’s visit, Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders have restated their refusal even to talk with Israel. They also claim that Netanyahu is refusing to discuss some issues in the talks, though the Israeli prime minister has simply not made such statements. In fact, as the Washington Post reported, November 1:
“The Palestinian position, if anything, appears to have hardened in recent days, leaving Israel to portray itself as the more willing partner.”
Well, Israel is the more willing partner, isn’t it? That’s the point that breaks the apparent paradox of suffering Palestinians yearning for peace but being thwarted by Israeli intransigence.
One point in the Post article, however, is just flat wrong:
“Israel promised to halt settlements under previous international agreements, and Palestinian officials say they want those promises fulfilled.”
In fact, at the time it signed the original peace process agreement—often called the Oslo accord—in 1993, that’s 16 years ago—Israel put forward its interpretation of the agreement. It said that there would be no new Jewish settlements and no geographical expansion of existing settlements. But Israel made it clear that it would continue to build apartments on existing settlements. That position was not challenged by the Palestinians at the time and it has never held up talks before now.
Indeed, another Washington Post article of November 1, this one by Howard Schneider, pointed out—though only indirectly—why things got even worse:
“However, Obama's election raised expectations among Palestinians and throughout the Arab states that the peace process would yield quicker results from an administration willing to openly criticize Israel and, it seemed, elevate Palestinian interests.”
More than that, it was the Obama Administration which called for a total freeze, distances itself from Israel, and took other steps leading the PA and Arab states to believe that by being intransigent they could get Washington to deliver Israel on their own terms. In other words, while everyone is being too polite to say so, the Obama Administration was responsible for the situation deteriorating.
Here's how Netanyahu put it in his joint press conference with Clinton:
"The simple fact is this: We are willing to engage in peace talks immediately without pre-conditions. The other fact is that unfortunately the other side is not. It is asking and piling on pre-conditions that it never put on in the sixteen years that we've had the peace process since the enunciation of the Oslo Accords. There have not been these pre-conditions. It's a change of Palestinian policy...."
Now both Egypt and Jordan have come out in support of the PA position, also setting themselves on a collision course with Washington, that there should be no talks at all until all construction on settlements stops without exception, including anything now being completed and all building in east Jerusalem. There is no chance Israel is going to agree to that; there is no chance the Obama Administration will demand it.
And so we have come to the point where it is becoming clear even to those who have been ruled by wishful thinking that there is not going to be any peace and that the Palestinian-Arab side is responsible for this situation.
It is quite probable--and this is extremely important to understand--that there is nothing the Obama Administration can say or do in order to make them change their mind. After all, this is the ideal position from the standpoint of the PA, Egypt, Jordan, and others. Refuse to support talks, reap benefits by showing their militancy, and be able to blame it on Israel.
After all his efforts and alleged popularity, Obama has absolutely zero credit and no leverage in the Arabic-speaking world.
How is this going to affect Obama Administration policy and thinking?
RubinReports: And Now the Truth Becomes Clear: Hilary Clinton Announces that the Palestinians are the Obstacles to Peace
RubinReports: Egypt’s Moments of Decision?
Egypt’s Moments of Decision?
By Barry Rubin
The two main and contending political forces in Egypt—the government and the Muslim Brotherhood—are both facing the choice of a new leader. Will they make a clear decision or postpone their decisions?
Regarding the government, the ruling National Democratic Party is holding its annual meeting. Everyone is asking: will it endorse Gamal Mubarak, 46, son of the current 81-year-old president, as the country’s next leader? While President Husni Mubarak has been building up his son, the incumbent has not crossed over into definitely indicating that this is his choice of successor.
Gamal has his supporters but he could be a disastrous choice. On the positive side, he is friendly to the West, a technocrat who might handle the economy well, and a man oriented toward internal affairs who would be unlikely to cause much international trouble or seek regional leadership.
On the negative side, he might be too Westernized and not a good enough politician to rule, nor would he probably be a strong leader in opposing Iran and the Islamist forces.
The disdain in the country’s leading circles is to see—as happened in Syria—the regime become a dynastic one. The fear is that an inept or unpopular Gamal could boost the Muslim Brotherhood’s prospects for taking power in future.
The next election is scheduled for 2011, assuming Husni can continue that long, and the government’s candidate will win. But will the big decision be made now so that Gamal can start to settle into the role and neutralize any opposition while his father will be around to help him, or will it be postponed to the last possible moment—and perhaps too late—in which case there could be some serious internal rifts and a possibly unprepared successor would lead a divided establishment?
At any rate, the longer Husni Mubarak takes to make and implement a decision, the worse.
Then there’s the Muslim Brotherhood. The 81-year-old hardline leader Muhammad Mehdi Akef has reportedly stepped down and the hardline number 2, Muhammad Habib, has stepped in, though there’s confusion as to whether or not this has actually happened.
One almost never sees in the Western media either examples of the Brotherhood's bloodcurdling statemens in Arabic or of the radical proposals Brotherhood representatives make in parliament. For examples of such things see here and here. Yóu'll also be able to read more about the Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere in my forthcoming new book The Muslim Brotherhood: A Global Islamist Movement (Palgrave-Macmillan).
There are some relative moderates in the Brotherhood—and the word “relative” should be taken seriously—who are brilliant at international public relations. They have persuaded various journalists and think-tank types that they are actually moderate and really have some chance of gaining the leadership, both questionable propositions.
In this context, though, the line is that it’s all the government’s fault. If it only didn’t repress the Brotherhood the group would become more moderate. This is questionable thinking since a stronger Brotherhood under radical leadership would both consolidate the hard line and destabilize Egypt.
Thus, we are given various hollow promises by the self-described moderates who are happy to say what they think will sell in the West. Here’s how one recent article puts it:
"`The policies of repression and arrests make it very difficult" to move toward a more moderate Brotherhood because they strengthen conservatives in the group.”
The claim that they want to imitate the Justice and Development Party which rules Turkey is hardly encouraging given the fact that the Turkish group is moving steadily toward Islamism. In other words, it isn’t that they are more moderate but merely willing to pretend that they are so until they get into power.
Thus we are told:
“Essam el-Erian, a 55-year old doctor and Brotherhood member for almost 35 years, is widely known as a moderate voice in the organization. He has been reported to accept the principle of women and Christians running for the presidency—counter to the group's official line—to agree with greater cooperation with the West, and has been reported to say that it's time to accept Israel as a reality with a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
Sure, and I had lunch with the Easter Bunny yesterday and he offered to sell me the Brooklyn Bridge. Note the key word in the above paragraph—“has been reported.” Erian hasn’t said it publicly or to the reporters, he just lets it be known to those who want to think that way, in the same manner that Hamas and Hizballah drop hints that they are ready to become more moderate in English to reporters and Western officials and then make 100 extremist statements in Arabic.
The above analysis is a bit too cynical. There no doubt are Brotherhood members who are fed up and would like to see their group be more flexible but they are few in number, have no influence, and will never take over. The siren song that the government should let the Brotherhood have more freedom of action would be a prelude to disaster.
This battle between government and Egypt’s problems, between government and Brotherhood, and perhaps inside each of these two warring institutions is going to be a feature of the country’s life for years to come. We are awaiting the stage to be set for the next step in those conflicts.
There will almost certainly be a succession in Egypt in the next few months. The question is whether there will be a succession crisis.
The two main and contending political forces in Egypt—the government and the Muslim Brotherhood—are both facing the choice of a new leader. Will they make a clear decision or postpone their decisions?
Regarding the government, the ruling National Democratic Party is holding its annual meeting. Everyone is asking: will it endorse Gamal Mubarak, 46, son of the current 81-year-old president, as the country’s next leader? While President Husni Mubarak has been building up his son, the incumbent has not crossed over into definitely indicating that this is his choice of successor.
Gamal has his supporters but he could be a disastrous choice. On the positive side, he is friendly to the West, a technocrat who might handle the economy well, and a man oriented toward internal affairs who would be unlikely to cause much international trouble or seek regional leadership.
On the negative side, he might be too Westernized and not a good enough politician to rule, nor would he probably be a strong leader in opposing Iran and the Islamist forces.
The disdain in the country’s leading circles is to see—as happened in Syria—the regime become a dynastic one. The fear is that an inept or unpopular Gamal could boost the Muslim Brotherhood’s prospects for taking power in future.
The next election is scheduled for 2011, assuming Husni can continue that long, and the government’s candidate will win. But will the big decision be made now so that Gamal can start to settle into the role and neutralize any opposition while his father will be around to help him, or will it be postponed to the last possible moment—and perhaps too late—in which case there could be some serious internal rifts and a possibly unprepared successor would lead a divided establishment?
At any rate, the longer Husni Mubarak takes to make and implement a decision, the worse.
Then there’s the Muslim Brotherhood. The 81-year-old hardline leader Muhammad Mehdi Akef has reportedly stepped down and the hardline number 2, Muhammad Habib, has stepped in, though there’s confusion as to whether or not this has actually happened.
One almost never sees in the Western media either examples of the Brotherhood's bloodcurdling statemens in Arabic or of the radical proposals Brotherhood representatives make in parliament. For examples of such things see here and here. Yóu'll also be able to read more about the Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere in my forthcoming new book The Muslim Brotherhood: A Global Islamist Movement (Palgrave-Macmillan).
There are some relative moderates in the Brotherhood—and the word “relative” should be taken seriously—who are brilliant at international public relations. They have persuaded various journalists and think-tank types that they are actually moderate and really have some chance of gaining the leadership, both questionable propositions.
In this context, though, the line is that it’s all the government’s fault. If it only didn’t repress the Brotherhood the group would become more moderate. This is questionable thinking since a stronger Brotherhood under radical leadership would both consolidate the hard line and destabilize Egypt.
Thus, we are given various hollow promises by the self-described moderates who are happy to say what they think will sell in the West. Here’s how one recent article puts it:
"`The policies of repression and arrests make it very difficult" to move toward a more moderate Brotherhood because they strengthen conservatives in the group.”
The claim that they want to imitate the Justice and Development Party which rules Turkey is hardly encouraging given the fact that the Turkish group is moving steadily toward Islamism. In other words, it isn’t that they are more moderate but merely willing to pretend that they are so until they get into power.
Thus we are told:
“Essam el-Erian, a 55-year old doctor and Brotherhood member for almost 35 years, is widely known as a moderate voice in the organization. He has been reported to accept the principle of women and Christians running for the presidency—counter to the group's official line—to agree with greater cooperation with the West, and has been reported to say that it's time to accept Israel as a reality with a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
Sure, and I had lunch with the Easter Bunny yesterday and he offered to sell me the Brooklyn Bridge. Note the key word in the above paragraph—“has been reported.” Erian hasn’t said it publicly or to the reporters, he just lets it be known to those who want to think that way, in the same manner that Hamas and Hizballah drop hints that they are ready to become more moderate in English to reporters and Western officials and then make 100 extremist statements in Arabic.
The above analysis is a bit too cynical. There no doubt are Brotherhood members who are fed up and would like to see their group be more flexible but they are few in number, have no influence, and will never take over. The siren song that the government should let the Brotherhood have more freedom of action would be a prelude to disaster.
This battle between government and Egypt’s problems, between government and Brotherhood, and perhaps inside each of these two warring institutions is going to be a feature of the country’s life for years to come. We are awaiting the stage to be set for the next step in those conflicts.
There will almost certainly be a succession in Egypt in the next few months. The question is whether there will be a succession crisis.
RubinReports: Egypt’s Moments of Decision?
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