'Thousands' of terrorists have been defecting from Hamas to four Salafist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda according to a report on the 'Palestinian Authority' Maan news website. Thousands of former Hamas members have switched their loyalties, and now belong to a Salafi terrorist group inspired by Al-Qaeda, a Gaza terrorist told the Palestinian Authority-based Maan news agency.
The terrorist, Abu Al-Hareth, is the founder of Jund Ansar Allah, a Salafi group that has clashed with Hamas and challenges its control of Gaza. There are more than 11,000 Salafists in Gaza today, Hareth claimed, 70 percent of them former members of Hamas.
The once-Hamas, now Salafi terrorists are termed Jaljalat, he said. Jund Ansar Allah is one of the four groups comprising the Jaljalat; the others are Jund Allah, A-Taweed wa-Jihad, and the Army of Islam (Jamat Jaish al-Islam).
The Army of Islam was behind the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was later turned over to Hamas. It also kidnapped British journalist Alan Johnston, who was released unharmed after several weeks in captivity.
The Jaljalat is not officially linked to Al-Qaeda but is influenced by its worldview and models itself after Al-Qaeda cells in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Hareth said. Its followers obey religious figures such as Shiekh Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, a senior figure in Al-Qaeda's Iraq branch.
The mountain air is clear as wine
And the scent of pines
Is carried on the breeze of twilight
With the sound of bells.
And in the slumber of tree and stone
Captured in her dream
The city that sits solitary
And in its midst is a wall.
Chorus:
Jerusalem of gold
And of bronze, and of light
Behold I am a violin for all your songs.
x2
How the cisterns have dried
The market-place is empty
And no one frequents the Temple Mount
In the Old City.
And in the caves in the mountain
Winds are howling
And no one descends to the Dead Sea
By way of Jericho.
Chorus...
But as I come to sing to you today,
And to adorn crowns to you (i.e. to tell your praise)
I am the smallest of the youngest of your children (i.e. the least worthy of doing so)
And of the last poet (i.e. of all the poets born).
For your name scorches the lips
Like the kiss of a seraph
If I forget thee, Jerusalem,
Which is all gold...
Chorus...
We have returned to the cisterns
To the market and to the market-place
A ram's horn calls out on the Temple Mount
In the Old City.
And in the caves in the mountain
Thousands of suns shine -
We will once again descend to the Dead Sea
By way of Jericho!
Chorus...
From Ma'an:
Is musakhan a Palestinian food?
So it appears that Musakhan originated in the Jordan Valley, which includes parts of British Mandate Palestine and parts of today's Jordan. Palestinian Arabs are now claiming the food as pretty much exclusively their own (see Wikipedia's stub entry.) |
Someone here in Israel finally understands that we could one day find ourselves facing Turkish soldiers on a battlefield. An arms purchase request from Turkey has been denied. Israel has declined a request by Turkey to purchase several different military systems, including an anti-tank guided weapon and a missile system for its navy.
The request by the Turkish government was rejected by Israel's SIBAT, the defense assistance and export organization, which is currently reviewing each order on a case-by-case basis.
Turkey said it wanted to buy the Spike non-line-of-site (NLOS) anti-tank guided weapon, the Namer heavy infantry fighting vehicle, and the Israel Aerospace Industries' (IAI) Barak 8 theater-defense missile system for its navy, according to UK-based Jane's Defence Weekly.
But there is something about the mood this year that feels darker than usual. It has a bipartisan quality to it. Both left and right are troubled, and both largely about the same things, especially the Iranian nuclear program combined with growing tensions with the Obama administration.
“There is a confluence of two very worrying events,” said Michael Freund, a rightist columnist for The Jerusalem Post in a telephone interview. “One is the Iranian threat, an existential threat. Add to that the fact that for the first time in recent memory there is a president in the White House who is not overly sensitive to the Jewish state and its interests. You put the two together and it will affect anyone’s mood, even an optimist like me.”
Haaretz, the newspaper that serves as the voice of the shrinking political left in this country, is in a truly depressed mood. Its editorial on Monday contended that Israel “is isolated globally and embroiled in a conflict with the superpower whose friendship and support are vital to its very existence.”
“It is devoid of any diplomatic plan aside from holding on to the territories and afraid of any movement,” the editorial said. “It wallows in a sense of existential threat that has only grown with time. It seizes on every instance of anti-Semitism, whether real or imagined, as a pretext for continued apathy and passivity.”
...
Israelis are profoundly worried — and profoundly divided — about their isolation. The left blames the government for a failure to withdraw from the West Bank, remove Jewish settlements and agree to share Jerusalem with the Palestinians. The right blames Palestinian and Arab intransigence and Western gutlessness, and says Jews have always been resented, so concessions will change nothing.
One thing both left and right have come to believe is that the government’s difficulties with the Obama administration are likely to prove central to the country’s fate in the coming year, especially if Iran gets closer to making a nuclear weapon.
The Jerusalem Post, the voice of the right-leaning English-speaking immigrants here, titled its Monday editorial “62, Under a U.S. Cloud” and fretted that the Obama administration “has diverged from the tone of previous administrations on the status of Jerusalem, and it has damagingly publicly questioned fundamental aspects of our alliance.” It added that Washington needed to understand that “Israel is still resented and rejected by most of the Arab world, not because of this or that policy, or this or that territorial presence, but because of the very fact of our existence here.”
... believe it or not, my old sparring partner Richard Cohen in the Washington Post. And although he got some things wrong (most notably his claim that 'most Israelis' still like Obama and his approach - that's an out and out lie), he gets some things very right that are worth pointing out. But it takes two to tango, and in this case, Obama does not dance like a star. He gives every appearance of not "getting" Israel; not appreciating its fears or its history. Israel is not half of the equation, as if both sides are right. It is a democracy with American values that has tried, over and over again, to make peace with a recalcitrant and unforgiving enemy. It is this, the music and not the words, that explains Koch and Wiesel and Lauder, not to mention the e-mailers, anonymous and otherwise, who seem to believe anything bad about Obama.
...
But the political middle, particularly the Israeli middle, is scared. It would give up East Jerusalem and the West Bank for peace [It certainly would not give up 'east' Jerusalem nor would it give up all of the 'West Bank.' CiJ] -- only it is skeptical that even those concessions would work. None of this is theoretical. It is about life and death. It is about rockets coming in from Gaza yet again. It is about Hezbollah's Scud missiles and the reasonable apprehension that Hamas would oust the moderate (and hapless) Palestinian Authority from the West Bank and turn the area into the functional equivalent of Gaza, an Islamic republic whose charter is a stew of crackpot anti-Semitism laced with death threats.
What then? Would Obama stick by Israel? Many Israelis wonder. Obama "needs to address Israelis' fears," the Israeli philosopher Carlo Strenger wrote recently in Haaretz. So far, Obama has done just the opposite, even going to Cairo to assure the Palestinians and the greater Arab world that he appreciates their plight without assuring Israelis that he appreciates theirs. His coolness toward Netanyahu, earned or not, has chilled the Israeli public and encouraged Palestinian defiance. He is on the cusp of an enormous diplomatic blunder.
On Monday, the US called in Syria's ranking diplomat in Washington, Deputy Chief of Mission Zouheir Jabbour, to "review Syria’s provocative behavior concerning the potential transfer of arms to Hizballah." "This was the fourth occasion on which these concerns have been raised to the Syrian Embassy in recent months, intended to further amplify our messages communicated to the Syrian government. Our dialogue with Syria on this issue has been frank and sustained. We expect the same in return."
The diplomatic rebuke came after reports said the U.S. believed Syria intended to transfer Scud missiles to Hezbollah, but isn't clear if the missiles were actually shipped to Lebanon.
"The United States condemns in the strongest terms the transfer of any arms, and especially ballistic missile systems such as the SCUD, from Syria to Hizballah," Duguid said. "The transfer of these arms can only have a destabilizing effect on the region, and would pose an immediate threat to both the security of Israel and the sovereignty of Lebanon."
"The risk of miscalculation that could result from this type of escalation should make Syria reverse the ill-conceived policy it has pursued in providing arms to Hizballah," he continued.
"We call for an immediate cessation of any arms transfers to Hizballah and other terrorist organizations in the region," Duguid said. "Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism is directly related to its support for terrorist groups, such as Hizbollah."
The statement stopped short of confirming the reports, which Syria has denied, but a senior U.S. official told Reuters that it was a sign that the allegations were being taken seriously, explaining, "We wouldn't have called them in if we didn't think something was going on."
כָּל עוֹד בַּלֵּבָב פְּנִימָה
נֶפֶשׁ יְהוּדִי הוֹמִיָּה
וּלְפַאֲתֵי מִזְרָח, קָדִימָה
עַיִן לְצִיּוֹן צוֹפִיָּה -
עוֹד לֹא אָבְדָה תִּקְוָתֵנוּ
הַתִּקְוָה בַּת שְׁנוֹת אַלְפַּיִם
לִהְיוֹת עַם חָפְשִׁי בְּאַרְצֵנוּ
אֶרֶץ צִיּוֹן וִירוּשָׁלַיִם
As long as deep within the heart
A Jewish soul stirs,
And forward, to the ends of the East
An eye looks out, towards Zion.
Our hope is not yet lost,
The hope of two thousand years,
To be a free people in our land
The land of Zion and Jerusalem
I wrote the original essay around 2002 and I have been modifying it since then. Here is this year's edition: Every year, the State of Israel seems to be up against yet another unsolvable crisis. Whether it is war against terrible odds, a wave of terror attacks, a new feeling of isolation as friends seem to turn hostile, or the threat of nuclear-armed enemies, there are always new challenges that she faces - sometimes simultaneously. |
Asharq Al Awsat has an op-ed by Hamad Al-Majid from which we can piece together what happened after the Saudi TV preacher, Mohammed al-Arifi, apparently changed his mind about visiting Jerusalem under pressure from Saudi clerics.
Sadly, I was not privy to the many hours of debates he mentions, so I do not know the Islamic legal issues involved in banning Muslims from visiting Islam's supposedly third-holiest site. |
"Fifteen months into his administration, Iran has faced no significant consequences for continuing with its uranium-enrichment programme, despite two deadlines set by Obama, which came and went without anything happening. Now it may be too late to stop Iran from becoming nuclear-capable.
“First, there was talk of crippling sanctions, then they [spoke of biting sanctions], and now we don’t know how tough they’re going to be. It depends on the level of support given by Russia and China—but neither is expected to back measures against Iran’s energy sector.”
Once again, the Washington Post comprehends the dangers:
"A year-long attempt at engagement failed; now the push for sanctions is proceeding at a snail's pace. Though administration officials say they have made progress in overcoming resistance from Russia and China, it appears a new UN sanctions resolution might require months more of dickering. Even then it might only be a shell intended to pave the way for ad hoc actions by the United States and European Union, which would require further diplomacy.
"And what would sanctions accomplish? Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told the Financial Times last week that `Maybe...[they] would lead to the kind of good-faith negotiations that President Obama called for 15 months ago.' Yet the notion that the hard-line Iranian clique now in power would ever negotiate in good faith is far-fetched."
It's almost May 2010, the Obama administration is almost 40 percent through its term in office, and Clinton is still talking about "good-faith negotiations"!
If the United States wants to prevent a future war with Iran, the best way to do so is through tough sanctions now--not only to discourage Iran's nuclear program but to weaken its overall military might and confidence--and a comprehensive strategic campaign of its own to counter the "regional policy objectives" of Iran and Syria.
Like all religions, the peace process has developed a dogmatic creed, with immutable first principles. Over the last two decades, I wrote them hundreds of times to my bosses in the upper echelons of the State Department and the White House; they were a catechism we all could recite by heart. First, pursuit of a comprehensive peace was a core, if not the core, U.S. interest in the region, and achieving it offered the only sure way to protect U.S. interests; second, peace could be achieved, but only through a serious negotiating process based on trading land for peace; and third, only America could help the Arabs and Israelis bring that peace to fruition.
Ungoverned, poorly governed and alternatively governed spaces. Weak civil and security institutions and the inability of certain governments in the region to exert full control over their territories and conditions that insurgent groups can exploit to create physical safe havens in which they can plan, train for, and launch operations, or pursue narco-criminal activities. We have seen these groups develop, or attempt to develop, what might be termed sub-states.
If Obama can’t set some parameters for our allies, how is he going to set some for the mullahs?
Obama’s team seems to understand that if they lose that contest of wills [with Israel], the rest of their foreign policy agenda is also threatened.
It is a vital national security interest of the United States to reduce these conflicts because whether we like it or not, we remain a dominant military superpower[.] ... And when conflicts break out, one way or another, we get pulled into them. And that ends up costing us significantly in terms of both blood and treasure.
US State Department Spokesman PJ Crowley said on Monday night that the IAEA offer to Iran to have its uranium enriched outside the country - which Iran rejected in October - is still on the table. But the possibility of implementing sanctions affecting the delivery of refined petroleum products (i.e. gasoline, or petrol as you Brits call it) to Iran is apparently OFF the table, because it would unduly impact the Iranian people.QUESTION: On Iran, Iran seems to be going out of its way to say that this nuclear swap deal might still be alive and how they’re becoming more flexible. And is it possible this deal is still alive? Is it possible that they’re offering something that anybody would accept?
MR. CROWLEY: Well, we looked at the deal offered last September as being a confidence-building step. Iran has now taken seven months and has really not been willing to respond meaningfully to that offer. I think we are still interested in taking that step, but at the heart of it, there was the proposal that Iran would ship out a significant amount of its stock of enriched fuel and there would be an exchange for a corresponding amount of fuel suitable to the Tehran research reactor.
Fundamentally, Iran has never agreed to that core element in the offer, which would be a step in restoring confidence by the international community in Iran’s nuclear intentions. I think we are still interested in pursuing that offer if Iran is interested. It would need to be updated, because over the course of the last seven months, Iran has had its centrifuges operating and one would presume has increased the amount of fuel that it has at its disposal. We are certainly not interested in having an arrangement that actually can be used to facilitate Iran’s noncompliance with its international obligations. So if Iran wants to pursue this, what it needs to do is actually indicate that formally to the IAEA. That is something that Iran has never done. We’ve heard press statements and other things, but what Iran has yet to do is come to the IAEA, sit down, and provide a meaningful response to what was put on the table last fall.
QUESTION: But just to follow up, I mean, the foreign minister of Turkey was here and he was telling reporters that the sticking point was the timing and that Iran wanted this to be simultaneous rather than have the stuff ship out, then it gets enriched and then returned, and that he was claiming that if, in fact, there was enough of this material to trade, then it would happen. And so I’m just – this is something I’ve never heard from Western diplomats. So I’m curious whether –
MR. CROWLEY: Well, I want to say – I mean the details matter. This was at one point a fairly simple proposition. Provide enriched fuel and it will be reprocessed, which will then allow you to continue operations at the TRR and not interrupt what is a important humanitarian operation for the benefit of the Iranian people. And Iran, over the course of months, has offered a number of variations, none of which address the core international concern about the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program. So if Iran is willing to have an exchange that not only meets legitimate Iranian needs, but also addresses core international concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, we can have that discussion. But unfortunately, Iran has not come forward and with any kind of meaningful follow-up to what was discussed in Geneva.
QUESTION: Also on Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called for sanctions on gasoline exports to Iran. Will the U.S. support that?
MR. CROWLEY: I’m not going to go into a play-by-play. We have ongoing discussions in New York on particulars of a sanctions resolution. Our goal is to have it be strong, meaningful, credible. But as to particular ingredients at this point, not willing to talk about them.
QUESTION: Are you aware of the reports that a senior Iranian official has said that the country is taking steps to try to decrease its imports of gasoline so as to protect itself or to mitigate the effects of any sanctions on its gas imports?
MR. CROWLEY: I’m not aware of that. I mean it is – it indicates Iran’s disregard for the welfare of its people. If it reduces gas imports, that will only increase the hardship on the Iranian people. Iran has a clear course in front of it. It can answer the questions that we have on its nuclear program, and in doing so in a constructive way, potentially end its isolation and allow for the kind of relationship and benefits of that relationship that come with the countries that are integrated into the global trading system. But the fact that they are now even pulling back even further tells us they’re not really interested in the welfare of their people. But I’m not aware of the --
QUESTION: Well, wait a minute. I mean, as you’re well aware, legislation has passed in the Congress looking to crack down on refined petroleum product imports into Iran. Does that indicate a view on the part of – in your view, that means that Chairman Berman is indifferent to the welfare of the Iranian people?
MR. CROWLEY: Well, we are in discussions about particular legislation with the Hill. I think let’s wait and see what emerges. We want to make sure, as the Secretary has said, and others, that what ultimately emerges on the sanctions front is directed at those entities within the Iranian Government that are directly related to and support their nuclear program while trying to spare hardship on the Iranian people. And in terms of whatever prospective legislation that might move forward that provides the foundation for national actions that could be taken, we want to make sure that there is enough flexibility in that legislation so that it can – we think it can be most effective in sending a strong, credible message to the Iranian people. But I’m not going to get ahead of either front. We’re working on a sanctions resolution in New York and we’re working constructively with Congress in terms of domestic legislation.
QUESTION: But P.J., what – I think what I just heard you say was that you’re taking that off the table.
MR. CROWLEY: I’m not taking – I’m not putting anything on the table or off the table.
QUESTION: Well, but if you say that if Iran reduces its imports of refined petroleum, that’s going to hurt the Iranian people, and at the same time you also say that you don’t want to hurt the Iranian people. I mean, it’s --
MR. CROWLEY: Well, and --
QUESTION: -- it’s a syllogism here.
MR. CROWLEY: Well, let me take it a step further.
QUESTION: That would mean – that would then mean that you don’t – you, the U.S., don’t want to go after refined petroleum products.
MR. CROWLEY: I’m not going to specify at this point precisely what step is going to be in a sanctions resolution and I don’t want to predict what particular actions may be incorporated in domestic legislation. Neither of those have advanced that far at this point.
QUESTION: This is not the question. The question is, what about the – does the Administration think that putting – that --
QUESTION: Taking action --
QUESTION: -- taking action against – on – in the refined petroleum sector is a good thing or is a bad thing?
MR. CROWLEY: It’s neither. What we want to see happen here is whatever does emerge, one, should be credible; two, should be aimed specifically at what we think the heart of the problem is; and three, can actually be enforceable. And there’s a great deal of debate and there are lots of potential targets, but the things that we ultimately choose and move forward, we have to make sure that we actually can have the desired impact on the Iranian Government. I’m just not going to predict precisely what steps we’re going to take at this point. We’re interested in strong, credible sanctions.
QUESTION: Right. But I’m not really asking what steps you’re going to take. I’m trying to figure out if it’s still – if the Administration believes that going after refined petroleum products would hurt the Iranian people and thus go against what --
MR. CROWLEY: Well, again --
QUESTION: -- what the Secretary and the President have been saying, that sanctions should target the elite.
MR. CROWLEY: Well, clearly the energy sector writ large is one of the areas that we’re studying. As to what particular action that would have, if we could find a way to have an impact on the IRGC, the government, the ruling elite, and – we don’t want to see sanctions that have a disproportionate impact on the Iranian people. That involves a balancing act, and that’s the kind of analysis and discussions that we’re having within the Security Council and the P-5+1 right now.
Go ahead. All right. Sure.
QUESTION: Could I have just one more follow up question, please? My impression was that the Administration thought it was useful that the Congress was proceeding with this kind of legislation, which I realize has not yet been conferenced, and therefore, you don’t actually have, you know, a passed bill from both houses, and that it was useful to have that somewhere as a potential tool to be used against Iran. And I’d like to follow up on Matt’s question on whether you are effectively suggesting that it’s not on the table anymore.
MR. CROWLEY: What’s not on the table anymore?
QUESTION: The possibility of reducing Iran’s refined petroleum off the table --
MR. CROWLEY: I haven’t taken anything off the table. I haven’t put anything on the table. We are in the midst of this discussion. To your earlier point, clearly, whatever sanctions resolution emerges from the UN can be supplemented by national actions. And we are working with the Congress on what the particulars of that legislation might be. We want to have the ability to incorporate sufficient flexibility into what legislation emerges so that we can have the impact that we want, not only on Iran but also to make sure that we have concerted international action as we apply pressure on Iran.
QUESTION: Same issue.
MR. CROWLEY: Yes.
QUESTION: Mr. Erdogan said that he’s not going to support the sanctions at the Security Council. Any comment on this?
MR. CROWLEY: He – pardon me?
QUESTION: He’s not going to support sanctions against Iran at the Security Council. What is your comment?
MR. CROWLEY: Well, I mean, we will continue the same kind of close consultation that we had with Turkey and other key countries as we did last week. And we expect that at the end of the day, we’ll get the support that we need to pass an important resolution.
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