Love of the Land: The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

Barry Rubin
The Rubin Report
14 February '10

The Department of Defense has just released its new Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2010. What does it say about the Middle East? Far less than you’d expect in terms of space but still some extremely important points about what might involve the United States in future wars there.

Aside from some scattered references on the need for more civilian nation-building experts, funding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and energy conservation efforts (that's an area, no doubt, where money could be saved), that region takes up less than two pages, about two percent, of the 97-page report.

In comparison, about one-quarter of the four-page note from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, attached to the report, spends 25 percent on the region and sounds far more sensible.

I read this gap as suggesting that the uniformed military (which prepared the admiral's note) is concerned about Iran and terrorist groups but that the text’s main body, by the secretary of defense and designed to please the White House, puts more emphasis on climate change, green energy, and the use of the military as a community-organizing type force to make civilians in places like Afghanistan more friendly to the United States.

But there are significant points of interests in both sections. Let’s start with the report itself which basically makes three points.

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Love of the Land: The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

Love of the Land: Defending Lebanon Or Israel?

Defending Lebanon Or Israel?

David Schenker
Forbes.com
07 January '10

In December, the Lebanese Web site Qifa Nabki featured a satirical "news story" discussing U.S. arms transfers to Lebanon. According to the article, the U.S. gifted "cutting edge" military material to the Lebanese Armed Forces that included camouflage-print bandages and, more menacingly, the USS Tadpole, a decommissioned World War II vessel that "until recently had been used for target practice by U.S. Navy gunners in Norfolk."

Humor aside, the article highlights a serious and increasingly prevalent critique of U.S. military assistance. Since the 2005 Cedar Revolution and the balloting that brought to power the only pro-West democratically elected government in the Arab world, Lebanon received nearly $500 million worth of military material from Washington. Yet many in Lebanon are concerned that U.S. weaponry enables the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to defend the state neither from Israel nor from local al-Qaida affiliates.

This line of thinking has some prominent and diverse proponents. In 2008, leader of the Shiite militia Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah complained that U.S. support for Israel prevented the transfer of sophisticated weapons to the LAF; in 2009, Minister of Defense Elias Murr implicitly criticized Washington for not providing fighter jets. "If we had aircraft," during the 2007 fighting against Islamist militants, "we would not have lost one martyr from the army," he said. This past December, from the White House podium, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman asked for increases in U.S. military assistance to finally enable the LAF to "defend Lebanon from enemy attacks and confront terrorism."

U.S. officials deny Lebanon is being given short shrift, but the perception articulated by Nasrallah and Sulieman is partly correct and stems from a fundamental Lebanese misreading of U.S. policy priorities: While U.S. taxpayer generosity, currently slated at over $100 million this year, will enhance LAF domestic counterterrorism capabilities, it is not meant--and will never be meant--to help Lebanon deter or defend against Israeli strikes.

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Love of the Land: Defending Lebanon Or Israel?

Love of the Land: Barack and Hassan concur, the US is waning

Barack and Hassan concur, the US is waning

Michael Young
NowLebanon.com
04 December 09

Barack Obama and Hassan Nasrallah agree the US is on the decline. (NOW Lebanon)

It’s not often that Barack Obama and Hassan Nasrallah agree, but both made important speeches this week, and both appeared to concur that American power was on the decline.

Of course Obama didn’t quite put it that way. Instead, he merely implied the growing sense of American difficulty, the fact that the United States was “passing through a time of great trial,” which he made more palatable by sandwiching it between words of encouragement and resolve. His speech to West Point cadets on Tuesday was an effort to explain to his countrymen why it was important to send an additional 30,000 or so troops to Afghanistan. But what remained, despite the soaring rhetoric toward the end of the president’s speech, was the terrible burden all this placed on an America much gloomier than it was decades ago.

Obama chose to highlight domestic American rifts, when he remarked that “years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort.” He drew attention to America’s economic travails by noting that “[i]n the wake of an economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the bills. Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children. Meanwhile, competition within the global economy has grown more fierce. So we can’t simply afford to ignore the price of these wars.”

As for the American enterprise in Afghanistan, the centerpiece of Obama’s speech was that he would actually start withdrawing American soldiers by July 2011. No, the United States would not bankroll an Afghan nation-building project, because (and here the president sounded more like a shopkeeper than a purveyor of global domination) such a scheme “sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost.”

Obama has always prided himself on being a realistic assessor of American limitations. However, listening to Hassan Nasrallah gloat at the weakness of the United States, you had to wonder if the US president misses the point. Power and success are in many respects fruits of perception. Just look at Nasrallah himself, who persuaded many a fool that the hecatomb of 2006 was a divine victory for Lebanon. Modesty in the exercise of foreign policy is a bad idea, particularly for the leader of the world’s most powerful country, whose destabilization, whether we like it or not, only destabilizes the global political and economic order

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Love of the Land: Barack and Hassan concur, the US is waning

Love of the Land: Understanding the Middle East: Me, You, The Scorpion, The Frog, and Barack Obama

Understanding the Middle East: Me, You, The Scorpion, The Frog, and Barack Obama

Barry Rubin

The Rubin Report

30 September 09

There’s a little fable that’s often used to explain the Middle East. You’ve probably heard it but for those of you who haven’t I’ll tell it briefly and then analyze it in detail to explain better about this most perplexing yet highly important part of the world.

First, the story:

One day, a frog and a scorpion are standing by the river bank. They both want to get across to the other side. The frog can swim; the scorpion can’t. So the scorpion asks the frog to carry him across.

“But,” protests the frog, “if I let you on my back you’ll sting me!”

“Don’t worry,” answers the scorpion. “Why would I do that since if I sting you I’ll drown?”

This makes sense to the frog. He lets the scorpion climb aboard, jumps into the water, and starts swimming. In the middle of the river the scorpion does indeed sting the frog, paralyzing him. And as they sink down into the depth, the frog speaks his last words: “Why did you do that! Now we’ll both die!”

The scorpion shrugs his carapace and says, “Oh well, after all this is the Middle East. Glub. Glub. Gl….”

What I’ve never liked about this story is that the scorpion’s action seems to be irrational and is clearly suicidal. But what if the scorpion has good reason for acting as he does and isn’t just committing suicide? I’ll come back to this point in a few sentences.

Before that, though, let’s consider some scenarios.

Scenario One: The nice, pragmatic scorpion.

Assume a rational Western policymaker who thinks that everyone in the world thinks and acts pretty much the same because they have the same goals. In his other experiences handling domestic issues or with friendly foreign powers, he knows that if you make concessions to reach a deal, the other side will do so as well. Everybody seeks to arrive at a mutually beneficial solution.

Or, in Obama’s words: "I'm not interested in victory. I'm interested in resolving the problem."
So in that sense, the frog is dealing with a ”scorpion” he can trust—say Canada, Britain, Israel, Colombia, Botswana, or Japan.

Scorpion and frog want to get to other side, scorpion and frog cooperate (the scorpion will even put his claws into the water and paddle since he’s interested in success), problem solved.
Scenario Two: The nasty but rational scorpion.

But the policymaker isn’t so naïve. He knows there are some real differences, but he chalks these down to misunderstandings. Perhaps previous frogs haven’t treated the scorpion properly. If he apologizes and shows he’s a different kind of frog than the scorpion won’t sting him but will be one over by his charm and willingness to compromise.

So he makes a speech: Scorpions have a long and proud history. Frogs have often been arrogant in their treatment of scorpions. Let’s be friends.

You don’t have to assume blindly good will on the scorpion’s side. You will give more than the scorpion in terms of concessions but in the end the scorpion will give something because it has an interest in making the arrangement work.

So the frog jumps in with the scorpion on its back, the scorpion lets the frog do all the work, demands refreshments, and doesn’t say “thank you” at the end. But at least it doesn’t sting the scorpion. The other bank is reached; peace and quiet is achieved.

Perhaps this can be said to characterize places like Egypt, Pakistan, Russia and Saudi Arabia. They put a higher value on getting along but will give the absolute minimum in exchange no matter how much they get from America and Europe.

Scenario Three: The Radical Frog-Hating Scorpion That Wants to Rule the Habitat

Here is where our problem is today. Briefly, the radical scorpions of the world—which include in alphabetical order: Cuba, Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, North Korea, the Palestinian Authority, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, and some others that could be mentioned don’t want to compromise and be friends.

Unlike the pragmatic scorpion, they won’t give a lot; unlike the nasty but pragmatic scorpion, they won’t give a little. They will take everything they can get and give nothing in return.

Does this make them irrational? No, because if they believe they can win by this strategy then it is quite a rational one to follow. And if you give them reason to think you are weak, stupid, naïve, or sympathetic enough to give them everything in exchange for nothing then you have persuaded them of that fact.

But now I have to redeem my promise about explaining why the scorpion isn’t committing suicide. In effect, answering this question has been one of my main efforts for 30 years now.
Briefly, the scorpion has good reason to think he is more likely to die if he doesn’t sting the frog.

Let’s put it this way: the scorpion stings the frog, the frog dies but becomes like a boat that the scorpion can use to stay afloat and to paddle wherever he wants. By using his stinger, the scorpion improves his situation.

Or to elucidate:
--Radical regimes use anti-American, anti-Western, and anti-Israel doctrine and conflicts as rationales for their many failures. Support your dictator; don’t complain about low living standards or lack of freedom because I’m saving you from the imperialist-Zionist-infidel plots against you.

--By stinging, radical regimes show how tough they are, thus pleasing and intimidating their own people and outdoing their rivals at home and competitors abroad.

--Not stinging is more dangerous than stinging. After all, if radical dictators had good relations with the Western democracies they could more easily influence the dictatorship’s society by opening up its economy and society more. The dictator will forego benefits in order to sustain his rule.

--They believe in their ideology. The scorpion must sting or he isn’t a scorpion. Iran’s leaders really believe what they say, as did Saddam Hussein or Yasir Arafat or Fidel Castro. Down with the frogs! Long live the scorpions!

--Finally, these regimes are ambitious. They want to rule their region and know that the West truly is an adversary. It isn’t a friend to be hugged or a limited rival with which you make a deal after tough bargaining, but rather an enemy to be defeated.

So it doesn’t matter whether Obama wears an “I love Scorpions” T-shirt, or speaks at the Scorpions’ Club (I mean the UN), or apologizes for previous frogs croaking too loud.

To the scorpions of the world, though, he's making America look like a plate of frogs’ legs.

Love of the Land: Understanding the Middle East: Me, You, The Scorpion, The Frog, and Barack Obama

Love of the Land: Land for Peace (1991)

Land for Peace (1991)

Click on this "full page" cartoon to open a larger, more readable version.

Love of the Land: Land for Peace (1991)

Love of the Land: The Master Plan

The Master Plan

Ted Belman

Israpundit

25 September 09

Conventional wisdom tells us that western Europe and America are pressing Israel for concessions in order to placate the Arabs. In my recent Israel can and must act in her own best interests. I wrote

Shortly thereafter (1938) Ben Gurion made his case to Malcolm MacDonald, the Colonial Secretary, who suggested, that the Arab and Muslim world could rise up and threaten the British Empire and therefore to prevent this, Britain had to make sure that the Jews in Palestine remained a minority.

But Menachem Begin had a different take which he set out in his 1948 book, The Revolt. This book is Begin’s reflection on the Jewish revolt against the British, which he lead. He likened this revolt to the revolt by the Maccabees against the Greeks in Second Century BCE and by the Jews against the Romans in the First Century CE and by Bar Kochba against the Romans in the Second Century. But he also foresaw a Maccabee-like victory rather than Bar Kochba-like defeat.

Begin advises that Britain had long wanted Palestine for itself well before the Balfour Declaration. When Herzl was still alive, Lord Cromer of Britain, said “When the Ottoman Empire crumbles, as sooner or later it will, we (Britain) must have Palestine.”

Britain generally had a policy of cloaking their goals with a lofty ideals, such, as in this case, giving the Jews a national home. So in furtherance of her “Master Plan” in the late Nineteenth Century she kept complaining of Turkey’s treatment of the Jews.

The best way for Britain to gain control of Palestine was to act ostensibly on behalf of the Jews. This was born out in the Balfour Declaration in 1917 in which the British Government backed the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, mind you, not Palestine as the Jewish homeland. Britain would have Palestine and the Jews would have a homeland in it. Britain had no fears that too many Jews would want to come. Afterall they were not pioneers and certainly not fighters. The blueprint evolved: the Arabs when required would “revolt” against the “foreign invasion”; the Jews would be forever a threatened minority. Thus Britain would be called upon to maintain the peace. Unfortunately for them, as Robbie Burns wrote, “The best laid schemes o’ mice an’ men gang aft agley,”

Throughout the twenties and thirties the British encouraged the Arabs to “revolt”. But because of the Holocaust, the Jews kept coming. Britain in order not to lose control had to limit their entry.

Thus the Peel Commission in the late thirties recommended in a White Paper that only 75,000 Jews more, be allowed into Palestine by 1944. The Jews had to be kept to a minority at all costs. In fact Hitler’s Final Solution played into their hands as there would be less Jews left to emigrate to Eretz Yisroel. The British spin machine went into overdrive and overtime. “Afterall, couldn’t let German spies into Palestine, could we.”

During this period, the Jewish leadership followed a policy of self-restraint known as “havlagah”. But Vladiimir Jabatinsky, the founder of Betar, would have none of it. He preached resistance and revolt until his death in 1940. Out of his teachings was born the Jewish underground army The Irgun and another underground group, Fighters for Freedom of Israel which later became known as the The Stern Gang after their slain leader.

In early 1944 The Irgun declared war on Britain demanding an “immediate transfer of power to a Provisional Hebrew Government” and announced a call to arms for all Jews. The British reaction amounted to, “What chutzpah!”.

Shortly thereafter, the revolt brought about the neutralization of the Arab factor. They ceased to do the British bidding. Only after the British announced that they were leaving Palestine and the Arab countries declared war on the future Jewish state did the local Arabs return to their attacks.

Britain expected that the Stern Gang and The Irgun would fight them and maybe even the Haganah would join in. They were confident they would crush them just as the Romans crushed the Jews 2000 years earlier. They would force the Jewish leaders to collaborate and hunt them down just like the Nazis did. They planned to get the support of the US for their plan arguing it was necessary to prevent Russian expansion into the Middle East. All this was set out in a document marked “Secret” prepared by the British “Cairo Bureau” which came into the hands of The Irgun.

The revolt depended on the willingness of the Jews to fight to the death. And they were not found wanting. According to Begin, but for the revolt, the state of Israel would not have come into existence. According to Ben Gurion, who usually opposed Begin, but for him the state would not have survived the war waged by the Arab counties after the state was declared. They were both right. Begin had forced Britain out and Ben Gurion had prepared Israel to defend itself by building an army and keeping the country unified.

A month before the State of Israel was declared, The Irgun and others, attacked Deir Yassin, an Arab village. There is much dispute on the numbers killed. Wikipedia reports

The massacre became a pivotal event in the Arab-Israeli conflict for its demographic and military consequences. The narrative was embellished and used by various parties to attack each other—by the Palestinians to besmirch Palestine’s Jewish community, and later Israel; by the Haganah to play down their own role in the affair; and later by the Israeli Left to accuse the Irgun and Lehi of violating the Jewish principle of “tohar hanashek” (purity of arms), thus blackening Israel’s name around the world.[6] News of the killings sparked terror within the Palestinian community, encouraging them to flee from their towns and villages in the face of Jewish troop advances, and it strengthened the resolve of Arab governments to intervene, which they did five weeks later by invading Palestine, following Israel’s declaration of independence on May 14.[2]

Begin advises that it was a very important military target and that the fighting was fierce. He adds;

Yet the hostile propaganda disseminated throughout the world, deliberately ignored the fact that the civilian population of Deir Yassin was actually given a warning by us before the battle began. One of our tenders carrying a loud speaker was stationed at the entrance of the village and it exhorted, in Arabic, all woman and children and aged to leave their houses and to take shelter on the slope of the hill. By giving this humane warning our fighters threw away the element of complete surprise, and thus increased their own risk in the ensuing battle.

Many, though not all, heeded the advice.

Our men were compelled to fight for every house; to overcome the enemy they used large numbers of hand grenades. The civilians who had disregarded our warnings, suffered inevitable casualties.
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Love of the Land: The Master Plan

Love of the Land: Crisis in Israel-Europe Relations?

Crisis in Israel-Europe Relations?

Barry Rubin

The Rubin Report

06 September 09

The AP reporter’s voice shows she’s very young and her choice of words show she’s very inexperienced. “What do you think,” she asks me, “about the crisis between Europe and Israel.”

Crisis? Well most immediately this is the kind of “crisis” you want, over a very narrow issue—construction on settlements—which can be easily resolved. The Europeans are supporting U.S. efforts, U.S. policy has become a lot more positive on this issue in recent weeks, and some resolution will soon be found.

The resolution will soon be found because President Barack Obama needs one. In the pattern so often repeated by this administration he has put himself in a corner. If he is going to look “good” at the UN session, feel he has a basis for raising sanctions on Iran, and broker an Israel-Palestinian Authority meeting he has to solve this issue of construction. Right now, he needs a resolution far more than does Israel.

This administration has a genius for putting itself into the weaker position on any international issue.

It’s funny, though, how European governments always find some reason to be annoyed and threatening pressure on Israel but never ever on the Palestinians. Have you noticed that? Massive corruption, incitement to violence, letting terrorists go or never arresting them in the first place, violating commitments, none of its seems to matter.

So European governments have an interesting choice: Is their main goal to be “pro-Palestinian” (if condemning a people to decades of conflict by supporting their intransigence can be called supporting them) or seeking Israel-Palestinian peace?

The answer in most cases—all countries are different—is the former. Being “pro-Palestinian” makes them look “progressive” and “humanitarian,” supposedly scores points in the Arab and Muslim world, theoretically promotes trade and investment with the aforementioned places, and so on.

Also, if European leaders believe—some do, some don’t—that there isn’t going to be peace (even if they privately blame the Palestinians) this policy can seem to make sense for their interests.
Israel’s problem is not predominantly with the European masses or even, to a lesser extent, with governments, but with the European intellectual elites. After all, take the four main countries of Europe: France, Germany, Italy, and the UK.

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Love of the Land: Crisis in Israel-Europe Relations?

Love of the Land: A Day in the Life of the Middle East

A Day in the Life of the Middle East

Barry Rubin
The Rubin Report
1 September 09

I’ve never been so discouraged, a courageous Arab intellectual writes to me. Understandably so. There are three fronts really in the battle of the Middle East, and none of them are going so well.

What are these three fronts? First and most important are the actions of the countries, leaders, and forces in the region themselves.

Second, is the understanding of these actions and developments as conveyed to the minds of participants and observers both in the region and internationally. Here, the role of the media, academia, and other conveyer belts of information are critical in shaping policymaker and public opinion.

Third, there is the response of governments outside the region, which means primarily in the West.

If we take one day in the region, we can see the interaction of these factors. Briefly, dangerous and outrageous developments happen in the region; they are misinterpreted—important things ignored, marginal ones obsessed about; enemies made to seem moderate and threats defused only in theory. Western responses are also misconceived and inadequate.

Eventually the pressure builds up to the point of crises. But what’s worse, an outbreak of crisis or a slow erosion of interests and a deepening of tyranny? Clearly, from the Western government standpoint, the latter is preferable. With no violent major crisis in play it is easy to do little or nothing, to avoid risks, to portray policies as successful.

In this framework, the region’s countries and societies have three main states of existence when it comes to degree of freedom and quality of life for the people: to advance (which only happens in rare places), to stand still (which is a prevalent condition), or actually to move backward.

I will leave it to you to categorize different places in this regard. Right now, I think Iran, Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Turkey are moving backward. Generally, I’ll leave the categorization to you.

Ironically, the one country that is clearly moving forward is Israel. It is stable within and relatively secure (whatever prospects for the future may seem worrisome). The economy is doing well despite the international slump, and feelings of well-being are remarkably high. This is a point that should always be kept in mind. And yes this does relate to having a democratic system and a largely free enterprise but regulated economy.

But enough background, let’s go to the headlines:

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Love of the Land: A Day in the Life of the Middle East

Originally posted by The Rubin Report (http://rubinreports.blogspot.com)