Simhat Torah
Love of the Land: Simhat Torah
Simon bar Kokhba, the commander of the revolt, was acclaimed the Messiah, the king prophesied to restore Israel. The revolt established a Jewish state for over two years, but a massive Roman army finally crushed it. The Romans then barred Jews from Jerusalem.
Bar Kokhba's tetradrachm. Obverse: the Temple facade with the rising star. Reverse: A lulav, the text reads: "Year one of the redemption of Israel"
A cluster of papyrus containing Bar Kokhba's orders found in the Judean desert by modern Israeli archeologist Yigael Yadin.
Expulsion of the Jews from Jerusalem during the reign of Hadrian. A miniature from the 15th-century manuscript "Histoire des Empereurs".


Soviet snipers were a part of the military planning and tactics long before the outbreak of the war. The Soviet experience from the first world war highlighted the importance of incorporating sharpshooters or snipers into their battle plans. Marksmanship and sharp shooting skills were emphasized in both the military and in official state run youth and recreation programs. When the rifle 1891/30 was developed it was also decided to develope a sniper variant. Up until that time the official tactics for small units largely ignored the importance of utilizing snipers equipped with special purpose rifles. The Soviet Army did utilize sharpshooters but they were equipped with either standard infantry rifles or sometimes civilian hunting rifles. However, the shooting skills of the Finns during the Winter War drove home a bloody point that could not be ignored by the Soviet high command. Soviet field commanders feared the presence of Finn sharpshooters and snipers and recognized that these snipers were able to disrupt the communications and flow of battle and served to demoralize front line troops. It was the experience of these commanders that shaped sniper tactics in the Soviet Army.
The initial plan was to equip every platoon sized unit with a sniper rifle to be used their best shooter. However, with only about 50,000 rifles in the inventory, the Army was hard pressed to man every platoon with snipers as the Army expanded. An unfortunate decision by the command led to a further diluting of sniper effectiveness through the introduction of the SVT sniper rifle. This rifle suffered from a series of problems when used in the field as a result of its design as a semi-automatic rifle. For one thing, it did not respond well to extremely cold environments and suffered problems with the lubricant gumming up its working parts. Another problem was in cold shot accuracy where the first round fired would tend to wander significantly wide of the point of aim. Many snipers complained that the rifle was unwieldy and mechanically loud to operate.
By the time the Soviets were fully engaged with German forces a rush program was initiated to get the 91/30 Sniper fully into production. In 1942 production figures totaled in the 90,000 range. As more of these rifles reached units, existing tactics were put into practice and refined. To examine the tactics of the Soviet Sniper, it is necessary to review the philosophy for using snipers in the first place. Under the Soviet system, snipers were fielded in teams of two with a sniper and an observer. Both team members were qualified snipers and changed roles after each kill. The sniper was to provide both scouting duties as well as point and indirect fire to disrupt enemy activities and communications. The observer assisted in spotting potential targets, provided security and recorded and confirmed kills. Each sniper carried a "kill book" where they recorded time, date, location and details of each kill or engagement. This book was also used to record detailed information on German troop concentrations and movements. As mentioned before, the sniper was assigned at platoon level and reported directly to the platoon leader. Most sniper teams worked autonomously and ranged ahead of advancing formations or across an assigned frontal sector.
The Great Patriotic War produced some changes to the way sniper teams operated. The advancing German Army moved rapidly and unpredictably, using flanking maneuvers to surround retreating or static forces and cut them off. Soviet commanders reacted to this by concentrating their sniper teams on their flanks out away from the main body to impede Nazi advances on the flanks. This required platoon teams to gather in larger groups that worked together to provide advance warning to the major command elements of German movement as well as to concentrate their firepower.
Contrary to popular belief, most sniper engagements took place at distances under 400 meters in rural settings and under 100 meters in urban settings. Sniper teams would move into the "no-man's land" separating the two sides under the cover of darkness and set up blinds or observation posts that were cleverly concealed. In the case of observing and harassing advancing troops, the sniper teams would blend in with straggling refugees that were largely ignored by the German forces and move ahead of the German advance, recording troop strength and composition. In the evening, they would slip under cover and close on German night defensive positions and conduct harassing fire at first light and then move rapidly out of the area. This was related to me by my father-in-law who served on the eastern front in the German Army.


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