The Islamic Jihad-linked Palestine Today reproduces and translates a paper from the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies on how Israel should react to Palestinian Arab "resistance."
The paper, by Michael Milstein, is titled "The Challenge of al-Muqawama (Resistance) to Israel."
While it is not surprising that Islamic Jihad or other terror groups would be keenly interested in any Israeli military analysis, I have never seen such an article in Arabic before.
For example, one section which reads like a playbook for the Gaza operation reads: The preferred policy (or more precisely, the lesser of the evils) is that
of a relatively extensive military campaign once every few years. The
scope of the campaign and its frequency are dictated by the intensity
of the threat posed by the elements of resistance, the nature of the
battlefield, and the regional and international circumstances prevailing
at the time. However, in every scenario it is crucial that Israel’s military
response be disproportionate, so as to demonstrate to the enemy the
heavy cost inherent in every attempt to undermine the security of Israel’s
regional sphere. Such a step must not last long, but must focus on causing
extensive damage to the leaderships of the resistance organizations (both
at the military and the political echelons) and the various infrastructures
under their auspices (including civilian). Such a step may well be
accompanied by extensive damage to the Israeli home front, and also
by extensive damage – unintentional, of course – to the enemy’s civilian
sphere. Therefore, Israel’s leadership must conduct a public diplomacy
campaign on two fronts: one at home, where it will have to clarify the cost
Israel’s citizens must pay for confrontations with resistance elements
and stress that one must not expect a quick victory or decision by the IDF;
and the other for international audiences, where it will be necessary to
explain the complexity of tackling resistance elements and describe the
constraints the enemy imposes on Israel, first and foremost the necessity
to fight in the densely populated civilian sphere.
None of the steps described is likely to cause the complete surrender
of resistance elements or convince them to enter into direct talks with
Israel or recognize its existence (at least not in the foreseeable future).
However, military moves, particularly extensive ones accompanied by
serious damage to the resistance elements, are likely to create long term
deterrence with regard to undertaking violent operations against Israel.
Indeed, resistance elements developing sovereign or semi-sovereign
status have also developed a sensitivity and vulnerability they lacked
in the past. The assets of a governing entity, such as those of Hamas
in the Gaza Strip, give Israel more targets to damage and spell out loss
considerations to the resistance organizations, especially at a time when
governmental stability hangs in the balance.
How closely the IDF follows the advice (or how often it independently arrives at the same ideas) is an open question. It is still interesting to see that the Arabs are closely following Israeli military thinking.
I assume the IDF is doing the same against the terrorist organizations. |
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