Monday, 10 May 2010

Elder of Ziyon: The influence of Judaism on modern European political thought

The influence of Judaism on modern European political thought

Yoram Hazony has a fascinating post about a new book by Eric Nelson, called
The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European Political Thought.

Hazony writes:

Almost everyone who’s ever written on the birth of modernity has recognized that the 17th century was the crucible in which modern ideas, science and political institutions were born. Less familiar is the fact that this same period was also a time of spectacularly intense Christian interest in the teachings of the Hebrew Scriptures, the Talmud, and later rabbinic sources. This is not just a matter of a few collectors of linguistic relics studying Hebrew. The effort to retrieve Jewish learning and traditions was a massive undertaking whose effects were felt, directly or indirectly, across the European intellectual landscape. An indication of what was happening is the astonishing effort at translation of rabbinic sources into languages accessible to Christians—an effort that, by century’s end, had led to the translation and publication in Latin of 15 tractates of the Talmud, the Mishnah, a range of Midrashic compilations, the Targums of Onkelos and Yonatan, rabbinic works by Maimonides, Yehuda Halevi, Ibn Ezra, David Kimchi (Radak), Levi ben Gershon (Ralbag), Abravanel and others, as well as the Zohar and other kabbalistic texts. An index of Christian works interpreting this ocean of newly translated Jewish sources, compiled in 1694, includes an amazing 1,300 titles, many of them published time and again all over Europe.

In the spring of 2001, my Shalem colleague Ofir Haivry returned to Jerusalem from a trip to London carrying a crate filled with photocopies of the huge folio pages of John Selden’s masterpiece, The Law of Nature and the Nations According to the Learning of the Hebrews (1640). I had encountered the political Hebraism of the 17th century before in pioneering works by the political theorists Michael Walzer and Daniel Elazar, and I had received letters from Ofir on the subject.[3] But nothing I had read really prepared me for what was in that crate. Selden’s The Law of Nature is 700 pages long. It is a work of the scope of Hobbes’ Leviathan, published eleven years before Hobbes’ work. The entire text is in Latin. And yet on nearly every page one finds—Hebrew. Not just a word or a phrase here and there, as in Locke. But entire paragraphs of biblical and Talmudic Hebrew, as well as Aramaic, followed by discussion that refers to famous medieval rabbinic figures constantly and at length. What was this all about? Who could possibly have written such a work? Who could possibly have been interested in reading it?

As I learned about it, my surprise only grew deeper. John Selden was in his day perhaps the most important political and legal theorist in England (“the law-book of the judges of England,” as the poet Ben Jonson called him). Yet Selden chose to publish most of his ideas in the form of a series of massive commentaries on the social and political ideas of the Talmud. Selden’s works sought to retrieve the political thought of the rabbis and apply them to pressing questions of early modern political theory such as the concept of a national tradition, the proper relationship between church and state, the theory of marriage contracts (especially pressing as Protestants broke with Catholic traditions on the subject), and much else. In particular, Selden’s The Law of Nature seeks to develop a political theory capable of undergirding the ongoing refusal of the English to abandon their national system of law, the Common Law, in favor of the putatively universal Roman Law being aggressively promoted on the Continent. Relying on the Jewish legal system as a prototype, and on rabbinic political theories as a crucial ally, Selden seeks to show that only a world constituted of independent nations, each with its own particular legal tradition, can be the basis for mankind’s search for that which is ultimately just and true. The rabbinic “Laws of the Sons of Noah,” which serve as the Talmudic version of a universal natural law, are taken by Selden to be the best approximation of a natural law available to mankind.

Hazony wrote about this at length in an article in Azure a couple of years ago. And he highly recommends the book by Nelson.



Elder of Ziyon: The influence of Judaism on modern European political thought

Elder of Ziyon: Israel joins the OECD

Israel joins the OECD

From YNet:

The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) accepted Israel into its ranks Monday during a vote, as its 32nd member.

Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz, currently in China, received an unofficial message from the organization, and an official statement will be made in Paris in the afternoon. The official invitation is to be handed to Steinitz at a convention of the OECD's finance ministers in Paris at the end of the month. Slovenia and Estonia were also accepted as members Monday.

"The significance of this is huge and that is why, as a matter of fact, I decided to treat it as a top priority 10 months ago and enter into a special program to introduce Israel into the organization at a peak time," Steinitz told Israel Radio.


"It is the most respectable international club a small state like Israel can be accepted into," he added. "From what we know about other states, in the years following the acceptance there is a rise of billions of dollars in foreign investments in the state accepted."

Steinitz said Israel was being accepted into the club responsible for dictating the world's financial guidelines. "There is also a political gain here. We are receiving a stamp of approval… that Israel belongs to the world's most advanced and developed countries, and not just financially – in civil rights, a clean and independent court system, regulations, equality, and steps to eliminate discrimination," he said.

Some people were not happy about this. From Daylife:

Pro-Palestinian activists hold a banner reading 'Israel Criminal: OEDC accomplice' after entering the loby of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OEDC) headquarters on May 6, 2010 in Paris to protest against the agreement signed earlier this year regarding Israel, on track to join the organisation.

The caption shows yet again that the press has a problem distinguishing between "pro-Palestinian" (which is a vanishingly small movement) and "anti-Israel" (which is quite large.)

I could not find a single banner from this group in Daylife that even mentions "Palestine." No, the protesters' obsession is not to create a Palestinian Arab state but to destroy a Jewish state.

Which, incidentally, has been the position of the Palestinian Arab leaders themselves since they first appeared on the scene in the ancient times of the 1920s.



Elder of Ziyon: Israel joins the OECD

Elder of Ziyon: Another "storming" of a Jewish holy place

Another "storming" of a Jewish holy place

From Firas Press:

About 500 settlers stormed 'Joseph's Tomb' at dawn today, in the eastern region of the city of Nablus in the northern West Bank.

Witnesses said that large numbers of vehicles carried the settlers during a raid of the city, guarding a large force of the army of occupation.

There are periodic incursions of settlers to the site, to perform prayers and religious rituals in 'Joseph's Tomb', guarded by the Israeli army.

And why do Jews have to be guarded by the Israeli Army to visit a place that is supposed to be open to Jews under existing agreements with the PA?

It is a real mystery.




Elder of Ziyon: Another "storming" of a Jewish holy place

Elder of Ziyon: "Rabbis storm Al Aqsa"

"Rabbis storm Al Aqsa"

Palestine Today again hyperventilates over Jews peacefully visiting their holiest site on the Temple Mount.

45 settlers and high-level rabbis of Israel stormed the Al Aqsa Mosque on Monday morning, in a provocative plan, protected by large numbers of Israeli police in the region.

Our correspondent says that the settlers in Jerusalem are [violating] the mosque on the occasion of the anniversary of the so-called unification of Jerusalem.

They again illustrate the story with a photo of Jews rampaging through Al Aqsa, terrifying Muslim worshippers and destroying everything in their path.

It makes your blood boil, doesn't it?


Elder of Ziyon: "Rabbis storm Al Aqsa"

Elder of Ziyon: Sheikh Jarrah in 1948

Sheikh Jarrah in 1948

The Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood has been in the news a lot lately. What is hardly mentioned is that it was the epicenter of Arab attacks on Jews in 1948.

In fact, that area - where Jews lived as well as Muslims before 1948, in quarters known as Shimon HaTzadik and Nahalat Shimon - was the scene of many Arab attacks in 1948 on their neighboring Jews.

Arabs from Sheikh Jarrah started attacking their Jewish neighbors almost immediately after the UN Partition vote. This article is from January 12, 1948, where it mentions that attacks had been coming from that area for three weeks already:



For the rest of the month, the Palestine Post had almost daily articles about attacks originating from Sheikh Jarrah at neighboring Jews:
In February, the attacks continued, including attacks on convoys headed towards Hadassah Hospital:
In March, attacks on innocents escalated. This is from March 28th, and the death of a Jew was barely mentioned:
While the British promised to protect hospital convoys, they did not take their jobs too seriously as they were planning to evacuate in May. In mid-April came the climax of Arab attacks on Jews, one that should have been foreseen given all the previous attacks:


Nearly 80 medical workers and others were slaughtered - and the neighborhood that spilled so much blood was known quite well:


It is interesting that this history of that neighborhood is not mentioned as today's media wants to paint the Jews as the aggressors - by savagely purchasing houses with Zionist cash and violently using a respected legal system to evict people who haven't paid their rent for years.

This history of real violence and aggression from the Arabs of Sheikh Jarrah just doesn't fit that narrative.

UPDATE: To make things clear, Sheikh Jarrah was both a sub-district and a neighborhood ("quarter") of Jerusalem. The sub-district included the quarters of Sheikh Jarrah, Hayy el-Huseyni, Wadi el-Joz and Bab ez-Zahira, and the Jewish quarters of Shim'on Hatsadik and Nahalat Shim'on.

The part that attacked the Jews was the Sheikh Jarrah quarter. The part that is now called "Sheikh Jarrah" that is in the news is actually the Jewish quarter of Shimon HaTzaddik.

Elder of Ziyon: Sheikh Jarrah in 1948

Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: Israel Joins the OECD

Israel Joins the OECD

The 31 members of the OECD today voted today to accept Estonia, Israel and Slovenia, which will thus become country members 32, 33 and 34. (The list of the other 31 is here).

The Economist often characterizes the OECD as "a rich-country think tank". While I doubt Israel's accession will make any difference in anyone's immediate day-to-day life, it's a nice club to belong to, and being inside is nicer than being outside.

The Palestinians did their best to prevent Israel being accepted, on the principle that anything that's good for Israel must be very bad. It seems however that the decision reflected actions and their expression in numbers, not ideology, so the Palestinian efforts didn't make any difference. The OECD press release announcing the decision (linked above) notes that "Israel’s scientific and technological policies have produced outstanding outcomes on a world scale."

Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: Israel Joins the OECD

Poll: Obama has Lost Almost Half of his US Jewish Support - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

Poll: Obama has Lost Almost Half of his US Jewish Support - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

'Obama Behind Jerusalem Apartheid' - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

'Obama Behind Jerusalem Apartheid' - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

Arab Activist: Attacking Israeli Civilians - Not a War Crime - Inside Israel - Israel News - Israel National News

Arab Activist: Attacking Israeli Civilians - Not a War Crime - Inside Israel - Israel News - Israel National News

White House Reports Two-Year Building Freeze in Ramat Shlomo - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

White House Reports Two-Year Building Freeze in Ramat Shlomo - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

MK Warns of Bloodshed after Yitzhar Yeshiva Razing Order - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

MK Warns of Bloodshed after Yitzhar Yeshiva Razing Order - Politics & Gov't - Israel News - Israel National News

Samaria Residents on War Footing Against Demolitions - Defense/Middle East - Israel News - Israel National News

Samaria Residents on War Footing Against Demolitions - Defense/Middle East - Israel News - Israel National News

IAF Responds to Fire, Blasts Terror Sites - Defense/Middle East - Israel News - Israel National News

IAF Responds to Fire, Blasts Terror Sites - Defense/Middle East - Israel News - Israel National News

Elder of Ziyon: I cannot wait to read this book

I cannot wait to read this book

Daniel Pipes reviews Efraim Karsh's new book, "Palestine Betrayed":

The Nakba ideology presents Palestinians as victims without choices and therefore without responsibility for the ills that befell them. It blames Israel alone for the Palestinian-refugee problem. This view has an intuitive appeal, for Muslim and Christian Palestinians had long formed a majority on the land that became Israel, whereas most Jews were relative newcomers.

Intuitive sense, however, does not equal historical accuracy. In his new tour de force, Palestine Betrayed, Efraim Karsh of the University of London offers the latter. With his customary in-depth archival research — in this case, relying on masses of recently declassified documents from the period of British rule and of the first Arab–Israeli war, 1917–49 — clear presentation, and meticulous historical sensibility, Karsh argues the opposite case: that Palestinians decided their own destiny and bear near-total responsibility for becoming refugees.

In Karsh's words: "Far from being the hapless victims of a predatory Zionist assault, it was Palestinian Arab leaders who, from the early 1920s onward, and very much against the wishes of their own constituents, launched a relentless campaign to obliterate the Jewish national revival which culminated in the violent attempt to abort the U.N. partition resolution." More broadly, he observes, "there was nothing inevitable about the Palestinian–Jewish confrontation, let alone the Arab–Israeli conflict."

Yet more counterintuitively, Karsh shows that his understanding was the conventional, indeed the undisputed interpretation in the late 1940s. Only with the passage of time did "Palestinians and their Western supporters gradually rewr[i]te their national narrative," thereby making Israel into the unique culprit, the one excoriated in the United Nations, university classrooms, and editorials.

Karsh successfully makes his case by establishing two main points: that (1) the Jewish-Zionist-Israeli side perpetually sought to find a compromise while the Palestinian-Arab-Muslim side rejected nearly all deals; and (2) Arab intransigence and violence caused the self-inflicted "catastrophe."

The first point is more familiar, especially since the Oslo Accords of 1993, for it remains today's pattern. Karsh demonstrates a consistency of Jewish goodwill and Arab rejectionism going back to the Balfour Declaration and persisting throughout the period of British rule. (To remind, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 expressed London's intention to establish in Palestine a "national home for the Jewish people," and the British conquest of Palestine just 37 days later gave it control of Palestine until 1948.)

In the first years after 1917, Arab reaction was muted, as leaders and masses alike recognized the benefits of the dynamic Zionist enterprise that helped revive a backward, poor, and sparsely populated Palestine. Then emerged, with British facilitation, the noxious figure who would dominate Palestinian politics over the next three decades, Amin al-Husseini. From about 1921 on, Karsh documents, Zionists and Palestinians had many choices to make; while the former invariably opted for compromise, the latter relentlessly decided on extermination.

In various capacities — mufti, head of Islamic and political organizations, Hitler ally, hero of the Arab masses — Husseini drove his constituents to what Karsh calls "a relentless collision course with the Zionist movement." Hating Jews so maniacally that he went on to join the Nazi genocide machine, Husseini refused to accept their presence in any numbers in Palestine, much less any form of Zionist sovereignty.

From the early 1920s, then, one witnessed a pattern still in place and familiar today: Zionist accommodation, "painful concessions," and constructive efforts to bridge differences, met by Palestinian anti-Semitism, rejectionism, and violence.

Complementing this binary dramatis personae, and complicating its stark contrast, stood the generally more accommodating Palestinian masses, the disgracefully anti-Semitic British mandatory authority, a Jordanian king eager to rule the Jews as subjects, feckless Arab state leaders, and an erratic American government.

Despite the radicalization of Palestinian opinion by the mufti and despite the Nazi rise to power, Zionists kept seeking an accommodation. It took some years, but the mufti's zero-sum policy and eliminationism eventually convinced reluctant Labor leaders, including David Ben-Gurion, that good works would not facilitate their dream of acceptance. Still, despite repeated failures, they continued the search for a moderate Arab partner with whom to strike a deal.

In contrast, Ze'ev Jabotinsky, the forerunner of today's Likud party, already in 1923 understood that "there is not even the slightest hope of ever obtaining the agreement of the Arabs of the Land of Israel to 'Palestine' becoming a country with a Jewish majority." Yet even he rejected the idea of expelling Arabs and insisted on their full enfranchisement in a future Jewish state.

This dialectic culminated in November 1947, when the United Nations passed a partition plan that nowadays would be termed a two-state solution. In other words, it handed the Palestinians a state on a silver platter. Zionists rejoiced but Palestinian leaders, foremost the malign Husseini, sourly rejected any solution that endorsed Jewish autonomy. They insisted on everything and so got nothing. Had they accepted the U.N. plan, Palestine would be celebrating its 62nd anniversary this May. And there would have been no Nakba.

The most original part of Palestine Betrayed is the half that contains a detailed review of the flight of Muslims and Christians from Palestine in the years 1947–49. Here Karsh's archival research comes into its own, allowing him to present a uniquely rich picture of the specific circumstances of Arab flight. He goes one by one through the various Arab population centers — Qastel, Deir Yassin, Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Safad — and then takes a close look at the villages.

Israel's war of independence divides into two parts. Ferocious fighting began within hours of the United Nations vote to partition Palestine on Nov. 29, 1947, and lasted till the eve of the British evacuation on May 14, 1948. The international conflict began on May 15 (the day after Israel came into being), when five Arab state armies invaded, with hostilities lasting until January 1949. The first phase consisted largely of guerrilla warfare, the second primarily of conventional warfare. Over half (between 300,000 and 340,000) of the 600,000 Arab refugees fled before the British evacuation, and most of them in the final month.

Palestinians fled in a wide range of circumstances and for varied reasons. Arab commanders ordered noncombatants out of the way of military maneuvers; or they threatened laggards with treatment as traitors if they stayed; or they demanded that villages be evacuated to improve their standing on the battlefield; or they promised a safe return in a matter of days. Some communities preferred to flee rather than to sign a truce with the Zionists; in the words of Jaffa's mayor, "I do not mind destruction of Jaffa if we secure destruction of Tel Aviv." The mufti's agents attacked Jews to provoke hostilities. Families with the means to do so fled danger. When agricultural tenants heard that their landlords would be punished, they worried about being expelled and preempted by abandoning the land. Bitter internecine enmities hobbled planning. Shortages of food and other necessities spread. Services like water-pumping stations were abandoned. Fears spread of Arab gunmen, as did rumors of Zionist atrocities.

In only one case (Lydda) did Israeli troops push Arabs out. The singularity of this event bears emphasis. Karsh explains about the entire first phase of fighting: "None of the 170,000–180,000 Arabs fleeing urban centers, and only a handful of the 130,000–160,000 villagers who left their homes, had been forced out by Jews."

The Palestinian leadership disapproved of a population return, seeing this as implicitly recognizing the nascent State of Israel. The Israelis were at first ready to take back the evacuees but then hardened their position as the war progressed. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion explained their thinking, on June 16, 1948: "This will be a war of life and death and [the evacuees] must not be able to return to the abandoned places. . . . We did not start the war. They made the war. Jaffa waged war on us, Haifa waged war on us, Beisan waged war on us. And I do not want them again to make war."

In sum, Karsh explains, "it was the actions of the Arab leaders that condemned hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to exile."

In this book, Karsh establishes two momentous facts: that Arabs aborted the Palestinian state and that they caused the Nakba. In the process, he confirms his status as the preeminent historian of the modern Middle East writing today, and extends the arguments of three of his earlier books. His magnum opus, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (with Inari Karsh, 1999), argued that Middle Easterners were not, as usually thought, "hapless victims of predatory imperial powers but active participants in the restructuring of their region," a shift with vast political implications. Palestine Betrayed applies that book's thesis to the Arab–Israeli conflict, depriving Palestinians of excuses and victimhood, showing that they actively, if mistakenly, chose their destiny.

In Fabricating Israeli History: The "New Historians" (1997), Karsh exposed the shoddy work, even the fraudulence, of the school of Israeli historians who blame the 1948–49 Palestinian refugee problem on the Jewish state. Palestine Betrayed offers the flip side; if the earlier book refuted mistakes, this one establishes truths. Finally, in Islamic Imperialism: A History (2006), he showed the expansionist core of the Islamic faith in action over the centuries; here he explores that drive in small-bore detail among the Palestinians, connecting the supremacist Islamic mentality with an unwillingness to make practical concessions to Jewish sovereignty.

Palestine Betrayed reframes today's Arab–Israeli debate by putting it into its proper historical context. Proving that for 90 years the Palestinian political elite has opted to reject "the Jewish national revival and [insisted on] the need for its violent destruction," Karsh correctly concludes that the conflict will end only when the Palestinians give up on their "genocidal hopes."

The part I highlighted above is so much against everything that we have been told for the past 20-30 years by Israel's "new historians" that the book is worth getting just to see Karsh's sources.

I have it on order along with his Islamic Imperialism book.


Elder of Ziyon: I cannot wait to read this book

Elder of Ziyon: "Phone flirting" with the Egyptian Foreign Minister?

"Phone flirting" with the Egyptian Foreign Minister?

Sometimes, either autotranslation fails me or really weird things are happening:

The Office of the Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit communicated with the public prosecutor to complain about the Minister receiving "flirting" telephone calls, from unknown numbers, after midnight.

The investigation revealed that one of the numbers who had repeatedly harassed the Egyptian minister belonged to a 66-year old woman named Mallawi in the Minya province (about 241 km south of Cairo), while the second number belongs to a 33-year old man who works in the technical field about 30 km west of Cairo.

Well, who wouldn't want to flirt with such a powerful, handsome man?

(I think the article is more about problems with Egypt's cell phone switching system routinely misdirecting phone calls.)


Elder of Ziyon: "Phone flirting" with the Egyptian Foreign Minister?

Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: Hakotel

Hakotel

This week we'll be celebrating 43 years since the reunification of Jerusalem, on the 2nd day of the Six Day War. So I'll be posting some of the shirim of those days.

Ofra Chaza (1957-2000) was born in Tel Aviv to a family of Yemenite Jews. She was one of our most important singers, and straddled various genres. When I presented Shirim Mizrachi'im last week a number of readers admonished me for not presenting Ofra, since she was an important performer of them. Yet she didn't start there, nor was she ever only a singer of mizrachi music. Since I'm bringing songs about Jerusalem this week, I've chosen one she sang.

Hakotel - the Western Wall - was written in the flush of victory after June 1967. Given that an event had just transpired which had been fervently anticipated for 1897 years, it would have been forgivable if the shirim of those days had been triumphant songs of victory. They weren't, not in the simple meaning of the words. Here, judge for yourselves: the words in Hebrew, English and transliteration are all on the You Tube page; if you look carefully you'll see Teddy Kollek, mythological mayor of Jerusalem, in the final frames of the film; the recording was probably made sometime in the 1980s, and the venue is the open-air auditorium below the wall of the Old City.

Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: Hakotel

Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: The One About the English Antisemites

The One About the English Antisemites

Ever wondered where the Guardian draws its hatred of the Jews from? Well, there was Shakespeare, of course, and Dickens, and Marlow, and Defoe, and HG Wells, and Chesteron.... and lots more were that came from. Take a course in English Literature 101, and you'll have the list.

This, and much more, in a book that probably needs to be read: Trials of the Diaspora: A History of Anti-Semitism in England. Assuming you wish to spend a chunk of time being educated about Jews haters, that is. If you don't, I suppose you can be forgiven.

h/t Contentions

Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: The One About the English Antisemites

Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: Jewish Identity Explained

Jewish Identity Explained

Yair Nitzani is a talented Israeli comedian. I'm not certain if he's talking Hebrew here but thinks he's talking English, or if he's talking English but thinks he's talking Hebrew, but if you understand both it's hilarious; I expect if you understand only one of the two you still may find it amusing. Since it touches upon a subject I've been dancing around for a while, I'll let him do the explaining.


Yaacov Lozowick's Ruminations: Jewish Identity Explained

Torat HaRav Aviner: We’ve Made Progress

We’ve Made Progress


09
מאי
2010

[Be-Ahavah U-Be-Emunah – Acharei Mot-Kedoshim 5770 – translated by R. Blumberg]

Question: Today, how can it be that we are on a higher level than the Desert Generation, which merited numerous miracles and was led by Moshe? It’s true that now, as well, in our Land, we are facing crises regarding the Torah and Eretz Yisrael, but they are nothing compared to the sins of the Golden Calf, the spies and other severe sins.
Answer: Indeed, our sages said that our own redemption will be greater, so much so that Ben Zoma declared that in the Messianic era, the Exodus will no longer be mentioned (Berachot 12b). As it says: “Behold, the days will come – says Hashem – when they shall no more say, ‘As Hashem lives, that brought up the Nation of Israel out of the land of Egypt,’ but, ‘As Hashem lives, that brought up and that led the seed of the House of Israel out of the north country and all the countries where I had driven them.’ They shall dwell in their own land” (Yirmiyahu 23:7-8). In fact, the present ingathering of the exiles is more remarkable than the Egyptian Exodus. Then, the entire Nation left Egypt together for Jerusalem. Now, the entire Jewish People have left all the countries of the world and returned to Eretz Yisrael, as though acting in synch. Moreover, in Egypt we had Moshe. Now, there is no Moshe. Now we are sheep without a shepherd. This has a disadvantage, but also an advantage. The advantage is that we are sheep who have done amazing things without a shepherd. The entire rebuilding of the Land, the entire return to Zion, the entire establishment of the Jewish State, all of Israel’s wars, the entire return to the Torah to Israel, we accomplished as sheep without a shepherd.
The shepherd will certainly come along, but not to solve problems that the sheep can solve alone. See Rashi at the beginning of Tehillim, Chapter 70, which employs the parable of a king who gets angry, destroys his sheep-pen, exiles the shepherd and banishes the flocks. Afterwards the king calms down, rebuilds the sheep-pen and brings back the flocks. The shepherd asks, “And what about me?” The king answers that he remembers him. Thus, the shepherd is brought back last.
When we left Egypt, we were like sheep entirely dependent on a shepherd. Hence, when the shepherd was absent, we committed the sin of the Golden Calf. On many other occasions, we were entirely dependent on the shepherd, like a boy who is dependent on his father and mother. Therefore, we sinned many times.
Now we know how to function without a shepherd, and we accomplish much. Even when we sin, it’s far from the level of sin that there was then.
All the same, our Sages say, “It is not that the Egyptian Exodus will be uprooted [from our awareness], but that our ultimate removal from the exile will be central and the Exodus from Egypt will be secondary” (Berachot ibid.). Here, however, Maharal carried out a Copernican revolution or paradigm shift in the introduction to his book “Netzach Yisrael”. There he explained that the relationship between the Egyptian Exodus and our ultimate liberation from the nations’ yoke is like the relationship between cause and effect. The cause is minor compared to the effect, and yet at the same time, the kernel of the effect is hidden within the cause. It’s like an apple seed buried in the earth. It’s insignificant compared to a large apple tree, but the potential of a tree is hidden within. Everything we are doing now with such great talent was hidden within us when we left Egypt, just as all of the adult’s talents are stored away in him when he is a child.
Similarly, our Rabbi, Ha-Rav Tzvi Yehuda Kook asked his father, Rav Avraham Yitzchak Ha-Cohain Kook, what stage we are at in the Redemption – the start, the middle or the end? His father responded that it depends on whether he was talking about the practical reality or the spiritual potential. In terms of the practical reality, the situation was very weak still. It was only the start of Redemption. Yet the spiritual awakening that was occurring possessed the power to usher the supreme Redemption to completion.
We should not boast about all the wonderful things we are doing now in our country, and look at eye level, or down our noses, at the Desert Generation. The Desert Generation was us, and everything we are doing now was already stored away in them. It just needed thousands of years of processing.
How fortunate we are to have been so privileged!

Torat HaRav Aviner: We’ve Made Progress

Sunday, 9 May 2010

RubinReports: Walter Laqueur: An Intellectual for All Seasons Brings His History to Life

Walter Laqueur: An Intellectual for All Seasons Brings His History to Life

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By Barry Rubin

Almost one-third of a century ago, I first met Walter Laqueur--one of the greatest historians, thinkers on international affairs, and political analysts of this or the past century--and he remains for me a role model. He is also one of the few remaining exemplars from the golden generation of Western intellectual life with its tremendous Jewish component and dedication to Enlightenment values.

When Walter was already 87 years old, last year, he mentioned to me that he was looking for a topic for his next book. I suggested an intellectual autobiography, to share what he has learned with the contemporary generations, and now the result is available as Best of Times, Worst of Times, Memoirs of a Political Education (Brandeis, 224pp.).

I knew the book was going to be great when reading some of the draft chapters. Yet only when I sat down with the published book did I realize how truly great and important it is and why you should definitely read it. I’ll explain that in a moment but first some background.

Laqueur was born in Breslau, then in Germany and now in Poland, in 1921. When he was a boy the Nazis came to power and he lived for about six years under that regime. He escaped by becoming a student at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, soon leaving to work on a kibbutz where—among other things—he quickly learned Russian and served at times as a mounted guard. He covered the 1948 Independence War as a journalist.

In the 1950s he began writing books, with his scholarly focus over the next 60 years including the USSR, German intellectual and cultural history, Zionism, the Middle East, Europe, guerrillas, the role of intelligence in Western decisionmaking, how news of the Holocaust reached the Allies, and terrorism. He practically created the field of terrorism studies. His career has stretched long enough that I own two books he wrote a half-century apart. The first was entitled Out of the Ruins of Europe, as the continent recovered from World War Two; the more recent called, The Last Days of Europe. He covered the full length of that up and down cycle.


Living in Jerusalem, London, and Washington, he created the Institute for Contemporary History, played a central role in the development of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and taught in several of the world's great universities. Indeed, Laqueur, as much as anyone, created the field of political analysis which has been my profession since the day we met.
If you think this is too effusive, remember I’m holding back because he is going to read this and tease me by saying: You exaggerated as usual.

But from the standpoint (or low point) of intellectual life in 2010 how can one possibly exaggerate what a role model Laqueur is for us today. There is the breadth of his experience and the breadth of his knowledge (it is hard to bring up a name of an author he hasn’t read or intellectual figure he hasn't known), or of his modesty.

And the mere thought that one could become a great international intellectual figure without even having a BA from a university makes one want to cry in our era of credentialed buffoons.

I once sat in on a chat between Walter and a famous Soviet expert who bragged that he spoke eight languages. Walter, who at least equals that, remarked: “Oh, you’re including Bulgarian! Well, everyone who knows Russian can understand it already so that doesn’t count.

His flexibility is also something I admire, and his constant demonstration of the interconnection of all knowledge--he's also a photography and film enthusiast--is a vital reminder in an age of narrow scholastic specialization which is predictably arid and unimaginative.


When I bought my first computer (a Lexitron behemoth consisting of a television screen mounted on a big table and one step beyond the type of thing seen in 1950s' science fiction films), he teased me that the greatest works of literature were written with a quill pen. Today, he puts most teenagers to shame given his computer literacy.

And so you should read all his books. But I want to get back to why you should read this latest book. One of the greatest deficits today is the ignorance or distortion of history (most often into an anti-democratic, anti-Western, anti-capitalist narrative), especially the last 90 years since the end of World War One. Walter has lived through this and it has left him with sound and sober judgments.


"Some of the main sources of error [in comprehending history and predicting politics include] mirror imaging ["They are people like you and me"]; the belief of academics that the main assignment of an intellectual is to be critical; the contention that conflicts can always or almost always be evaded; the idea that in the case of a conflict, truth is more often than not to be found somewhere in the middle and that one's own country is very likely to be in the wrong." (p. 17)

The romance of extremism is one of the greatest of temptations. He compares Rosa Luxemburg, the failed quasi-Communist who is celebrated today though she led a disastrous uprising that ultimately contributed to the triumph of fascism, with Eduard Bernstein, the democratic socialist who is forgotten but did so much to create the modern democratic state and improve the lives of workers. (p. 47) Why does the revolutionary failure become a heroine and the successful former a non-entity?

Laqueur explains why the concept of totalitarianism is needed to understand the Soviet Union. He shows what Nazism was actually like and how that name should not just become some insult to be hurled at anyone with whom one disagrees politically. (“One of the Nazi slogans was, “The individual is nothing, the community—everything.”)

There is one story Walter tells in the book that particularly haunts me given attitudes today. During the period before the Nazis came to power, his parents took him on a river cruise. One of the passengers jumped off the boat, swam around for a while, and climbed back. He used the boat’s Weimar Republic flag as a towel to dry himself. Some of the passengers laughed and applauded. When people no longer appreciate their democratic country and the freedom it provides they are well on their way to losing it.

And he also writes why the West was right and the USSR was wrong in the Cold War. Indeed, I think this analysis is very useful for today in considering states like Iran today:

“Of course the Soviet leaders were, on the whole, not prone to act recklessly. When there were great risks involved they would not take the offensive. Someone compared them to a hotel thief trying all the doors on a certain floor. When he found a door locked he would not persist but instead would pass on to the next door.”

He has taught me about the importance of boredom and incompetence in shaping history, of the ridiculousness of “experts” who prattled on about matters they didn’t really understand. He also taught me that being prolific is not a sin and that the best way to be really productive is to avoid going to meetings whenever possible.


In this present day, his career is a reminder that a scholar should be someone who does creative and insightful work rather than someone driven by a passion to be a celebrity.

You should read this book, then, for his charming style, eyewitness accounts, and most of all his sound judgment. Walter writes:

“I thought of myself as a person of the center-left, and in most ways I continue to do so….The problem is, of course, what is left?….I did not believe that Stalin was a left-winger, nor his followers, nor the various post-modernist schools, such as postcolonialism, nor the German or the Italian terrorists of the 1970s, nor North Korea, nor the Albania of Enver Hoxha or the Cambodia of Pol Pot, nor the Islamists whether following Osama bin Laden or other versions of that ideology.” (p. 70)

These are all excuses for authoritarianism or totalitarianism against human liberty and they should not be allowed—this is my sentiment—to dress themselves or be prettified as anything else.

In other words, if you read this book you will be given a quick and entertaining (in the best sense of the word) course on how we arrived where we are today (“how did we reach this impasse—proceeding from the optimism of Victor Hugo to the dire prospects of the early twentieth century”) and how to think reasonably about that recent past, a field that Laqueur practically created and which he called contemporary history.

He doesn’t give easy answers but always persuasive ones. Go and read this book and as many of his earlier works as you can, including his novels, then thank me for recommending them. You can find a list here.


RubinReports: Walter Laqueur: An Intellectual for All Seasons Brings His History to Life

Are Honor Killings Domestic Terrorism?-Chester Chronicles

Are Honor Killings Domestic Terrorism?

My second study about honor killings was posted this week at Middle East Quarterly. The first study is here. The second study is a groundbreaking examination of 230 victims on five continents.

So far, the study has been picked up widely on the web, and I’ve been interviewed in the Hindustan Times (!) and the Edmonton Sun about honor killings. I was just interviewed by the most excellent Lauren Green on the Fox News Channel’s “Strategy Room” program about “faith and terrorism.” I was encouraged to position honor killings as a form of domestic, Islamist terrorism. In reality, the same radically Islamist mindset responsible for 9/11 or the Mumbai massacre tends to keep their women in burqas, niquab, or hijab, segregated and subordinate. Such fundamentalists tend to follow radical Islamist mullahs who preach militant jihad and who do not preach against honor related violence, including honor killings.

(Left to right) Lynne Jordal Martin, Phyllis Chesler, Lauren Green

Fox News had convened a panel to discuss the relationship between “faith and terrorism.” We began by discussing the interview with Hussein Ibish, formerly the director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, now the Executive Director of the Foundation for Arab American Leadership, a non-member organization. Ibish made a series of false claims, all of which sounded reasonable, “fair,” and logical, and he did so in excellent American English. For example, he said that Muslims were persecuted by pagans when Mohammed was alive and that’s why there are some Qu’ranic verses that encourage or permit violence.

Poppycock!

Muslims under Mohammed were busy raping, pillaging, plundering, and enslaving the so-called pagans, trying to convert them; Mohammed and his soldiers genocidally slaughtered the Jewish tribes of Arabia. So, what Ibish is really saying is that when Muslims cannot convert another faith group to Islam, that Muslims feel “persecuted” and therefore resort to violence.

Nothing’s changed.

But one more point: When Mohammed was in a weak position, he counseled “peace.” When he was in a strong position, he counseled “no mercy, full jihad ahead.”

I stressed the terrorists, home-grown and otherwise, are not motivated by poverty, unemployment, or lack of education. Remember that Bin Laden is a billionaire, the Christmas Day failed bomber Abdul Muttalab came from a wealthy family, Mohamed Ata was educated, as were Fort Hood Major Nidal Hassan and Times Square Faisal Shahaz. Mental illness does not “cause” terrorism. The Saudi Wahabi Salifist world-wide funding of mosques, madrassas, and Middle East Institutes does. Iranian funding of Hamas and Hezbollah funds and indoctrinates terrorism.

If a true and “peaceful” Islam — a pro-woman Islam — has been hijacked by maniacs then true and peaceful Muslims must stand up to them. If one’s interpretation of faith can encourage a man to drive a car bomb into Times Square, it can also give good people the faith and courage to stand up and fight the extremists in their midst.

Faith can empower people to combat radical evil in a way that nothing else can.

I got to say all this — and much more. I am not sure if there will be a link posted to this interview but I will link to it if and when it becomes available.

Meanwhile, here’s the study. Let me know what you think.

Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings

by Phyllis Chesler
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2010, pp. 3-11
(Article originally online here.)

To combat the epidemic of honor killings requires understanding what makes these murders unique. They differ from plain and psychopathic homicides, serial killings, crimes of passion, revenge killings, and domestic violence. Their motivation is different and based on codes of morality and behavior that typify some cultures, often reinforced by fundamentalist religious dictates. In 2000, the United Nations estimated that there are 5,000 honor killings every year.[1] That number might be reasonable for Pakistan alone, but worldwide the numbers are much greater. In 2002 and again in 2004, the U.N. brought a resolution to end honor killings and other honor-related crimes. In 2004, at a meeting in The Hague about the rising tide of honor killings in Europe, law enforcement officers from the U.K. announced plans to begin reopening old cases to see if certain murders were, indeed, honor murders.[2] The number of honor killings is routinely underestimated, and most estimates are little more than guesses that vary widely. Definitive or reliable worldwide estimates of honor killing incidence do not exist.

Most honor killings are not classified as such, are rarely prosecuted, or when prosecuted in the Muslim world, result in relatively light sentences.[3] When an honor killing occurs in the West, many people, including the police, still shy away from calling it an honor killing. In the West, both Islamist and feminist groups, including domestic violence activists, continue to insist that honor killings are a form of Western-style domestic violence or femicide (killing of women).[4] They are not.[5] This study documents that there are at least two types of honor killings and two victim populations. Both types differ significantly from each other, just as they differ from Western domestic femicide. One group has an average age of seventeen; the other group’s average age is thirty-six. The age difference is a statistically significant one.

Families Killing Their Young Women

The photo in the right-hand corner of the top of this page is of Morsal O, a 16-year-old German-Afghan girl, who was killed in May 2008 by her 24-year-old brother Ahmad Sobair O. He stabbed her twenty-three times in a parking lot in Hamburg, Germany, because of her alleged impure moral conduct. Murder of teenage or young adult women by their fathers or other close male relatives is characteristic of classic honor killings and is not a pattern in non-immigrant Western populations.

The study’s findings indicate that honor killings accelerated significantly in a 20-year period between 1989 and 2009.[6] This may mean that honor killings are genuinely escalating, perhaps as a function of jihadist extremism and Islamic fundamentalism, or that honor killings are being more accurately reported and prosecuted, especially in the West, but also in the East. The expansion of the Internet may account for wider reporting of these incidents.

The worldwide average age of victims for the entire population is twenty-three (Table 1). This is true for all geographical regions. Thus, wherever an honor killing is committed, it is primarily a crime against young people. Just over half of these victims were daughters and sisters; about a quarter were wives and girlfriends of the perpetrators. The remainder included mothers, aunts, nieces, cousins, uncles, or non-relatives.

Honor killings are a family collaboration. Worldwide, two-thirds of the victims were killed by their families of origin. (See Table 1). Murder by the family of origin was at its highest (72 percent) in the Muslim world and at its lowest in North America (49 percent); European families of origin were involved almost as often as those in the Muslim world, possibly because so many are first- or second-generation immigrants and, therefore, still tightly bound to their native cultures. Alternatively, this might be due to the Islamist radicalization of third or even fourth generations. Internationally, fathers played an active role in over one-third of the honor murders. Fathers were most involved in North America (52 percent) and least involved in the Muslim world; in Europe, fathers were involved in more than one-third of the murders.

Worldwide, 42 percent of these murders were carried out by multiple perpetrators, a characteristic which distinguishes them considerably from Western domestic femicide. A small number of the murders worldwide involved more than one victim. Multiple murders were at their highest in North America and at their lowest in Europe. In the Muslim world, just under a quarter of the murders involved more than one victim. Additional victims included the dead woman’s children, boyfriend, fiancé, husband, sister, brother, or parents.

Worldwide, more than half the victims were tortured; i.e., they did not die instantly but in agony. In North America, over one-third of the victims were tortured; in Europe, two-thirds were tortured; in the Muslim world, half were tortured. Torturous deaths include: being raped or gang-raped before being killed; being strangled or bludgeoned to death; being stabbed many times (10 to 40 times); being stoned or burned to death; being beheaded, or having one’s throat slashed.

Finally, worldwide, 58 percent of the victims were murdered for being “too Western” and/or for resisting or disobeying cultural and religious expectations (see Table 1). The accusation of being “too Western” was the exact language used by the perpetrator or perpetrators. Being “too Western” meant being seen as too independent, not subservient enough, refusing to wear varieties of Islamic clothing (including forms of the veil), wanting an advanced education and a career, having non-Muslim (or non-Sikh or non-Hindu) friends or boyfriends, refusing to marry one’s first cousin, wanting to choose one’s own husband, choosing a socially “inferior” or non-Muslim (or non-Sikh or non-Hindu) husband; or leaving an abusive husband. There were statistically significant regional differences for this motive. For example, in North America, 91 percent of victims were murdered for being “too Western” as compared to a smaller but still substantial number (71 percent) in Europe. In comparison, only 43 percent of victims were killed for this reason in the Muslim world.

Less than half (42 percent) of the victims worldwide were murdered for committing an alleged “sexual impropriety”; this refers to victims who had been raped, were allegedly having extra-marital affairs, or who were viewed as “promiscuous” (even where this might not refer to actual sexual promiscuity or even sexual activity). However, in the Muslim world, 57 percent of victims were murdered for this motive as compared to 29 percent in Europe and a small number (9 percent) in North America.

What the Age Differences Mean

This study documents that there are at least two different kinds of honor killings and/or two different victim populations: one made up of female children and young women whose average age is seventeen (Table 3), the other composed of women whose average age is thirty-six (Table 5). Both kinds of honor murders differ from Western domestic femicide.

In the non-immigrant West, serious domestic violence exists which includes incest, child abuse, marital rape, marital battering, marital stalking, and marital post-battering femicide. However, there is no cultural pattern of fathers specifically targeting or murdering their teenage or young adult daughters, nor do families of origin participate in planning, perpetrating, justifying, and valorizing such murders. Clearly, these characteristics define the classic honor killing of younger women and girls.

The honor murders of older women might seem to resemble Western-style domestic femicide. The victim is an older married woman, usually a mother, who is often killed by her husband but also by multiple perpetrators (30 percent of the time). Worldwide, almost half (44 percent) of those who kill older-age victims include members of either the victim’s family of origin or members of her husband’s family of origin. (See Table 5.) This is extremely rare in a Western domestic femicide; the husband who kills his wife in the West is rarely assisted by members of his family of origin or by his in-laws.

However, in the Muslim world, older-age honor killing victims are murdered by their own families of origin nearly two-thirds of the time. This suggests that the old-world custom has changed somewhat in Europe where the victim’s family of origin participates in her murder only one-third (31 percent) of the time. Thus far, in North America, no members of the family of origin have participated in the honor killing of an older-age victim. Whether North America will eventually come to resemble Europe or even the Muslim world remains to be seen, as this will be influenced by immigration and other demographic factors. Finally, nearly half the older-age victims are subjected to a torturous death. However, the torture rate was at its highest (68 percent) in Europe for female victims of all ages. The torture rate was 35 percent and 51 percent in North America and in the Muslim world, respectively.

Worldwide, younger-age victims were killed by their families of origin 81 percent of the time. In North America, 94 percent were killed by their family of origin; this figure was 77 percent in Europe and 82 percent in the Muslim world. (See Table 3.) In North America, fathers had a hands-on role in 100 percent of the cases when the daughter was eighteen-years-old or younger (See Table 4). Worldwide, younger-age women and girls were tortured 53 percent of the time; however, in Europe, they were tortured between 72 and 83 percent of the time—significantly more than older-age women worldwide.

Western Responses to Honor Killing

Many Western feminists and advocates for victims of domestic violence have confused Western domestic violence or domestic femicide (the two are different) with the honor killings of older-age victims. Representatives of Islamist pressure groups including Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Canadian Islamic Congress, various academics (e.g., Ajay Nair, Tom Keil), activists (e.g., Rana Husseini), and religious leaders (e.g., Abdulhai Patel of the Canadian Council of Imams) have insisted that honor killings either do not exist or have nothing to do with Islam; that they are cultural, tribal, pre-Islamic customs, and that, in any event, domestic violence exists everywhere.[7] Feminists who work with the victims of domestic violence have seen so much violence against women that they are uncomfortable singling out one group of perpetrators, especially an immigrant or Muslim group. However, Western domestic femicide differs significantly from honor killing.[8]

Former National Organization for Women (NOW) president Kim Gandy compared the battered and beheaded Aasiya Hassan[9] to the battered (but still living) pop star Rihanna and further questioned whether Hassan’s murder was an honor killing:

Is a Muslim man in Buffalo more likely to kill his wife than a Catholic man in Buffalo? A Jewish man in Buffalo? I don’t know the answer to that, but I know that there is plenty of violence to go around—and that the long and sordid history of oppressing women in the name of religion surely includes Islam, but is not limited to Islam.[10]

At the time of the Hassan beheading, a coalition of domestic violence workers sent an (unpublished) letter to the Erie County district attorney’s office and to some media stating that this was not an honor killing, that honor killings had nothing to do with Islam, and that sensationalizing Muslim domestic violence was not only racist but also served to render invisible the much larger incidence of both domestic violence and domestic femicide. They have a point, but they also miss the point, namely, that apples are not oranges and that honor killings are not the same as Western domestic femicides.

One might argue that the stated murder motive of being “too Westernized” may, in a sense, overlap substantively with the stated and unstated motives involved in Western domestic femicide. In both instances, the woman is expected to live with male violence and to remain silent about it. She is not supposed to leave—or to leave with the children or any other male “property.” However, the need to keep a woman isolated, subordinate, fearful, and dependent through the use of violence does not reflect a Western cultural or religious value; rather, it reflects the individual, psychological pathology of the Western batterer-murderer. On the other hand, an honor killing reflects the culture’s values aimed at regulating female behavior—values that the family, including the victim’s family, is expected to enforce and uphold.

Further, such cultural, ethnic, or tribal values are not often condemned by the major religious and political leaders in developing Muslim countries or in immigrant communities in the West. On the contrary, such communities maintain an enforced silence on all matters of religious, cultural, or communal “sensitivity.” Today, such leaders (and their many followers) often tempt, shame, or force Muslim girls and women into wearing a variety of body coverings including the hijab (head covering), burqa, or chadari (full-body covering) as an expression of religiosity and cultural pride or as an expression of symbolic resistance to the non-Muslim West.[11] Muslim men are allowed to dress like Westerners, and no one challenges the ubiquitous use of Western technology, including airplanes, cell phones, the Internet, or satellite television as un-Islamic. But Muslim women are expected to bear the burden of upholding these ancient and allegedly religious customs of gender apartheid.

It is clear that Muslim girls and women are murdered for honor in both the West and the East when they refuse to wear the hijab or choose to wear it improperly. In addition, they are killed for behaving in accepted Western or modern ways when they express a desire to attend college, have careers, live independent lives, have non-Muslim friends (including boyfriends with whom they may or may not be sexually involved), choose their own husbands, refuse to marry their first cousins, or want to leave an abusive husband. This “Westernization” trend also exists in Muslim countries but to a lesser extent. Allegations of unacceptable “Westernization” accounted for 44 percent of honor murders in the Muslim world as compared to 71 percent in Europe and 91 percent in North America.

Tempted by Western ideas, desiring to assimilate, and hoping to escape lives of subordination, those girls and women who exercise their option to be Western are killed—at early ages and in particularly gruesome ways. Frightening honor murders may constitute an object lesson to other Muslim girls and women about what may happen to them if they act on the temptation to do more than serve their fathers and brothers as domestic servants, marry their first cousin, and breed as many children as possible. The deaths of females already living in the West may also be intended as lessons for other female immigrants who are expected to lead subordinate and segregated lives amid the temptations and privileges of freedom. This is especially true in Europe where large Muslim ghettos have formed in the past few decades. It is particularly alarming to note that in Europe 96 percent of the honor killing perpetrators are Muslims.

The level of primal, sadistic, or barbaric savagery shown in honor killings towards a female family intimate more closely approximates some of the murders in the West perpetrated by serial killers against prostitutes or randomly selected women. It also suggests that gender separatism, the devaluation of girls and women, normalized child abuse, including arranged child marriages of both boys and girls, sexual repression, misogyny (sometimes inspired by misogynist interpretations of the Qur’an), and the demands made by an increase in the violent ideology of jihad all lead to murderous levels of aggression towards girls and women. One only has to kill a few girls and women to keep the others in line. Honor killings are, in a sense, a form of domestic terrorism, meant to ensure that Muslim women wear the Islamic veil, have Muslim babies, and mingle only with other Muslims.

Since Muslim immigration and, therefore, family networks are more restricted in North America than in Europe, honor-killing fathers may feel that the entire burden for upholding standards for female behavior falls heavily upon them and them alone. This may account for the fact that fathers are responsible 100 percent of the time for the honor murders of the youngest-age victims. In Europe and in the Muslim world, that burden may more easily be shared by sons and brothers, grandfathers, uncles, and male cousins.

What Must Be Done

How can this problem be addressed? Immigration, law enforcement, and religious authorities must all be included in education, prevention, and prosecution efforts in the matter of honor killings.

In addition, shelters for battered Muslim girls and women should be established and multilingual staff appropriately trained in the facts about honor killings. For example, young Muslim girls are frequently lured back home by their mothers. When a shelter resident receives such a phone call, the staff must immediately go on high alert. The equivalent of a federal witness protection program for the intended targets of honor killings should be created; England has already established such a program.[12] Extended safe surrogate family networks must be created to replace existing family networks; the intended victims themselves, with enormous assistance, may become each other’s “sisters.”

In addition, clear government warnings must be issued to Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu immigrants and citizens: Honor killings must be prosecuted in the West, and perpetrators, accomplices, and enablers must all be prosecuted. Participating families should be publicly shamed. Criminals must be deported after they have served their sentences.

Western judicial systems and governments have recently begun to address this problem. In 2006, a Danish court convicted nine members of a clan for the honor murder of Ghazala Khan.[13] In 2009, a German court sentenced a father to life in prison for having ordered his son to murder his sister for the family honor while the 20-year-old son was sentenced to nine and a half years.[14] In another case, a British court, with the help of testimony from the victim’s mother and fiancé, convicted a father of a 10-year-old honor murder after the crime was reclassified;[15] and, for the first time, the Canadian government informed new immigrants:

Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, “honour killings,” female genital mutilation or other gender-based violence. Those guilty of these crimes are severely punished under Canada’s criminal laws.[16]

Islamic gender apartheid is a human rights violation and cannot be justified in the name of cultural relativism, tolerance, anti-racism, diversity, or political correctness. As long as Islamist groups continue to deny, minimize, or obfuscate the problem, and government and police officials accept their inaccurate versions of reality, women will continue to be killed for honor in the West.

The battle for women’s rights is central to the battle for Europe and for Western values. It is a necessary part of true democracy, along with freedom of religion, tolerance for homosexuals, and freedom of dissent. Here, then, is exactly where the greatest battle of the twenty-first century is joined.

Phyllis Chesler is emerita professor of psychology and women’s studies at the Richmond College of the City University of New York and co-founder of the Association for Women in Psychology and the National Women’s Health Network. The author wishes to thank Jonathan Francis Carmona, graduate student at Hunter College, CUNY, for the statistical tests for this study, and Prof. Howard Lune, director of the Graduate Social Research Program at Hunter College.

Table One: Entire Population (N = 230)

REGIONWorldwideNorth AmericaEuropeMuslim World
AVERAGE AGE23252223
BY PERCENTAGE
Killed by Family of Origin1,266496672
Family Position1
– Daughter/Sister53504956
– Wife/Girlfriend23273417
– Other324332727
Paternal Participation437533931
Multiple Perpetrators42424541
Multiple Victims11730721
Tortured153396749
Motive4
– “too Western”58917143
– “sexual impropriety”4292957

1 Significant according to a chi square test.
2 Family of origin includes fathers, mothers, brothers, grandfathers, uncles, and male cousins.
3 “Other” includes mothers, aunts, cousins, and no familial relation.
4 Significant according to a Pearson correlation test.

Table Two: Women Only, All Ages (N = 214)

REGIONWorldwideNorth AmericaEuropeMuslim World
AVERAGE AGE23262123
BY PERCENTAGE
Killed by Family of Origin1,269526675
Family Position1
– Daughter/Sister56525358
– Wife/Girlfriend24283717
– Other320201025
Paternal Participation439524233
Multiple Perpetrators42454440
Multiple Victims11830721
Tortured154356851
Motive4
– “too Western”58897344
– “sexual impropriety”42112756

1 Significant according to a chi square test.
2 Family of origin includes fathers, mothers, brothers, grandfathers, uncles, and male cousins.
3 “Other” includes mothers, aunts, cousins, and no familial relation.
4 Significant according to a Pearson correlation test.

Table Three: Females 25 Years of Age and Younger (N = 129)

REGIONWorldwideNorth AmericaEuropeMuslim World
AVERAGE AGE17181817
BY PERCENTAGE
Killed by Family of Origin1,281947782
Family Position1
– Daughter/Sister74946773
– Wife/Girlfriend1402014
– Other3361313
Paternal Participation454885446
Multiple Perpetrators46754638
Multiple Victims11730820
Tortured153257247
Motive4
– “too Western”57887438
– “sexual impropriety”43122662

1 Significant according to a chi square test.
2 Family of origin includes fathers, mothers, brothers, grandfathers, uncles, and male cousins.
3 “Other” includes mothers, aunts, cousins, and no familial relation.
4 Significant according to a Pearson correlation test.

Table Four: Females 18 Years of Age and Younger (N = 68)

REGIONWorldwideNorth AmericaEuropeMuslim World
AVERAGE AGE15151413
BY PERCENTAGE
Killed by Family of Origin1,289908690
Family Position1
– Daughter/Sister821007879
– Wife/Girlfriend80136
– Other3100915
Paternal Participation4701006861
Multiple Perpetrators39803232
Multiple Victims125291630
Tortured155308358
Motive4
– “too Western”55806741
– “sexual impropriety”45203359

1 Significant according to a chi square test.
2 Family of origin includes fathers, mothers, brothers, grandfathers, uncles, and male cousins.
3 “Other” includes mothers, aunts, cousins, and no familial relation.
4 Significant according to a Pearson correlation test.

Table Five: Females 26 Years of Age and Older (N = 51)

REGIONWorldwideNorth AmericaEuropeMuslim World
AVERAGE AGE36403137
BY PERCENTAGE
Killed by Family of Origin1,24403165
Family Position1
– Daughter/Sister2401337
– Wife/Girlfriend55898726
– Other32111037
Paternal Participation480137
Multiple Perpetrators30114330
Multiple Victims192985
Tortured145445344
Motive4
– “too Western”56886938
– “sexual impropriety”44123162

1 Significant according to a chi square test.
2 Family of origin includes fathers, mothers, brothers, grandfathers, uncles, and male cousins.
3 “Other” includes mothers, aunts, cousins, and no familial relation.
4 Significant according to a Pearson correlation test.

Methodology

This study analyzes 172 incidents and 230 honor-killing victims. The information was obtained from the English-language media around the world with one exception. There were 100 victims murdered for honor in the West, including 33 in North America and 67 in Europe. There were 130 additional victims in the Muslim world. Most of the perpetrators were Muslims, as were their victims, and most of the victims were women.

The perpetrators and victims in this study lived in the following twenty-nine countries or territories: Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Gaza Strip, Germany, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and the West Bank.

In general, statistically significant interactions were found for age, geographical region, the participation of multiple perpetrators (mainly members of the victim’s family of origin, including the victim’s father), family position, multiple victims, the use of torture, and the stated motive for the murder. Between 1989 and 2009, honor killings also escalated over time in a statistically significant way.

Worldwide, the majority of victims were women; a mere 7 percent were men. Only five men were killed by their families of origin whereas the rest of the male victims were killed by the families of the women with whom they were allegedly consorting or planning to consort with either within or outside of marriage. The murdered male victims were usually perceived as men who were unacceptable due to lower class or caste status, because the marriage had not been arranged by the woman’s family of origin, because they were not the woman’s first cousin, or because the men allegedly engaged in pre- or extramarital sex. Men were rarely killed when they were alone; 81 percent were killed when the couple in question was together.

Although Sikhs and Hindus do sometimes commit such murders, honor killings, both worldwide and in the West, are mainly Muslim-on-Muslim crimes. In this study, worldwide, 91 percent of perpetrators were Muslims. In North America, most killers (84 percent) were Muslims, with only a few Sikhs and even fewer Hindus perpetrating honor killings; in Europe, Muslims comprised an even larger majority at 96 percent while Sikhs were a tiny percentage. In Muslim countries, obviously almost all the perpetrators were Muslims. With only two exceptions, the victims were all members of the same religious group as their murderers.

In the West, 76 individuals or groups of multiple perpetrators killed one hundred people. Of these perpetrators, 37 percent came from Pakistan; 17 percent were of Iraqi origin while Turks and Afghans made up 12 and 11 percent, respectively. The remainder, just under a quarter in all, came from Albania, Algeria, Bosnia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Iran, Morocco, and the West Bank.

[1]Ending Violence against Women and Girls,” State of the World Population 2000 (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2000), chap. 3.
[2] BBC News, June 22, 2004.
[3] Yotam Feldner, “‘Honor’ Murders–Why the Perps Get off Easy,” Middle East Quarterly, Dec. 2000, pp. 41-50.
[4] See, for example, SoundVision.com, Islamic information and products site, Aug. 24, 2000; Sheila Musaji, “The Death of Aqsa Parvez Should Be an Interfaith Call to Action,” The American Muslim, Dec. 14, 2007; Mohammed Elmasry, Canadian Islamic Congress, Fox News.com, Dec. 12, 2007; Mustafaa Carroll, Dallas branch of the Council of American-Islamic Relations, FoxNews.com, Oct. 14, 2008.
[5] Phyllis Chesler, “Are Honor Killings Simply Domestic Violence?” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2009, pp. 61-9.
[6] According to the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, the most widely used measure of correlation or association.
[7] See, for example, SoundVision.com, Aug. 24, 2000; Musaji, “The Death of Aqsa Parvez Should Be an Interfaith Call to Action“; Elmasry, Fox News.com, Dec. 12, 2007; Carroll, FoxNews.com, Oct. 14, 2008.
[8] Chesler,” Are Honor Killings Simply Domestic Violence?“; “A Civilized Dialogue about Islam and Honor Killing: When Feminist Heroes Disagree,” Chesler Chronicles, Mar. 2, 2009; “Jordanian Journalist Rana Husseini on ‘Murder in the Name of Honor: The True Story of One Woman’s Heroic Fight Against an Unbelievable Crime,’” Democracy Now, Oct. 21, 2009.
[9] Fox News, Feb. 16, 2009.
[10] Kim Gandy, NOW president,Below the Belt. No Woman, No Culture Immune to Violence against Women,” Feb. 20, 2009.
[11] BBC News, Oct. 5, 2006; Aisha Stacey, “Why Muslim Women Wear the Veil,” IslamReligion.com, Nov 15, 2009.
[12] James Brandon and Salam Hafez, Crimes of the Community: Honour-based Violence in the UK (London: Centre for Social Cohesion, 2008), pp. 136-40.
[13] Brussels Journal, July 2, 2006.
[14] Deutsche Welle (Bonn), Dec. 29, 2009.
[15] The Guardian (London), Dec. 17, 2009.
[16] The National Post (Don Mills, Ont.), Nov. 12, 2009.


Are Honor Killings Domestic Terrorism?-Chester Chronicles
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