Showing posts with label U.S. Military and Middle East. Show all posts
Showing posts with label U.S. Military and Middle East. Show all posts

Sunday, 21 March 2010

RubinReports: Other Than Apartments in Jerusalem, What Else is Going on in the Middle East?

Other Than Apartments in Jerusalem, What Else is Going on in the Middle East?

By Barry Rubin

While the Obama Administration is fiddling over the construction of apartments in Jerusalem, the Middle East is burning. Yet these other issues don’t attract the attention—and certainly not the action—required.

1. Iran is now allied with al-Qaida: General David Petraeus, head of the U.S. Central Command, revealed a bombshell story that has been ignored: Iran is helping al-Qaida attack Americans.

Iran, he said in military-speak, provides "a key facilitation hub, where facilitators connect al Qaida's senior leadership to regional affiliates." Translation: Tehran is letting al-Qaida leaders travel freely back and forth to Pakistan and Afghanistan, using its territory as a safe haven, while permitting them to hold meetings to plan terrorist attacks for attacking U.S. targets and killing Americans. While nominally Iran sometimes takes these people into custody, that seems, Petraeus says, a fiction to fool foreigners.

Oh, and Petraeus added that Iran also helps the Taliban fight America in Afghanistan. Regarding Iraq, the general explains, "The Qods Force [an elite Iranian military group within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps] also maintains its lethal support to Shia Iraqi militia groups, providing them with weapons, funding and training,"

So, Petraeus pointed out that Iran is helping al-Qaida against the United States and also, at times, Shia groups intended to be Iran’s proxies for spreading its influence in Iraq. In effect, the Tehran regime is at war with the United States. Yet this point is not being highlighted, nor does it stir rage in the hearts of White House officials or strenuous attempts to counter this threat.

Meanwhile, Iran isn’t just building apartments but nuclear weapons’ facilities.

2. Lebanon being further integrated into Iran-Syria alliance

In an interview with al-Jazira television, Walid Jumblatt, formerly the roaring lion of the opposition, turns into a mouse and apologizes to Syrian dictator Bashar al-Asad:

"I said, at a moment of anger, what is improper and illogical against President Bashar Assad.” And now he is begging for an invitation to Damascus where he can kiss the ring of the man whose father (Hafiz al-Asad) murdered his father (Kemal Jumblatt).

One cannot blame Walid Jumblatt nor Sa’d al-Hariri, leader of the March 14 coalition, whose father was murdered by Bashar himself and has already gone to Damascus to beg forgiveness.

But Jumblatt, leader of the main Druze community in Lebanon, was a man who not long ago denied comparing Bashar al-Asad to a dog by saying that to do so would be an insult to canines. Jumblatt was also the man who bragged about being a friend of the United States during his rebellious phase. No more.

Meanwhile, Hizballah, which enjoys veto power in Lebanon’s government, isn’t just building apartments, its building fortifications and importing record amounts of weapons.

3. It is now clear that Russia and China won’t support sanctions on Iran. The administration’s plan is in major trouble and there’s no way out, except to do the most minimal possible sanctions and claim victory.

Russia openly defies the Obama Administration by insisting it will finish a nuclear plant for Iran, just when Secretary of State Hilary Clinton is visiting! This was a real slap in the face, much bigger strategically than the apartments’ issue. But there will be no strong reaction from Washington.

According to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev: “We believe that [engagement with Iran is] not over yet, that we can still reach an agreement."

So Russia still isn’t ready to support sanctions and isn’t building apartments in Iran but rather a nuclear reactor.

Same thing with China, whose Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang put it this way: "We believe there is still room for diplomatic efforts and the parties concerned should intensify those efforts."

China isn’t building apartments in Iran but developing oilfields and building a huge oil refinery, plus reportedly supplying weapons.

4. Despite U.S. concessions aimed to reduce Syria’s alliance with Iran, their bond is getting stronger, as witnessed by Asad’s invitation to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Damascus and their signing of new cooperation agreements. During the press conference, Asad literally laughed at U.S. policy.

5. Increasing signs of Turkey’s close cooperation with the Iran-Syria axis. Both Ahmadinejad and the official Syrian government newspaper now call Turkey an ally of Syria and Iran.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sounds the same way, insisting that Iran has no intention of developing nuclear weapons, that Ahmadinejad is a “friend,” and that the United States has no right to try to stop Iran from getting such weapons any way.

The Turkish government isn’t building just apartments but an alliance with Tehran and an increasingly Islamist regime at home.

So let's leave it to Ahmadinejad to summarize how things seem to Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hizballah, and lots of Arabs both pro- and anti-American:

The Americans, Ahmadinejad said, “not only have failed to gain any power, but also are forced to leave the region. They are leaving their reputation, image, and power behind in order to escape.…The [American] government has no influence [to stop].…the expansion of Iran-Syria ties, Syria-Turkey ties, and Iran-Turkey ties--God willing, Iraq too will join the circle...."

Iran is also building not just apartments and not even just nuclear facilities and not even just revolutions abrod. It's also building an empire or, to put things more modestly, a very large sphere of influence.

In short, the regional situation is terrible. None of this really has much to do with Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian issues; none of this is going to change because U.S. policy is seen as being tough on Israel. What the Arabs want to see is whether U.S. policy is going to be tough on Iran and its allies.

The Obama Administration policy isn't making the radicals more moderate but rather--by feeding their arrogance and belief in American weakness--making them more aggressive. Every day the regional situation is becoming more dangerous, but the highest-level and highest-priority U.S. efforts seem to be largely over getting indirect Israel-Palestinian talks which everyone involved knows will produce nothing.

Something is seriously wrong here. Of course this isn't the first time such things have happened in battling aggressive dictatorships, both in the case of Germany and of the USSR. Still, one can only echo the words of George Orwell, written in his diary in early 1941:

"The most depressing thing in this war is not the disasters we are bound to suffer at this stage, but the knowledge that we are being led by weaklings....It is as though your life depended on a game of chess, and you had to sit watching it, seeing the most idiotic moves being made and being powerless to prevent them."


RubinReports: Other Than Apartments in Jerusalem, What Else is Going on in the Middle East?

Tuesday, 23 February 2010

RubinReports: The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

Please subscribe and be subscriber number 9,102!

By Barry Rubin

The Department of Defense has just released its new Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2010. What does it say about the Middle East? Far less than you’d expect in terms of space but still some extremely important points about what might involve the United States in future wars there.

Aside from some scattered references on the need for more civilian nation-building experts, funding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and energy conservation efforts (that's an area, no doubt, where money could be saved), that region takes up less than two pages, about two percent, of the 97-page report.

In comparison, about one-quarter of the four-page note from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, attached to the report, spends 25 percent on the region and sounds far more sensible.

I read this gap as suggesting that the uniformed military (which prepared the admiral's note) is concerned about Iran and terrorist groups but that the text’s main body, by the secretary of defense and designed to please the White House, puts more emphasis on climate change, green energy, and the use of the military as a community-organizing type force to make civilians in places like Afghanistan more friendly to the United States.

But there are significant points of interests in both sections. Let’s start with the report itself which basically makes three points.

First, while an Iranian nuclear capability and terrorism are basically not mentioned at all, there is significant concern over two aspects of Iran’s military build-up. Iranian missile systems are becoming more accurate and longer-range, meaning U.S. air bases, command centers, and other military targets could come under attack. This concern presumably originated in the U.S. Army.

The other Iranian military threat comes from “large numbers of small, fast attack craft designed to support `swarming’ tactics that seek to overwhelm the layers of defenses deployed by U.S. and other nations’ naval vessels.” Though the report doesn’t say so, this refers to the Persian Gulf, and especially the narrow Straits of Hormuz, where petroleum and natural gas shipping could be blocked. This assessment no doubt came from the U.S. Navy.

The report also mentions that “non-state actors such as Hezbollah have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles and man-portable air defense systems from Iran.” And this was clearly the contribution of the U.S. Air Force. ("Man-portable," that means someone can carry it. I love military-speak.)

Taken as a whole, these concerns point to a possible scenario often forgotten in current discussions. The United States is not going to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. It is possible, however, that a future military clash could originate by an Iranian act of aggression—perhaps coming from lower-ranking personnel or some miscalculation—that could result in an armed conflict. While not highly likely, such an outcome is more possible when Iran has nuclear weapons and has gained in confidence (arrogance to put it bluntly). Again, this is a low-likelihood scenario but one the U.S. military has to be prepared to meet.

Since the U.S. government seems determined not to take notice Iranian involvement in attacks on U.S. military personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, or in terrorist attacks elsewhere--for example the Khaibar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia--this doesn't seem a likely cause of conflict. Of course, the United States doesn't want--and should not want--to get into a war with Iran. The problem, however, is the failure to use of tough talk, sanctions, organizing an anti-Tehran alliance, or other stronger diplomatic means to discourage such behavior by the Iranian regime.

Second, and perhaps most interesting of all, is the Department of Defense's concept of strategy for the region:

“It is time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests….Long-term relationships and shared interests with allies and partners will clarify our extended commitment to the region’s security, enhance the resiliency of our defense posture, and improve our collective ability to carry out current operations while preparing for contingency requests.”

To translate this into normal English: The United States has to build up its alliances and cooperation with local states. But what does this mean? Most obviously, it requires working with the Gulf Arab states (and especially Saudi Arabia), Jordan, Israel, Iraq, and Egypt against Iran’s ambitions. “Shared interests” is a code word for that factor. Two other states which should be on that list—Lebanon and Turkey—have basically gone over to the other side though the U.S. government may not realize that situation.

But what does it mean in practice to build up such arrangements? The term “strategic architecture” is a fancy way of saying some kind of alliance system. But for several reasons—inter-Arab quarrels, the Arab-Israeli conflict, radical posturing by moderate Arab states, and Arab appeasement of Iran—this isn’t going to happen the way it should if only national interests were the motivations. (This is why “Realist” analysts don’t understand the Middle East but that’s for another article.)

Note also the phrase “extended commitment” which means U.S. power is in the area to stay, that Washington won’t bug out on allies, or in short, American credibility. That factor has been fast declining during the first year of the Obama administration.

Finally, there is Iraq, where the language strikes me as a little strange and potentially explosive:

“The United States will therefore manage a responsible force drawdown in Iraq and support an orderly transition to a more normal diplomatic and civilian presence.” The word “drawdown” means fewer troops, not complete withdrawal. Remember that one for the future—the Defense Department wants to keep open the option of keeping soldiers in Iraq and that might not just include trainers.

What does the chairman of the Joint Chiefs say? Well, he’s far blunter about it: “I remain concerned about the nuclear ambitions and confrontational postures of Iran and North Korea.” These are real threats and the word “confrontational” means that they might go to war on U.S. allies or forces. By the way, if you want to know what the United States really should be worried about regarding Iran's nuclear weapons read this.

He quickly adds, paying obeisance to the White House, how the report “emphasizes the President’s focus on engagement and reinforces our efforts to work with allies and partners to prevent global nuclear proliferation, regardless of origin.”

If you understand how these things work, that sentence has the bureaucratic brilliance of a masterpiece painting and the humor of a great comedian. It hits all the Obama themes: yes, engagement is great, we prefer a deal, of course we should never act unilaterally, and we would like to get rid of all nuclear weapons.

But the chairman goes on with a couple of great “at the same time” points regarding countering weapons of mass destruction, finding where such weapons are, and destroying them if necessary.

Translation: We know we are probably on our own. All this politics stuff is great but in the final analysis—when engagement fails and others look after their own interests rather than help us--the U.S. military must be ready to squish anyone threatening us. Yep, that’s what it’s there for.


RubinReports: The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

Sunday, 14 February 2010

RubinReports: The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too

Please subscribe and be subscriber numbe 9,102!

By Barry Rubin

The Department of Defense has just released its new Quadrennial Defense Review Report for 2010. What does it say about the Middle East? Far less than you’d expect in terms of space but still some extremely important points about what might involve the United States in future wars there.

Aside from some scattered references on the need for more civilian nation-building experts, funding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and energy conservation efforts (that's an area, no doubt, where money could be saved), that region takes up less than two pages, about two percent, of the 97-page report.

In comparison, about one-quarter of the four-page note from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, attached to the report, spends 25 percent on the region and sounds far more sensible.

I read this gap as suggesting that the uniformed military (which prepared the admiral's note) is concerned about Iran and terrorist groups but that the text’s main body, by the secretary of defense and designed to please the White House, puts more emphasis on climate change, green energy, and the use of the military as a community-organizing type force to make civilians in places like Afghanistan more friendly to the United States.

But there are significant points of interests in both sections. Let’s start with the report itself which basically makes three points.

First, while an Iranian nuclear capability and terrorism are basically not mentioned at all, there is significant concern over two aspects of Iran’s military build-up. Iranian missile systems are becoming more accurate and longer-range, meaning U.S. air bases, command centers, and other military targets could come under attack. This concern presumably originated in the U.S. Army.

The other Iranian military threat comes from “large numbers of small, fast attack craft designed to support `swarming’ tactics that seek to overwhelm the layers of defenses deployed by U.S. and other nations’ naval vessels.” Though the report doesn’t say so, this refers to the Persian Gulf, and especially the narrow Straits of Hormuz, where petroleum and natural gas shipping could be blocked. This assessment no doubt came from the U.S. Navy.

The report also mentions that “non-state actors such as Hezbollah have acquired unmanned aerial vehicles and man-portable air defense systems from Iran.” And this was clearly the contribution of the U.S. Air Force. ("Man-portable," that means someone can carry it. I love military-speak.)

Taken as a whole, these concerns point to a possible scenario often forgotten in current discussions. The United States is not going to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. It is possible, however, that a future military clash could originate by an Iranian act of aggression—perhaps coming from lower-ranking personnel or some miscalculation—that could result in an armed conflict. While not highly likely, such an outcome is more possible when Iran has nuclear weapons and has gained in confidence (arrogance to put it bluntly). Again, this is a low-likelihood scenario but one the U.S. military has to be prepared to meet.

Since the U.S. government seems determined not to take notice Iranian involvement in attacks on U.S. military personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, or in terrorist attacks elsewhere--for example the Khaibar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia--this doesn't seem a likely cause of conflict. Of course, the United States doesn't want--and should not want--to get into a war with Iran. The problem, however, is the failure to use of tough talk, sanctions, organizing an anti-Tehran alliance, or other stronger diplomatic means to discourage such behavior by the Iranian regime.

Second, and perhaps most interesting of all, is the Department of Defense's concept of strategy for the region:

“It is time to renew focus on a strategic architecture that better serves U.S., allied, and partner interests….Long-term relationships and shared interests with allies and partners will clarify our extended commitment to the region’s security, enhance the resiliency of our defense posture, and improve our collective ability to carry out current operations while preparing for contingency requests.”

To translate this into normal English: The United States has to build up its alliances and cooperation with local states. But what does this mean? Most obviously, it requires working with the Gulf Arab states (and especially Saudi Arabia), Jordan, Israel, Iraq, and Egypt against Iran’s ambitions. “Shared interests” is a code word for that factor. Two other states which should be on that list—Lebanon and Turkey—have basically gone over to the other side though the U.S. government may not realize that situation.

But what does it mean in practice to build up such arrangements? The term “strategic architecture” is a fancy way of saying some kind of alliance system. But for several reasons—inter-Arab quarrels, the Arab-Israeli conflict, radical posturing by moderate Arab states, and Arab appeasement of Iran—this isn’t going to happen the way it should if only national interests were the motivations. (This is why “Realist” analysts don’t understand the Middle East but that’s for another article.)

Note also the phrase “extended commitment” which means U.S. power is in the area to stay, that Washington won’t bug out on allies, or in short, American credibility. That factor has been fast declining during the first year of the Obama administration.

Finally, there is Iraq, where the language strikes me as a little strange and potentially explosive:

“The United States will therefore manage a responsible force drawdown in Iraq and support an orderly transition to a more normal diplomatic and civilian presence.” The word “drawdown” means fewer troops, not complete withdrawal. Remember that one for the future—the Defense Department wants to keep open the option of keeping soldiers in Iraq and that might not just include trainers.

What does the chairman of the Joint Chiefs say? Well, he’s far blunter about it: “I remain concerned about the nuclear ambitions and confrontational postures of Iran and North Korea.” These are real threats and the word “confrontational” means that they might go to war on U.S. allies or forces. By the way, if you want to know what the United States really should be worried about regarding Iran's nuclear weapons read this.

He quickly adds, paying obeisance to the White House, how the report “emphasizes the President’s focus on engagement and reinforces our efforts to work with allies and partners to prevent global nuclear proliferation, regardless of origin.”

If you understand how these things work, that sentence has the bureaucratic brilliance of a masterpiece painting and the humor of a great comedian. It hits all the Obama themes: yes, engagement is great, we prefer a deal, of course we should never act unilaterally, and we would like to get rid of all nuclear weapons.

But the chairman goes on with a couple of great “at the same time” points regarding countering weapons of mass destruction, finding where such weapons are, and destroying them if necessary.

Translation: We know we are probably on our own. All this politics stuff is great but in the final analysis—when engagement fails and others look after their own interests rather than help us--the U.S. military must be ready to squish anyone threatening us. Yep, that’s what it’s there for.

RubinReports: The U.S. Military Looks at the Middle East: Bows to the White House But Knows Its Mission, Too
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