Love of the Land: Linkage Threat: Will Israel Pay the Price for Obama’s Nuclear Delusions?

Linkage Threat: Will Israel Pay the Price for Obama’s Nuclear Delusions?

Jonathan Tobin
Contentions/Commentary
07 May '10

While the world watches and waits to see what, if anything, Washington will do to stop Iran’s nuclear program, the greatest obstacle to action may not be just the president’s indifference to the existential threat to Israel or the possibility such a development would pose to regional stability. Instead, as it is rapidly becoming evident, one of the fundamental problems here may be something else: the Obama administration’s obsession with pursuing the left’s Cold War agenda against nuclear arms.

As the New York Times’s report (mentioned earlier today by Jennifer) shows, President Obama plans to revive a civilian nuclear agreement with Russia, one that had been spiked by the Bush administration after Moscow’s invasion of Georgia in 2008. When it comes to nuclear issues, the administration’s priority remains the futile pursuit of agreements that will diminish America’s nuclear edge rather than an all-out effort to stop the spread of such weapons. As was the case with last year’s decision to betray past promises to the Czech Republic and Poland on missile defense to appease Russia, Obama’s main concern seems to be conciliating America’s antagonists rather than solidarity with allies. Rather than wait to see if Russia will make good on the vague pledges it has made about supporting the United States on Iran, Obama has gone ahead and handed the Medvedev/Putin regime a major victory in exchange for nothing.

Yet as troubling as this foolish determination to please Russia’s new autocrats may be, it is merely part of a larger agenda in which the administration’s interest in nuclear issues has created a situation that, rather than isolating the rogue regime in Tehran, may serve to harm Israel. As the United Nations’s month-long nuclear nonproliferation conference that began last week has shown, Washington’s push on the issue has been derailed. The president’s much-heralded deference to international opinion and his clear interest in appeasing Russia and China have contributed to a situation where the main topic of conversation is becoming not how to stop Iran but rather how to disarm its intended victim Israel. The fact that Israel’s possession of nukes is purely defensive — after all, it is the only nation marked for extinction by many of its neighbors as well as by the Iranian regime — is more easily forgotten amid the new emphasis given to banning nukes started by Obama. This is reinforced by a statement earlier this week from the head of the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency, Yukiya Amano, who is asking for international input on an Arab-led push to have Israel join the Nonproliferation Treaty, in a move that increases pressure on Jerusalem to disclose more information about its own nuclear weapons.

(Read full post)

Love of the Land: Linkage Threat: Will Israel Pay the Price for Obama’s Nuclear Delusions?

Love of the Land: Iran, Hezbollah, and the Bomb

Iran, Hezbollah, and the Bomb

William Harris
The Weekly Standard
07 May '10

When Iran gets the bomb, the nuclear club will have a crucial new feature. Without an Iranian bomb and barring regime change in Pakistan, we know that no nuclear power will transfer a device to a private army of the religious elect like Hezbollah in Lebanon. With an Iranian bomb, such assurance instantly ends. This is a looming, tangible state of affairs--in contrast to the hype about loose nuclear materials at the April 2010 Washington nuclear security summit.

Proponents of containing a nuclear Iran in and around the Obama administration conceive of deterring Iran in standard realist style. The Islamic Republic of Iran, however, has become a hybrid of the government of God and ruthless militarized mafias. It is well practiced in long-range subversion, intimidation, and weapons smuggling. It may be confidently expected to shred so-called containment, especially when equipped with a nuclear aura and facing the quivering potentates of Arabia.

In any case, Iran has a strategic extension across the Middle East to the Mediterranean that puts it beyond containment. On February 25, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah met in Damascus to celebrate their alignment and its achievements. The Syrian-Iranian partnership has enabled the Syrian ruling clique to go from strength to strength in dealing with the West and the Arabs. Syria only looks forward to more gains from the partnership as Iran moves toward the bomb. At the tripartite summit, Assad mocked Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's call for Syria to steer away from Iran.

(Read full article)

Love of the Land: Iran, Hezbollah, and the Bomb

Love of the Land: What Happens When Iran Gets the Bomb

What Happens When Iran Gets the Bomb

Jennifer Rubin
Contentions/Commentary
03 May '10

John Bolton writes that we can no longer avoid the obvious: “There are only two options: Iran gets nuclear weapons, or someone uses pre-emptive military force to break Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and paralyze its program, at least temporarily.” The watered-down sanctions under contemplation by the UN or being slow-walked through Congress are too little, too late. And as Bolton notes, it is virtually inconceivable that Obama will employ military force to thwart the mullahs’ nuclear plans. So where does that leave us? Bolton explains:

That leaves Israel, which the administration is implicitly threatening not to resupply with airplanes and weapons lost in attacking Iran—thereby rendering Israel vulnerable to potential retaliation from Hezbollah and Hamas.

It is hard to conclude anything except that the Obama administration is resigned to Iran possessing nuclear weapons. While U.S. policy makers will not welcome that outcome, they certainly hope as a corollary that Iran can be contained and deterred. Since they have ruled out the only immediate alternative, military force, they are doubtless now busy preparing to make lemonade out of this pile of lemons.

The notion that we can contain a nuclear-armed Iran is preposterous — for we are not containing an Iran that lacks a nuclear capability. For those who perceive a nuclear-armed revolutionary Islamic state as literally “unacceptable” — not merely regrettable, as the Obami seem to — Bolton suggests that it is time to begin marshalling support for Israel’s military action:

(Read full post)

Love of the Land: What Happens When Iran Gets the Bomb

Love of the Land: The Obama Administration's Conflicting Messages on Iran

The Obama Administration's Conflicting Messages on Iran

Alan M. Dershowitz
Hudson New York
19 April '10

The Obama Administration is sending conflicting and confusing messages both to Iran and to those who fear an Iranian nuclear weapon. According to The New York Times, defense secretary Robert M. Gates sent a top secret memorandum to White House officials bemoaning the fact that the United States simply has no policy in place to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. At the same time, it is telling Israel that although Iran has threatened to wipe it off the map, the Jewish state should not take military action to prevent a second Holocaust. Indeed former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who has participated in White House discussions concerning the Middle East, has threatened that if Israel tries to destroy Iran's nuclear weapon facilities, the United States is fully capable of shooting Israeli jets out of the air.

Although Gates subsequently denied that his memo, which he acknowledges writing, was intended as a "wake up call," a senior White House official has confirmed that it was just that. There is no evidence, however, that the White House is prepared to confront the grave threat posed by a nuclear Iran. The policy that seems to be emerging from the White House is one called "containment." But what is containment? It is little more than an acknowledgement of failure. Containment implies that the United States will not succeed in preventing Iran from securing nuclear weapons, but rather it will accept such an eventuality and seek to deter the use of nuclear weapons by threats and by the deployment of defensive measures. The analogy that proponents of containment point to is North Korea, which has nuclear weapons but has thus far been "contained" from using them. But there are vast differences between North Korea and Iran.

North Korea is a secular Communist regime that is risk averse and that has no sworn existential enemies. The goal of its leaders is simply to remain in power and maintain their totalitarian control over their people. Iran is a theocratic, apocalyptic regime that believes that it has a religious obligation to destroy Israel and threaten the United States. Iran, unlike North Korea, also operates through surrogates, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and other smaller terrorist groups. They could hand-off nuclear material to such groups, or to sympathetic individuals, for use as dirty bombs directed against its enemies.

(Read full article)

Love of the Land: The Obama Administration's Conflicting Messages on Iran

Love of the Land: To only say Iranian nukes are unacceptable is to accept them

To only say Iranian nukes are unacceptable is to accept them

William Kristol
Washington Post
28 March '10

In March 1936, Hitler occupied the Rhineland. The French prime minister, Leon Blum, denounced the act as "unacceptable." But France, Britain and the rest of the world accepted it. Years later, the French political thinker Raymond Aron commented, "To say that something is unacceptable was to say that one accepted it."

In March 2010, as Iran moved ahead with its nuclear weapons program, the American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, speaking at the policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee last week, said no fewer than four times in one paragraph that a nuclear-armed Iran would be "unacceptable." It would be unacceptable simply, "unacceptable to the United States," "unacceptable to Israel" and "unacceptable to the region and the international community."

Then, perhaps sensing the ghost of Raymond Aron at her shoulder, Clinton hastened to add: "So let me be very clear: The United States is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."

But this attempt at reassurance merely conjured up (at least for me) another ghost: that of Richard Nixon. Didn't Nixon always say, at moments of utmost insincerity, that he wanted to make something very clear?

In March 2010, as Iran moved ahead with its nuclear weapons program, the American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, speaking at the policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee last week, said no fewer than four times in one paragraph that a nuclear-armed Iran would be "unacceptable." It would be unacceptable simply, "unacceptable to the United States," "unacceptable to Israel" and "unacceptable to the region and the international community."

Then, perhaps sensing the ghost of Raymond Aron at her shoulder, Clinton hastened to add: "So let me be very clear: The United States is determined to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."

But this attempt at reassurance merely conjured up (at least for me) another ghost: that of Richard Nixon. Didn't Nixon always say, at moments of utmost insincerity, that he wanted to make something very clear?

(Read full article)

Love of the Land: To only say Iranian nukes are unacceptable is to accept them

Love of the Land: Can the US Contain a Nuclear Iran?

Can the US Contain a Nuclear Iran?

Emily B. Landau
INSS Insight No. 171
24 March '10

With any hope of a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran now postponed until June, and the understanding that if at all, these will be weak and ineffective measures, Obama's diplomatic initiative is slowly grinding to a halt. Taking into account Iran's steady progress in developing fissible material, its work on producing a nuclear warhead, and its ever-improving missile capabilities -- together with low expectations that anything in this dynamic will impress upon the Obama administration the need to ultimately take military action -- part of the discourse on this topic is changing track. Instead of focusing on the stinging failure to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, some are arguing that it's now time to move on. They say that in the likely scenario that Iran becomes the next nuclear state, the US will simply resort to its ultimate strategy that has worked in other cases: it will contain a nuclear Iran.

But will the US indeed be able to contain a nuclear Iran? The answer to this question involves two levels: first, US credibility vis-à-vis Iran, and second, what the US will be seeking to contain. On both counts, there is little room for optimism.

Containment (and deterrence) of an adversary necessarily depend on a state's ability to transmit to the adversary credible threats of consequences for certain behavior on the part of the adversary. In this regard, the idea that the US can contain Iran cannot be divorced from what has transpired over the past year vis-à-vis the diplomatic initiative that Obama has pursued from his first day in office. The lesson that Iran has learned from the Obama administration is that while there has been no shortage of threats of consequences, there have been little to no actual consequences. Iran has seen that the US sets red lines and deadlines that in practice are virtually meaningless. The US has undermined its own ability to present a credible threat by saying outright that it has no intention of taking military action because it is overstretched in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it has clarified through its actions that broad multilateral agreement is more important than demonstrating resolve to Iran in the economic realm as well. Why should we assume that the US will be any more successful in projecting credibility toward Iran when this state becomes a nuclear state than it has been in the period before Iran crossed this line?

(Read full report)

Love of the Land: Can the US Contain a Nuclear Iran?

Love of the Land: Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran

Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran

Zaki Shalom/Jonathan Schachter
INSS Insight No. 169
18 March '10

In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on February 26, 2010, Defense Minister Ehud Barak made extensive reference to Iran, its attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities, and the policy ramifications for the major powers and Israel towards Iran. Despite a certain measure of opacity in his address, Barak did make some unequivocal statements of interest. These express the situation assessment prevalent in Israel regarding Iran’s nuclear goal and the gaps between Israel and the American administration and their implications from Israel’s perspective. What follows are highlights:

a. Iran is a threat challenging not only Israel but also the entire international community. It is hard to imagine a stable world order with a nuclear Iran. Iran is attempting to “defy, deceive, and deter” the entire world with its nuclear ambitions and gain time in order to attain military nuclear capabilities.

b. Iran’s objective is not merely the construction of a “Manhattan project-like crude nuclear device.” Its goal is to skip to the “second or second and a half generation” of nuclear warheads that can be mounted on surface-to-surface missiles with ranges covering not only Israel but also Moscow and Paris.

c. A nuclear Iran will lead to the elimination of the non-proliferation regime. Saudi Arabia, and perhaps another state or two in the region, will also feel obligated to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. At a later stage this might lead to third-tier dictators acting in the same manner.

d. The model Iran looks to is that of Pakistan rather than that of North Korea. The meaning of this distinction is almost certainly that Iran strives for a solid nuclear capability based on a large number of nuclear warheads and the capacity for launching them at remote targets rather than on single launchers for purposes of show.

e. These circumstances obligate adoption of a clear policy toward Iran before it manages to realize its nuclear ambitions. Such a policy must be “intensive, concrete and conclusive.”

f. There is real activity aimed at instituting sanctions against Iran. The severity of these sanctions – from “targeted," to "hurting," "crippling," and "paralyzing" – remains unclear. Israel prefers the most severe option.

g. Israel will not deny its own responsibility or enter into a cycle of self-delusion and turn a blind eye to what is happening right before it. Therefore, it recommends not removing any option – i.e., the military option – from the table.

Barak’s statements suggest a gap between US and Israeli perspectives on Iran’s nuclear activity, in terms of its significance and severity. The United States, so it seems from Barak’s address, can live with a nuclear Iran – despite its declarations to the contrary. Israel, by contrast, cannot accept such a reality. In any event, Israel must first and foremost see to its own existential interests, even to the point of not coordinating its every move with the American administration.

(Read full report)

Love of the Land: Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran

Love of the Land: Iranian Website: Iranian Nuclear Bomb Spells Death to Israel

Iranian Website: Iranian Nuclear Bomb Spells Death to Israel

Graphic: Stephen Hughes
MEMRI
23 February '10

On February 18, 2010, the Iranian website Asr-e Iran posted an editorial stating that Iran's possessing nuclear weapons will threaten Israel's existence and lead to its elimination – even if they are never used. The editorial explained that Israel's raison d'être is the illusion that it can provide absolute security for the Jewish people, and that it has security supremacy. Once Iran possesses nuclear weapons and shifts the balance of power in the Middle East, it states, this will be end of Israeli society.

The following is the translation of the article:

"The Zionist Regime Must Continue to Preserve this Illusion of 'Absolute Security' within the Borders of Israel"

"Since its establishment in 1948, the central pillar on which Israel is founded has been 'creating a secure territory for the Jewish people, in order to protect it from any possible danger.' This issue is so important to the elected officials of the Israeli regime that in the country's 62 years of existence, they have dealt harshly with any element, [even] the most minor, that could possibly strike at or harm 'the famous Paradise.'

"In order to continue to be a safe haven for Jews from all over the world, and to continue to draw human, economic, and other capital from all over the world, the Zionist regime must continue to preserve this illusion of 'absolute security' within the borders of Israel (i.e. occupied Palestine).

"For this reason, and driven by this strategy, in the 1960s Israel produced dozens of nuclear warheads (as the Western countries looked the other way, and some even collaborated, such as France) – so that it would, or so it thought, attain absolute supremacy in the Middle East balance of power.

"The truth is that for Israel, not just insecurity, but even the mere sense of insecurity is deadly poison. That is why this regime focuses all its efforts on preventing what it sees as the nuclearization of Iran.

"Israeli officials are well aware of what nuclear weapons mean and of the scope of their deterrence. They know well that using nuclear weapons as deterrence in a first strike capacity means mutual destruction if the other side has them as well. Thus, it cannot be assumed that a country that has nuclear weapons will use them against another country (particularly if that country also has them).

(Read full article)

Love of the Land: Iranian Website: Iranian Nuclear Bomb Spells Death to Israel

Love of the Land: What Is To Be Done About Nuclear Iran?

What Is To Be Done About Nuclear Iran?

Roger L Simon
Pajamamedia.com
11 February '10

Click here to watch the second part of Roger’s interview with Israeli ambassador to the United States. (View Part One here.)

A transcript of the entire interview appears below:

MR. SIMON: Ambassador Oren, thanks for taking time out of your busy schedule for PJTV. And before we get into the real subject of this discussion on Iran, I can’t resist asking you to comment on the events yesterday at UC Irvine. Was it really as bad as Judean Ramallah or not as bad?

AMBASSADOR OREN: First of all, pleasure to be here, Roger. As to what happened yesterday in UC Irvine, I was giving a presentation on the state of US Israel and Israel-Middle Eastern relations, and a group of several hundred students kept on disturbing me, calling out rather, you know, various curses and expletives, none of them deleted, and basically, violating the most fundamental law on an American campus, indeed, outside of American campus in this country, and that’s the right of free speech. And from my perspective, it was a great squandered opportunity for them. Here, they had an opportunity to hear a different perspective, perhaps not a perspective they agreed with or like, but — and a chance to exchange ideas, and that, I think, is what universities are about, but they’ve blocked this. And unfortunately, this has happened at several campuses to several Israeli speakers, but not only to Israeli speakers. Last week, down at Georgetown campus, General Petraeus was subject to the same type of interference. So I think it’s the beginning of a trend that we have to watch very, very carefully, a trend to sort of bring the Middle East, where there is no freedom of expression, onto American campuses. And I think we have to be very vigilant, indeed, to prevent that from happening.

MR. SIMON: It’s not just American campuses, though, unfortunately. My nephew is a student at the London School of Economics, and the same thing happened there. And he wrote about it for Pajamas Media. But let’s move on to Iran, here.

(Read full transcript)

Love of the Land: What Is To Be Done About Nuclear Iran?

Israel Matzav: Iran increases uranium output

Iran increases uranium output

While the world dithers on Iran, Iran continues to pursue its goal of obtaining nuclear weapons. To that end, Iran has increased uranium mining, as shown by satellite photos.

Evidence of stepped-up activity at the Gchine mine, near the Persian Gulf coast city of Bandar Abbas, is seen in pictures obtained by Bloomberg News and the Washington-based New America Foundation, according to four nuclear analysts who examined the images. The mine could produce enough uranium to craft at least two atomic bombs a year, experts said.

The photographs, taken on April 26 and Oct. 3 by DigitalGlobe Inc. and GeoEye Inc., two U.S. commercial satellite companies, show Iran increased the rate at which it pumps waste from the mine during the intervening months. Iran has filled one waste pool since November 2008, when a previous photograph was taken, and built a second pond with pipes connecting it to processing tanks that separate the metal from rock.

“Iran’s decision to expand mining and milling at Bandar Abbas seems to validate the suspicions of those who think it was the main uranium site for a covert program,” Jeffrey G. Lewis, nuclear strategy and non-proliferation director at the New America Foundation, a public policy institute, said in an Oct. 20 interview.

The increased uranium production indicates that United Nations inspectors need to widen their field of vision beyond facilities such as Iran’s uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz and its Esfahan conversion facility, Lewis and other analysts said. The UN’s nuclear agency should renew demands to inspect research labs, machine shops and mines including Gchine, they added.

What could go wrong?

Israel Matzav: Iran increases uranium output

RubinReports: Iran Rejects Deal on Nuclear Weapons’ Issue: Engagement is Dead but the Obama Administration Won't Admit It

Iran Rejects Deal on Nuclear Weapons’ Issue: Engagement is Dead but the Obama Administration Won't Admit It

[Please subscribe. The news in the Middle East and with U.S. foreign policy changes dramatically every day and you will have advanced, inside information on developments. I note we are scooping the mass media on many stories by days and even weeks.]

By Barry Rubin

The great experiment of engaging Iran seems to be over but the Obama Administration refuses to admit it.

This shouldn't be a surprise. As the Iranian regime's record shows, it stalls, maneuvers, gives vague promises and then doesn’t deliver, but only after they’ve taken your concessions. Do you know how many years the talks with Iran have gone on without yielding fruit and letting Tehran develop nuclear weapons every day? Answer: Seven.

Do you know when the “deadline” originally was for Iran to stop its nuclear program “or else”? Answer: Approximately September 2007.

But the Obama Administration doesn't want to admit that the new Iranian counter-offer is unacceptable because it would have to give up its dreams of a deal and actually do something in response.

Even the New York Times headlines its story: Iran Rejects Nuclear Accord, Officials Report

Here’s the best article on the subject of the current deal/no deal from the sober Financial Times. The headline is “Tehran seeks big changes to nuclear deal.”

It concerns Iran’s response to questions about whether it would transfer two-thirds of its enriched uranium outside the country to make into a special non-weapons material that can only be used for medical purposes. (Note: it can be changed back into weapons-usable uranium in about four months or so.)

After interviewing officials, the newspaper concludes that the Europeans are ready to reject Iran’s demands now as “unacceptable” but the United States isn’t. It writes:

“The comments indicate the US remains more willing to show patience than either Britain and [sic] France. While London and Paris have at times made known their reservations about the agreement, it is seen in the US as a test of President Barack Obama's policy of engagement.”

In other words, the U.S. government is now lagging behind Britain, France, and presumably Germany on this issue. So who is the United States trying to keep on board if the key European allies are all saying: forget this nonsense, we have to put on more pressure!

I suggest there are three answers:

--President Barack Obama’s world view which insists that all problems are resolvable by talking and making concessions, and which fears confrontation.

--The president’s domestic constituency and colleagues (not all of them) who simply don’t comprehend that Iran and radical Islamism are threats.

I am positive, given some of her public statements, that Secretary of State Hilary Clinton knows this is all sheer nonsense. And just as the U.S. government has fallen behind its European counterparts, the White House has fallen behind the State Department.

--Someone else. Here’s the hint:

"We remain unified with our Russian and French partners in support of the IAEA draft agreement - it is a good and balanced agreement," said the US, signaling Washington's hope that Iran could yet agree to the original deal.”

That’s right, Russia. But we know that Russia won’t ever agree to sanctions and serious pressure on Iran. For one thing, everyone in the world but the Obama Administration knows that the Russian leadership wants America to fail internationally. And for another thing, Russia is Iran’s ally.

So America’s policy is being held hostage by a president with no experience or understanding of international affairs, a set of ideas that makes failure inevitable, trying to please a country which is an ally of the adversary, and a dictatorial regime whose president believes that his country is going to conquer the whole Middle East (and on some days, the world).

And here’s a good joke: It was only--what?--four years ago that U.S. officials under the Bush Administration were making fun of Europe as wimpy and incapable of taking a tough stance on international issues. Now the goo is on the other foot!

What a mess. BUT how long into 2010 can they spin this before Washington is going to have to recognize the talks are going nowhere?

RubinReports: Iran Rejects Deal on Nuclear Weapons’ Issue: Engagement is Dead but the Obama Administration Won't Admit It

Israel Matzav: Iran clenches its fist

Iran clenches its fist

Iran responded to the P - 5+1 countries on Thursday by clenching its fist. According to Iranian media, it demanded to send its low enriched uranium abroad gradually rather than all at once, and it demanded the right to import higher enriched uranium simultaneously with the lower enriched uranium's departure. Those conditions have been labeled 'non-starters' for the West by the media.

Western powers were likely to rebuff Tehran's proposed amendments because their priority is to reduce the stockpile of Iranian LEU to ward off the danger that Iran might turn it into the highly-enriched uranium needed for an atom bomb.

Sending most of the LEU abroad would buy about a year for talks on halting enrichment in Iran in return for incentives to forge a long-term solution to the nuclear dispute.

The powers will see Iran's counter-offer involving nuclear fuel imports as problematic because U.N. sanctions ban trade in nuclear materials, including enriched uranium, with Tehran.

Iran views such sanctions as illegal and unjust.

Israel labeled Iran's offer 'insufficient.'

Defence Minister Ehud Barak said the downside of the agreement was that it granted international recognition to uranium enrichment by Iran.

He urged the international community to go further and demand a complete stop to enrichment on Iranian soil.

'If this agreement is implemented, it will take them back a year, but there is a fly in the ointment. It means that they (the US, Russia and France) recognize that Iran is enriching uranium and that helps them (Iran) with their argument that they are enriching uranium for peaceful purposes,' Barak said.

'It is important to insist on an end to enrichment in Iran,' he told Israel Radio.

President Obama's chance to play hardball looks like it's coming real soon. Let's see if he even steps up to the plate.

Israel Matzav: Iran clenches its fist

Israel Matzav: What else is Iran hiding?

What else is Iran hiding?

The disclosure of the Qom nuclear facility (pictured) has of course led to speculation that Iran has other, undeclared nuclear facilities. What is the basis for that speculation? Newsweek explains.

U.S. arms-control experts say that Qum is probably one of at least a half-dozen undeclared sites in Iran's "nuclear archipelago." At its present rate of production, Qum's estimated 3,000 antiquated IR-1 centrifuges would take two years to churn out enough highly enriched uranium for a single bomb, according to Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. If Iran had another secret site, its parallel fuel cycle would cut down the waiting time to a year.

Furthermore, because Iran went to the trouble of hiding Qum, it's likely hiding other key components of a weapons program too. Take the conversion plant at Isfahan, which provides the uranium that goes into an enrichment facility--in this case, the site at Natanz. Both sites are being closely monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amount of uranium needed at Qum, some 7 to 16 percent of Isfahan's stockpile, would be too great a diversion to go unnoticed, says Andreas Persbo, an arms-control analyst at the U.K.-based Ploughshares Fund.

The existence of Qum's secret enrichment facility thus implies a corresponding conversion plant, as well as mines to extract uranium ore, labs to turn the enriched fuel into a metal, and workshops to produce firing circuits and high-explosive ­lenses. Indeed, The New York Times recently reported that classified portions of the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate listed some dozen additional suspected nuclear sites in Iran. As the black sites multiply, chances are that Western intelligence agencies will not be able to keep tabs on all of them. It's a game of hide-and-seek that the West can't afford to lose.

Unfortunately, it's a game of hide and seek that the West apparently is unwilling to go all out to win.

Israel Matzav: What else is Iran hiding?

Israel Matzav: What's wrong with 'testing' Iran?

What's wrong with 'testing' Iran?

The proposal to have Iran send some 80% of its known low enriched fuel stock to Russia and France for enrichment to 20% is deemed to be a test of Iran's intentions by the Obama administration. Emily Landau and Ephraim Asculai explain why it's the wrong test.

This test, however, is flawed in two important respects. The first dimension goes to the terms of the test itself. Even if Iran ultimately agrees to the deal, this by no means "proves" that its intentions are peaceful, because it may calculate that it can replenish the stocks in Natanz relatively quickly and perhaps use other secret facilities for this purpose as well. Moreover, it is working on the plutonium route in Arak. Similarly, if Iran does not agree to the draft, this in itself would not be "proof" that its intentions are necessarily military.

The second flaw is the very need to test Iran's intentions. In fact, there are enough indications already that Iran's intentions are not peaceful. One needs to look no further than the IAEA itself – not at the positions of its director-general, ElBaradei, rather those of his deputy, Olli Heinonen. Heinonen indicated already in February 2008 that the IAEA possesses evidence that is not consistent with any explanation other than that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. The existence of the second enrichment plant at Qom also points in this direction.

As such, these tests of Iran's intentions add nothing, but more problematic, they can be dangerous. The so-called test of Iran's intentions has been framed in a manner that if this week Iran agrees to the deal – especially after saying that it needs more time once the US, Russia, and France have all agreed – the determination of the international community to confront it firmly will very likely decrease considerably. It will seem that Iran has "finally" chosen the route of cooperation, whereas in reality the specific deal that will have been secured does nothing more than (at best) delay Iran's plans.

The international community cannot afford to allow this deal to distract it from the broader goal that it has set for itself, which is to stop Iran from advancing toward nuclear weapons. If Iran accepts the deal, the challenge for the international community will be to continue negotiations while maintaining the same degree of determination as before the deal was secured. At the very least, it should consider postponing provision of reactor fuel to Iran until a more comprehensive deal with Iran – that addresses the real issues of concern – is carved out.

And if Iran rejects the deal, the international community will be left in an awkward position, but at least its determination to stop Iran will likely remain strong.

I disagree with that last sentence - there's no determination to stop Iran except in Israel. The rest of the world regards the idea of stopping Iran as distasteful and something it would not undertake but for the fact that if the world does not stop Iran, Israel will, and the rest of the world will pay a major share of the consequences.

The distaste for stopping Iran is greater in some countries (the United States - or more specifically the Obama administration) than it is in others (like France - can you envision having written that three years ago?). President Obama will try to play this down to the wire to avoid doing what will eventually have to be done - confronting Iran militarily.

What could go wrong?

Read the whole thing.

Israel Matzav: What's wrong with 'testing' Iran?

Israel Matzav: The price of a nuclear deal with Iran

The price of a nuclear deal with Iran

At Foreign Policy, Michael Singh talks about the price of the deal currently being discussed by the P -5+1 with Iran to have Iran send low enriched uranium to Russia and France to have it enriched for medical use.

Like all purchases of information, however, this one comes at a cost. The P5+1 have had to accept the uranium enrichment which Iran has conducted in recent years in defiance of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. Even if it ultimately does not reach a deal to send its LEU abroad, Iran will surely seek to pocket this concession and declare a measure of victory. Similarly, by presenting the admission of IAEA inspectors to the until-recently-covert Qom enrichment plant as a concession, Iran gains tacit international acceptance of a facility built in defiance of its Nonproliferation Treaty obligations. If the P5+1 accepts this fait accompli and negotiates to limit rather than eliminate uranium enrichment in Iran and to monitor rather than shut down the Qom facility, the result could be a dangerous one for the stability of the Middle East and the viability of the global nonproliferation regime.

Another cost of the current U.S. initiative is that it risks demoralizing Iran's ascendant political opposition by bolstering the regime at a time when its legitimacy at home appears to be waning. Given that an internal transformation in Iran may be the best hope for long-run peace and stability in the region, any action that risks delaying it could be costly indeed. None of this is to say that the current approach should not be tried, given the paucity of attractive options; it is simply to say that it is not free. At some point the purchases of information must end, and a decision must be taken. A pharmaceutical company that conducts many clinical trials but sells no drugs eventually finds itself out of business.

Here in Israel, there is discontent with the deal currently being discussed in Vienna.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak broke Israel's official silence on a draft plan to ship one load of Iranian uranium abroad for enrichment, saying Thursday night there was a need to halt all uranium enrichment on Iranian soil.

"This agreement, if it is signed, will set Iran's accumulation of enriched material back by about a year," Barak said during a speech at President Shimon Peres's Israeli Presidential Conference at the Jerusalem International Convention Center.

"However, if they don't stop enrichment, then the only result will be that Iran has gained the legitimacy to enrich uranium on its soil for civilian purposes, in clear opposition to the interlocutors' and our understanding that their true plan is to attain [military] nuclear capability," he said.

"So, I repeat, what is required is a halt to enrichment in Iran, not just an export of the enriched material to build fuel rods," the defense minister said.

It's actually worse than that. The deal sets Iran back by a year on the presumption that the low enriched uranium that they are sending abroad - which is about 80% of what they are known to possess - is in fact 80% of what they have. But they could have other low (or even high) enriched uranium that is unknown to the IAEA 'international community.' (I struck the IAEA because so long as ElBaradei is in charge, I don't believe it would necessarily tell anyone if Iran has undisclosed uranium stockpiles).

Herb Keinon of the JPost adds:

Barak's comments reflect the belief that the plan does not address the three fundamental issues that have been enshrined in various UN Security Council resolutions on Iran: that all Iranian enrichment activity be suspended until confidence is restored that the nuclear program is for civilian purposes only; that there be increased verification from the IAEA supervisors; and that there be transparency, meaning questions and explanations to a wide array of outstanding questions posed by the IAEA.

Read the whole thing.

What could go wrong?

Israel Matzav: The price of a nuclear deal with Iran

Israel Matzav: Smoking gun on Iran's nuclear program

Smoking gun on Iran's nuclear program

A three-minute video proving Iran is trying to produce nuclear weapons has been smuggled out of Iran (Hat Tip: David Hazony via Twitter).

The video depicted a room made of stone. At the center stood a Perspex mock-up - equipped with a flashing red light - of a ball-shaped bomb resting in the metallic, gold-plated cone of a missile warhead. In the most important scene in the film, the computer simulation shows the launched warhead reentering the atmosphere and exploding 600 meters above the earth's surface. According to experts, this is the ideal altitude for detonating a nuclear bomb in order to generate the maximum degree of destruction on the ground.

At the briefing, Heinonen noted that the type of warhead represented by the model could fit an Iranian Shahab missile.

...

In addition to the video, Heinonen displayed documents in Farsi, which he said dated back to July 2003-January 2004, and which included a number of sketches. Both the film and sketches showed a machine that can produce light-weight aluminum warheads.

Heinonen was very cautious, emphasizing there was no evidence proving that what they had seen was necessarily a mock-up of a nuclear warhead; it could have been a conventional one. Nonetheless, his listeners were stunned. It was clear to most of them that it was likely a nuclear device.

As one of those who was present explained to Haaretz: "If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it must be a duck." That is, one can assume the Iranians have conducted research and calculations for weaponization - how to assemble a nuclear device - as part of a secret military nuclear program alongside their civilian one.

At the briefing, Heinonen told participants that he and other IAEA officials had asked the Iranians for an explanation of the video - specifically, about the warhead, its simulated reentry into the earth's atmosphere, the detonation of its nuclear payload at an altitude of 600 meters, the ball-like mechanism and so on. However, as befitting their usual tactics, the Iranians delayed their response, and then argued that the materials - the footage, photos and sketches - were a total fabrication, produced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency or Israel's Mossad, or perhaps by both of them together. According to the Iranians, the forgery was intended to frame them, to present Iran as a country engaged in developing nuclear weapons, and thus operating in blatant violation of international conventions.

The Iranians' next move was to admit half-heartedly that the video was authentic, but that it depicted a computer simulation of a reentry vehicle of a conventional warhead - not a nuclear one.

...

Albright explained last month that the scientist who smuggled out the secret data was indeed an agent for German intelligence, who suspected Iran's security services had discovered his espionage activities. For that reason, he gave his wife the "electronic media," including the video, and instructed her to go to Turkey and hand it over to American diplomats there. A short while afterward, reported Albright, the scientist-agent vanished without a trace: Apparently, he was arrested by Iranian intelligence and executed for treason.

When it reached the United States, the data was sent to the Sandia National Laboratories to verify whether it was authentic and whether the simulation of the detonation of a nuclear device had, in fact, been carried out. Subsequently, probably in 2005, the information was transmitted in censored format to the IAEA. However, after examination, the organization's experts could not determine definitively whether it was genuine.

Nonetheless, the data convinced the IAEA's board of governors that Iran had indeed reneged on its obligations, and the agency decided to submit a report on the matter to the UN Security Council. In 2006, that body imposed sanctions on Iran for breaching its safeguards agreements and called upon it to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities. However, because of the internal dispute within the IAEA, the Vienna briefing was held only two years later.

Heinonen and his team compiled a 67-page report and asked ElBaradei to include it as an appendix to one of the IAEA's seasonal reports on Iran. However, on this issue, ElBaradei gained the upper hand: Convinced that there was no evidence of an Iranian military program, he refused to append the internal report and even asked that the fact of its very existence be concealed.

Read the whole thing.

Anyone still doubt what they're up to?

Israel Matzav: Smoking gun on Iran's nuclear program

Israel Matzav: Iran's nuclear threat... a lie?

Iran's nuclear threat... a lie?

I try to minimize the number of people I follow on Twitter because the volume of tweets becomes excessive. In general, I follow people whom I have used as sources in the past and who have many more followers than people they are following. One of the people I follow is a young blogger named Saeed from Iran who writes a blog called Revolutionary Road. I've been following Saeed since the first days of the post-election violence in Iran in June.

This morning, he disappoints.

Saeed runs without comment an article by John Pilger, a British 'investigative journalist,' who claims that Iran's nuclear threat is a lie. In the article, Pilger also attacks Israel, in case you have any doubts as to why the article was written:

On 16 September, Newsweek disclosed that the major US intelligence agencies had reported to the White House that Iran's "nuclear status" had not changed since the National Intelligence Estimate of November 2007, which stated with "high confidence" that Iran had halted in 2003 the programme it was alleged to have developed. The International Atomic Energy Agency has backed this, time and again.

The current propaganda derives from Obama's announcement that the US is scrapping missiles stationed on Russia's border. This serves to cover the fact that the number of US missile sites is actually expanding in Europe and the "redundant" missiles are being redeployed on ships. The game is to mollify Russia into joining, or not obstructing, the US campaign against Iran. "President Bush was right," said Obama, "that Iran's ballistic missile programme poses a significant threat [to Europe and the US]." That Iran would contemplate a suicidal attack on the US is preposterous. The threat, as ever, is one-way, with the world's superpower virtually ensconced on Iran's borders.

Iran's crime is its independence. Having thrown out America's favourite tyrant, Shah Reza Pahlavi, Iran remains the only resource-rich Muslim state beyond US control. As only Israel has a "right to exist" in the Middle East, the US goal is to cripple the Islamic Republic. This will allow Israel to divide and dominate the Middle East on Washington's behalf, undeterred by a confident neighbour. If any country in the world has been handed urgent cause to develop a nuclear "deterrence", it is Iran.

As one of the original signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has been a consistent advocate of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. In contrast, Israel has never agreed to an IAEA inspection, and its nuclear weapons plant at Dimona remains an open secret. Armed with as many as 200 active nuclear warheads, Israel "deplores" UN resolutions calling on it to sign the NPT, just as it deplored the recent UN report charging it with crimes against humanity in Gaza, just as it maintains a world record for violations of international law. It gets away with this because great power grants it immunity.

Here's the comment I wrote on Saeed's site (in case it is removed):

Saeed,

I hope you don't believe this crap. All the evidence is to the contrary. Have they even reported in Iran that there is a secret facility in Qom that was just disclosed last month?

As to Israel, assuming it has nuclear weapons, if you can't see the difference between a democracy holding nuclear weapons and an apocalyptic dictatorship holding them, you haven't learned the lessons of what you and your countrymen have been through in the last four months. Assuming that Israel has nuclear weapons, it has likely had them for more than 40 years and has never used them, including twice (1967 and especially 1973) when its very existence was threatened. Compare that to Ahmadinejad's threats to wipe Israel off the map at the first opportunity. After what you've gone through in the last four months, do you really believe he'd wouldn't do it?

Sorry my friend, but I'm very surprised and disappointed to see something like this on your site.

I could say a lot more (and have said it in the past) but I'll say it on my site.

How unreliable is Pilger's report? This is the Newsweek article to which he is referring.

The officials, who asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, said that U.S. intelligence agencies have informed policymakers at the White House and other agencies that the status of Iranian work on development and production of a nuclear bomb has not changed since the formal National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran's "Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities" in November 2007. Public portions of that report stated that U.S. intelligence agencies had "high confidence" that, as of early 2003, Iranian military units were pursuing development of a nuclear bomb, but that in the fall of that year Iran "halted its nuclear weapons program." The document said that while U.S. agencies believed the Iranian government "at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons," U.S. intelligence as of mid-2007 still had "moderate confidence" that it had not restarted weapons-development efforts.

One of the two officials said that the Obama administration has now worked out a system in which intelligence agencies provide top policymakers, including the president, with regular updates on intelligence judgments like the conclusions in the 2007 Iran NIE. According to the two officials, the latest update to policymakers has been that as of now—two years after the period covered by the 2007 NIE—U.S. intelligence agencies still believe Iran has not resumed nuclear-weapons development work. "That's the conclusion, but it's one that—like every other—is constantly checked and reassessed, both to take account of new information and to test old assumptions," one of the officials told NEWSWEEK. It is not clear whether U.S. agencies' confidence in this judgment has grown at all since the 2007 statement.

Without considering Israel's objections to the National Intelligence Assessment, there are other grounds for doubting it. First there is the assessment of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany's foreign intelligence agency. As the Wall Street Journal reported in July,

In a 30-page legal opinion on March 26 and a May 27 press release in a case about possible illegal trading with Iran, a special national security panel of the Federal Supreme Court in Karlsruhe cites from a May 2008 BND report, saying the agency "showed comprehensively" that "development work on nuclear weapons can be observed in Iran even after 2003."

According to the judges, the BND supplemented its findings on August 28, 2008, showing "the development of a new missile launcher and the similarities between Iran's acquisition efforts and those of countries with already known nuclear weapons programs, such as Pakistan and North Korea."

It's important to point out that this was no ordinary agency report, the kind that often consists just of open source material, hearsay and speculation. Rather, the BND submitted an "office testimony," which consists of factual statements about the Iranian program that can be proved in a court of law. This is why, in their March 26 opinion, the judges wrote that "a preliminary assessment of the available evidence suggests that at the time of the crime [April to November 2007] nuclear weapons were being developed in Iran." In their May press release, the judges come out even more clear, stating unequivocally that "Iran in 2007 worked on the development of nuclear weapons."

The information received from the Germans - who generally have much better sources on the ground in Iran than the United States has - led the Journal to conclude that the 2007 United States National Intelligence Assessment on Iran was politicized and did not constitute an objective assessment of the facts.

The court's decision and the BND's reports raise the question of how, or why, U.S. intelligence officials could have come to the conclusion that Iran suspended its program in 2003. German intelligence officials wonder themselves. BND sources have told me that they have shared their findings and documentation with their U.S. colleagues ahead of the 2007 NIE report -- as is customary between these two allies. It appears the Americans have simply ignored this evidence despite repeated warnings from the BND. This suggests not so much a failure of U.S. intelligence but its sabotage.

The politicized 2007 NIE report undermined the Bush Administration's efforts to rally international support for tough action against Iran. The world's best hope is that the Obama Administration is not being fed the same false sense of security.

The Journal article about the BND assessment appeared in July. Less than ten days after the Newsweek report cited by Pilger appeared, Iran admitted to the IAEA that it maintains a nuclear facility in Qom that had not been disclosed to that point. That facility happens to be a perfect size for the development of nuclear weapons. Since that disclosure, more people in the United States have reached the conclusion that the NIE was politicized and did not represent the true state of affairs. The CIA has now admitted that it knew about Qom (pictured) as far back as 2006, but has yet to provide a satisfactory explanation for why Qom apparently did not figure into the 2007 assessment.

Would Mark Hosenball have written the same article for Newsweek ten days later after Qom was disclosed? In this article, published on October 2, Hosenball is much more cautious.

Three European counterproliferation officials, who asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive information, confirmed to NEWSWEEK that British intelligence agencies believe that Iran is actively pushing ahead with a nuclear-bomb program. One of the officials said that U.K. intelligence outfits—led by MI-6—are "skeptical" of suggestions, most notably by U.S. intelligence agencies, that Iran stopped work on a military program to design and build a nuclear weapon in 2003.

...

U.S. officials acknowledged this week that there do seem to be differences between Washington and some of its closest allies—including Germany and Israel—when it comes to assessing Iran's progress on weapons development. However, one U.S. intelligence official insisted: "The public reports of differences are, to some degree, exaggerated. Our judgments on the Iranian nuclear program—like all the judgments we reach—are subject to reassessment in light of new information, which comes in constantly. But you have to weigh and test each piece, running tough traps on everything from sourcing to assumptions."

Several U.S. and European officials said they were confident that the allied agencies—including CIA, MI-6, Germany's BND and Israel's Mossad—were working from the same raw information. In other words, neither the United States nor any of the allies have secret, unilateral sources of intelligence which would lead them to different conclusions about Iran's bomb efforts, the officials maintain.

Two of the European officials suggested that the American assessment is very cautious because U.S. intelligence analysts still feel burned by their mistakes in the run-up to the Iraq War, when faulty intelligence was used by Bush administration officials to justify military action.

...

American agencies agree with European counterparts that the Qom facility is highly suspicious. This is not only because the Iranians built it underground and concealed it from the world for years. Western intelligence agencies also note that the facility is designed to accommodate enough centrifuges to enrich uranium to bomb-grade, but too few centrifuges for the large-scale enrichment needed to generate electrical power. Still, some U.S. counterproliferation officials point out that the Qom facility is still being built, and that centrifuges have not yet been installed there—leaving open the possibility that the Iranians could be telling the truth when they insist that the facility is being built for peaceful purposes.

...

The Germans seem to share the British view that Iran's nuclear weapons work never ceased. The views of Germany's BND, or Federal Intelligence Service, were cited during an attempt by German authorities to prosecute a German-Iranian businessman for shipping potentially-nuclear-related equipment to Iran, including high-speed cameras and radiation detectors built to withstand high temperatures. German judges quoted a BND assessment that "development work on nuclear weapons can be observed in Iran even after 2003." However, a European official says that some German experts believe that Iran may not actually be building a bomb, but only assembling the necessary equipment and technology. This would enable the Iranians to be in a position to assemble a bomb quickly without actually becoming a nuclear-armed state.

Sorry Saeed, but John Pilger is clearly someone with an axe to grind against the State of Israel. I won't stake my families' lives on agreeing with his assessments and I don't suggest that you stake your life or your families' lives on them either.

Would you?
Israel Matzav: Iran's nuclear threat... a lie?

RubinReports: Iran’s Plan to Beat Sanctions

Iran’s Plan to Beat Sanctions

By Barry Rubin

Iran is sneering at the possibility that one day during the remainder of this century, the United States and European countries will put some form of sanctions on Iran to try to stop its nuclear weapons’ program.

At the Friday prayer sermon in Tehran—the most important forum in the country—on October 9, Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the event’s leader, said of the Geneva talks between Iran and the United States plus other important countries:

"The meeting was a great victory for the Islamic Republic of Iran to such an extent that even the Western and Zionist media had to admit defeat....Prior to the talks, they used to speak of suspension and sanctions against Iran, but after the talks, there has not been any word of suspension or sanctions, rather, Iran's package of proposals was the axis."

While it is not true there hasn’t been any talk of sanctions, there have been no major advances in plans for them either.

Supposedly the secret weapon—of the West, not Iran—will be to restrict the sale of gasoline and other refined petroleum products to Iran, which can’t make its own. Yet while this idea is being pressed by the U.S. Congress and discussed at length among the Western states, it is already becoming outdated. That is, it’s already clear three to six months before such restrictions are imposed—and yes, it would be better to have them than to do nothing—they are outdated and will be ineffective.

Iran’s leaders are confident of breaking any embargo or sanctions. When you hear their plans you can well believe them:

--Use China, Russia, and other countries that will violate sanctions in exchange for money. China and Russia will water down sanctions and then, whether or not they promise to adhere to them, will circumvent restrictions put on trade with Iran.

--Reduce subsidies for fuel to cut down on consumption.

--Employ the big gasoline stockpile Iran has been building just for this purpose.

--Put into production the huge new refinery the Chinese have built for them.

--Use the fact that there is an international recession plus surplus refining capacity to find companies eager to sell them gasoline and other fuel products.

And, of course, the more time Tehran has before sanctions are invoked, the more prepared it will be to defeat U.S. efforts.

I hate to say this but I’m betting on Tehran.

RubinReports: Iran’s Plan to Beat Sanctions

RubinReports: Palestinians Choose the Illusion of "Victory" Over Negotiated Peace

Palestinians Choose the Illusion of "Victory" Over Negotiated Peace

By Barry Rubin

This may be a very big development, a turning point. Palestinian Authority (PA) leaders are now openly complaining about President Barack Obama, saying he has hurt the Palestinian cause, by accepting less than a complete freeze of construction on settlements from Israel, pressuring PA leader Mahmoud Abbas to stand next to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the president's UN photo opportunity, and pushing the Palestinian Authority to ease off on demanding the UN put sanctions against Israel over the Goldstone Commission issue.

Obama is now going to discover what gratitude is worth in the Middle East. All his pro-Palestinian, pro-Muslim pronouncements, all his criticism of Israel, and everything else he's tried to do to show his warm support for that side have availed him nothing. In the eyes of the Palestinian leadership it isn't enough. It can never be enough.

I predict that within a month or two, Obama is going to be denounced in the Palestinian media--with the Syrians and others picking this up--that he is just another George W. Bush. Will he get angry or just keep pretending this isn't happening?

Here's how one Palestinian activist puts it, "We had more than a little hope that things would change with an Obama administration. Now the almost universal feeling among Palestinians is one of disappointment." This view isn't just coming from high-level officials but also has broad popular appeal.

Once again, the Palestinians have made clear choice. They can seek a mythical victory or real negotiations and a solution. They are choosing the illusion of victory over the reality of getting peace and a Palestinian state through negotiations.

Victory:

Fight on for decades, shed rivers of blood, try either to defeat and destroy Israel or to force it militarily or through international pressure to withdraw to the 1967 borders and give the Palestinians everything they want without concession on their part.

It is always tempting to try to get everything and give up nothing. It is also a good stance for a politician to tell his constituency that if they support him they can have all they want at no real cost.

But it doesn’t work.

Now Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas has made a major public speech in which he calls for the UN Human Rights Commission to hold a special session on the ridiculous Goldstone report. The goal is that the Commission will condemn Israel and call for sanctions against it, the UN will endorse the sanctions, and Israel will face massive sanctions.

The next step, unless the U.S. government vetoes this camaign, would be the passage of sanctions condemning Israel for committing war crimes in the Gaza Strip that never happened, rubberstamping the claims of Hamas, an antisemitic terrorist group which preaches genocide against Jews.

Feeling that it is winning, the PA won't be interested in negotiations. Feeling, understandably, that the world is against it, neither will Israel.

In short, the PA’s strategy would wreck President Barack Obama’s policy of trying to negotiate peace.

Or, there would be a U.S. veto of sanctions, which would make Obama and his administration angry and make them look bad in the world and to the very Muslims they’ve been trying to court.

In short, the PA’s strategy could wreck Obama’s international policy generally, undermining the popularity of someone who is obsessed with being popular.

Either way, the Palestinians would lose, assuming they really wanted peace and a state.

Negotiation:

The PA could actually try to compromise and get an independent state, the withdrawal of all Jewish settlements on its territory, more than $20 billion in aid, and the ability to return all refugees who so wished to live in Palestine.

So here’s the problem: the West and especially Obama wants to act as if the Palestinians are desperate to end the occupation and get a state and have peace.

But they show that they want victory, even if it sacrifices all those things, damages the Obama administration, and destroys its policy of supporting them.

This is what Bill Clinton and George W. Bush learned through experience. Now it’s Obama’s turn to discover that the Palestinian Authority isn’t some poor suffering force that he will rescue but rather a problem, the barrier to peace, and an enemy to U.S. interests.

Don't underestimate the importance of what's unfolding here. One thing politicians can't forgive is someone making them look foolish. Yasir Arafat and the PA did that to Clinton by rejecting his plan for negotiations offered at the Camp David meeting in 2000. Mahmoud Abbas and the PA did that to George W. Bush by lying to him about their arms deal with Hizballah and Iran to smuggle a huge arms shipment that, if not intercepted by Israel, would have led to a bloodbath.

Now the PA is doing the same thing to Obama. Will he be any more forgiving than his two predecessors?

RubinReports: Palestinians Choose the Illusion of "Victory" Over Negotiated Peace

Israel Matzav: What the delayed inspection of Qom means

What the delayed inspection of Qom means

Although the IAEA first learned of the 'secret' Iranian nuclear plant in Qom on September 21, the inspection is currently scheduled for October 25, more than one month later. That delay is significant. Dore Gold, Israel's former ambassador to the United Nations and the author of The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West explains why.

Back in March 2004, the IAEA was convinced there was incriminating evidence about the Iranian nuclear program at the Lavizan Technological Research center near Teheran. The Iranians managed to postpone the IAEA visit for about 30 days, and in the meantime they razed several buildings at the facility and even dug out two meters of the earth where they had previously stood in order to make it more difficult for inspectors to take soil samples that contained radioactive materials.

By delaying the IAEA visit to Lavizan, the Iranian government concealed what its scientists were doing there. Teheran was off the hook from any crippling sanctions. Moreover, Lavizan was the location of the Iranian weaponization group which designed and constructed nuclear warheads.

Former Israeli intelligence sources believe that the Iranians simply used the time they gained in dismantling Lavizan, after they were caught, and moved their weaponization work to another site. Time allowed Iran to not only cleanse Lavizan, but also to transfer valuable equipment elsewhere.

There was an even longer delay for an IAEA inspection during the previous year, when the UN nuclear watchdog sought to inspect the Kalaye electric facility. The Iranians managed to get a delay from February to August 2003. In the meantime they retiled and repainted several suspected rooms before the IAEA teams arrived. Their purpose was to prevent the inspectors from obtaining any incriminating evidence from swipes of the walls that radioactive materials were ever present. Another Iranian technique was to permit the IAEA to take environmental samples near some buildings but not close to others; Teheran adopted this method when the IAEA came in 2005 to inspect, after yet another delay, the Parchin Military Complex, where conventional high explosives had been tested that could be used for detonating a nuclear device.

Gold goes on to recount several other instances in which Iran has managed to delay inspections that otherwise would have found 'smoking gun' evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons development program. But the truth is that we all know what Iran's game is. And it's a game that has to be stopped one way or the other.

Read the whole thing.

Israel Matzav: What the delayed inspection of Qom means