Love of the Land: Middle East Scorecard

Middle East Scorecard

An Interview with Lee Smith


Matthew RJ Brodsky
inFocus
Spring '10

Posted before Shabbat

On February 28, inFOCUS Editor Matthew RJ Brodsky interviewed Lee Smith, author of the new book, The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations. Smith writes a weekly column called "Agents of Influence" for Tablet Magazine, and is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute. He has worked at a number of journals, magazines, and publishers, including GQ Magazine, the Hudson Review, and Talk Magazine. He was also editor-in-chief of the Voice Literary Supplement, the Village Voice's national monthly literary magazine. Smith has been a frequent guest on radio and television, including Fox News and National Public Radio, and has contributed articles on Arab and Islamic affairs to, among other publications, the Weekly Standard, the New York Times, the New Republic, and the Boston Globe.

iF: What inspired the title of your new book, The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations ?

LS: The title comes from Osama Bin Laden's observation, "when people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse."

iF: What is your book's central thesis and why did you decide to write it?

LS: I was raised in New York City and wanted to understand and explain why almost 3,000 of my neighbors were killed on 9/11. So I sought to explain the centrality of violence in Middle Eastern politics and society to an American audience that is freakishly lucky insofar as we are able, unlike the majority of human beings throughout history, to conduct our political lives free of bloodshed, repression and coercion. Because we have inherited this system we tend to assume that most of the world's other political cultures are similar to ours. Some are but many more are not; the political culture of the Arabic-speaking Middle East is one that has no mechanism for sharing power, or transmitting political authority from one governing body to another except through inheritance, coup or conquest.

iF: A cornerstone of Obama's foreign policy has been engagement based on the idea of "resetting" our relations with certain countries. Does such a metaphorical reset button exist and how does it work in the Middle East?

LS: Such a button could only exist, even metaphorically, if American interests and policies were subject to change every time a new president came to office. Since they are not, all the "reset" button did was to inadvertently make explicit what everyone already knows about the United States: new administrations typically ignore the lessons of their predecessors and have to make their own mistakes before they are capable of dealing with the reality that is, rather than the reality they promised on the campaign trail.

Let's hope the administration has learned from its errors over the past year. Among others, they should have discovered that: 1) despite the counsel of academic experts and media pundits, there is a point past which you cannot "strong-arm" an Israeli government; 2) the Saudis do not offer confidence-building gestures toward Jerusalem and it is unwise to push them on this in public; 3) the Iranians do not wish to have normal bilateral relations with Washington, a preference they have made clear to five different U.S. administrations over the last 30 years.

(Read full interview)

Love of the Land: Middle East Scorecard

RubinReports: The Arabic-Speaking World in 2010

The Arabic-Speaking World in 2010

By Barry Rubin

The politics of the Arabic-speaking world are going to face some serious challenges during 2010. Probably none of them, however, will have anything to do with the Arab-Israeli issue, despite the overwhelming attention and exaggerated importance usually given to that question by outside observers.

Unquestionably, the leading problem will be dealing with an increasingly powerful Iran and its sidekick Syria which aren’t being contained by the United States. The Arabs, after all, live in the neighborhood and if they conclude that America can’t or won’t protect them, they’ll have to cut their own deal combined with finding some way to defend themselves better.

Already we’ve seen huge gains for Iran in 2009 which U.S. policymakers seem largely to ignore:

--The Saudis have reduced their level of confrontation with Iran and Syria, especially abandoning their attempt to block Tehran’s influence in Lebanon.

--The Lebanese moderate May 14 movement has bowed to Iranian-backed Hizballah in setting up a government which won’t do anything Tehran doesn’t like.

--While the full extent of Iranian intervention in Yemen is not clear, it seems like Tehran is backing a tribal revolt which is extending its influence into a new area.

--Western reluctance to raise sanctions and the ease with which Iran fooled and made fools of the West over the nuclear weapons’ issue seems to show that Iran holds the stronger hand. Russia and China are basically defending Iran’s interests in avoiding international pressure. Despite the Obama Administration having set dedlines of September and December, as 2010 begins, the implementation of higher sanctions is still months away.

--While many think that opposition demonstrations and protests have weakened the regime, in a real sense it emerged as stronger. Other factions were forced out of the leadership; Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps leaders occupied more positions of importance. The spiritual guide accepted both the IRGC role and the reelection of President Ahmadinejad, despite his past economic mismanagement and the supposed international or domestic costs. In other words, the regime proved how tough it was which in that part of the world is a major asset.

--Iran seems to have stepped up efforts to extend its influence in southwestern Afghanistan, despite the U.S. military presence there.

Will this march continue in 2010? One of the things that the Obama Administration doesn’t realize is that it’s obvious unwillingness to confront Iran is demoralizing its allies in the Arabic-speaking world whose lives are on the line. If the United States won’t even use tough rhetoric or sanctions how could it be possibly counted on if things get really rough?

Consequently, it’s hard to see Arab states taking a tougher stand during 2010, though if Iran provokes them by getting caught doing internal subversion in Egypt or Saudi Arabia, for example, they could feel forced to take a stand.

A potential crisis is succession in Egypt. Will this be the year that President Husni Mubarak has to stand down? If so, there would be the long-awaited transition, forcing a final decision on whether or not the ill-prepared Gamal Mubarak is going to become president. Gamal is in many ways the West’s dream of an Arab president, Westernized and a technocrat, but could that mean he lacks the skills to keep Egypt stable?

Another issue to watch is the power balance in Lebanon, a delicate mechanism to say the least. Will Hizballah be content to get a long list of things it wants: a free hand for its militia, unlimited weapons’ imports, the country’s servility to Syria, a green light to attack Israel whenever it wants (though it is unlikely to do so this year), and an end to investigations about its own (and Syria’s) involvement in terrorism and murders within Lebanon? Or will it push harder to seize hegemony in the country?

Finally, there is Iraq, whose government is still fighting a terrorist war sponsored by Syria and Iran. As the American withdrawal proceeds will those two countries step up the violence in order to make it look as if the United States is running away in defeat? Here, the Obama Administration has not backed Iraq’s complaints about Syrian involvement in terrorism, thus undermining another ally. Baghdad’s current policy is, however, to remain on good terms with both Washington and Tehran if possible.

If this list makes it sound like nothing good is going to happen in the Arabic-speaking world in2010 then you’ve read it correctly.

RubinReports: The Arabic-Speaking World in 2010

RubinReports: What’s the Difference between Middle East and Western Politics? The Race to Moderation versus The Race to Militancy

What’s the Difference between Middle East and Western Politics? The Race to Moderation versus The Race to Militancy

[Please subscribe to get good reporting and analysis unavailable elsewhere.]

By Barry Rubin

In a democratic country, where politicians need to gain the majority of votes, to win an election requires convincing voters that you are not too extreme. It’s ok to talk about hope and change and reform, but generally speaking the citizens will support a candidate who convinces them he will create some combination of stability and material benefits.

In Middle Eastern dictatorships, and even if there are elections it is the regime’s power which determines the outcome, things are different. Demagoguery and ideology comes from Arab nationalist (or Islamist in Iran and the Gaza Strip) rulers as well as from Islamist oppositions.

In this narrow spectrum ruled by hardline nationalism and religious passions, you are either a hero or a traitor. Militants are heroes; moderates are traitors. And material benefits just aren't important. The virtues are honor and steadfastness, defending Islam and Arabism, resistance to the forces of evil.

Sure, the regime gives material benefits to its elite cadre of supporters but these governments don't mobilize support by promising a chicken in every pot, a car in every garage, and better health care. And any way the resistance to the forces of imperialism, Zionism, and the infidel come first. No voice, as the Arab saying goes, can be allowed to rise above the din of battle.

Alas, how Middle East politics works! And so if you do something that can be portrayed as moderate--even as a cynical maneuver to benefit your own side--rivals will use this to portray you as a traitor. Western observers often write as if people are afraid to speak out lest they be killed. In leading circles however, the more immediate fear is to have your reputation ruined and to be cast out of power.

Imagine for the moment that Syria were to make peace with Israel in exchange for all the Golan Heights. Within days, two-thirds of the population would be demanding a peace divident in terms of more freedom and democracy, threatening the regime's survival. And another two-thirds would be denouncing the rulers as traitors who any way aren't proper Muslims who should be overthrown. A lot of people would be doing both at the same time. The dictatorship's survival would be put in question.

Instead, the Syrian regime thunders about resistance and not surrendering one inch. It supports Hizballah and Hamas and the Iraqi insurgency to kill people. Naturally, the economy is in the dumps. But the regime is wildly popular at home.

Naturally, this inhibits moderation and provokes a race in which everyone tries to prove how militant they are.

This common tactic in Arab politics can also be seen in Iran. The opposition candidate Mehdi Karroubi says that the Iranian regime is selling out by talking with the Americans. He criticized President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as being too soft on the United States because he expressed “readiness for dialogue” and met personally with non-governmental Americans.

Karroubi said:

"If one-tenth of such a meeting happened at the time of all past government, Islamists would have come onto the streets...to protest the government….National interests should be observed. The national interest is not a matter that different governments can change."

And who’s the enemy here? President Barack Obama, the man who has bent over double-backwards to make Tehran want to engage with him. The problem is not who the American president is but the needs of radical dictatorial regimes in the Middle East

So if Karroubi came to power he’d have to build nuclear weapons and follow anti-American policies because he defines these things to be in the national interest of Iran, and certainly in the regime’s interest, and most certainly of all in his own political interest to stave off accusations that he was too moderate.

The same thing applies to Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Mahmoud Abbas. Even after the United States and Israel announce that Israeli construction will be frozen, Abbas must insist that he can’t even talk to Israel unless not a single cinder block is laid atop another one. He also says that he will hold new elections next January but won’t run in them.

First of all, there won’t be new elections because his Fatah movement will never get a deal with Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip, and maybe also because Fatah’s afraid it won’t win.

Second, Abbas is trying to use this threat as leverage on the United States to get more. Let’s remember the situation: President Barack Obama wants direct Israel-PA talks and Abbas refuses. Obama made a deal with Israel on freezing construction on settlements, Abbas rejects it.

Once again, this is the farce played out in which everyone pretends Abbas is serious, while Washington pretends that it can get some real cooperation from the PA

But what is triggering Abbas’s action most immediately is the cries of betrayal when he agreed with Obama’s request that the PA not take the lead in pushing the Goldstone report in the UN. Everyone knew that it would pass and that all the Arab and Muslim-majority regimes would support it. Yet Washington wanted to avoid the embarrassment of having one of the two parties it is trying to get to the negotiating table call the other one a bestial war criminal that should be lynched.

Abbas went along for about 48 hours but there was an uproar in Fatah. Why? Because everyone was scoring points by proving they were more militant than Abbas. So Abbas did a turnaround. That wasn’t enough so then he helped provoke riots on the Temple Mount and now is doing this resignation farce.

This is one of the main reasons why the region is caught in a vicious circle from which Arab governments and Iran don’t escape.

Equally, that’s why when Obama asks Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt to make some small concession so he can get a construction on settlements freeze from Israel they turned him down flat.

And that’s why no amount of apology, flattery, or concessions from the United States will moderate radicals or make moderates more outspoken and ready to compromise.

Western politicians generally don't want to face this reality. Instead, they even defend their adversaries' behavior (as the alternative would be to have to confront them.)

Thus, Obama claims, with no conceivable justification, that getting a deal on nuclear weapons, "is going to take time, and part of the challenge that we face is that neither North Korea nor Iran seem to be settled enough politically to make quick decisions on these issues."

No, the problem is the precise opposite: they have already decided they won't make a deal. One reason for this is that they are all to "settled enough" politically and can ignore any argument that they would be better off if they made a compromise agreement. Another reason is that they want to remain "settled enough" and realize that an agreement to make peace with Israel or dispense with nuclear weapons would leave them worse off.

And when the inexperienced president says things like this, he doesn't understand that he is signalling Iran to stall for an even longer time while it rushes to get nuclear weapons. In other words, Obama is playing right into Iran's hands and sabotaging his own efforts. Sure, he can pretend he's making progress now but what's he going to do in six months?

Or consider Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who is generally more realistic, explaining:

"It is not in Iran's interest to have a nuclear arms race in the Gulf, where they would be less secure than they are today. It is not in Iran's interest, to the Iranian people's interest, to be subjected to very onerous sanctions."

Sure, but it is in Iran's interest if Tehran believes that having nuclear weapons will raise Islamic fervor and Iranian patriotism at home while intimidating Arab and Western states into appeasing Tehran. It is in Iran's interest if it believes--and in listening to Obama how could it help but believe?--that "very onerous sanctions" are just a bluff and the president is desperate to avoid using them.

These administration arguments are bogus. Most people in the Middle East--whether Arab, Iranian, or Israeli--can see through them easily. The U.S. and European leaders simply miscompehend the Middle East because they keep seeing it in terms of their own world view and behavior.

Here's the real answer: Arab and Iranian politicians put their own survival above making Obama happy every time. If they can use a show of militancy and intransigence, it is all the better for them. And if they can get away with it and not incur any cost from U.S. criticism, punishment, or pressure, then that is an extra incentive to bash U.S. interests and reject peace with Israel.

RubinReports: What’s the Difference between Middle East and Western Politics? The Race to Moderation versus The Race to Militancy

Love of the Land: Europe Sells Out to Syria and Gets Slapped: A Middle East Case Study in Begging to Give Something for Nothing

Europe Sells Out to Syria and Gets Slapped: A Middle East Case Study in Begging to Give Something for Nothing

Barry Rubin
The Rubin Report
26 October 09

Ugarte: “But think of all the poor devils who cannot meet Renault’s price. I get it for them for half. Is that so parasitic?”

Rick: “I don’t mind a parasite. I object to a cut-rate one.” --From the film “Casablanca” 1942

Wow what a great lesson in Middle East politics! Bear with me. The issue seems obscure but the story is a treasure house of dark humor and educational value.

For many years the European Union has talked with Syria about a trade treaty giving Damascus lots of benefits. For some time, the EU balked, insisting that Syria make some commitments on improving human rights in the country. Yet step by step, while Syria did nothing in the way of concessions, the EU gave in until it offered to sign the treaty unconditionally.

And guess what happened? When the EU was ready to sign, Syria said “No!” Get it, the Syrians are getting a big concession which will help their country but they turn it down as insufficient. They get the other side to beg them to accept goodies by merely saying no repeatedly, even though the EU had nothing and Syria had everything to gain.

See any parallels to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Western negotiations with Iran over nuclear weapons, and many other examples?

Before we go any further, ask yourself these questions:

--Who’s stronger economically, Europe or Syria? Europe.

--Who’s in need of this agreement in purely economic terms? Syria.

--Who’s blocking peace in the Middle East, sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, trying to take over Lebanon, helping Iran to get nuclear weapons, repressing dissidents with torture, and responsible for murdering the former Lebanese prime minister and other officials in that country? Syria.

--So who’s making all the concessions and acting as the weaker party? The EU!

Talks have been going on for 5 years. At first, the EU went slow because the United States wanted to isolate Syria, and the EU wanted Damascus to promise not to develop weapons of mass destruction. Since Syria said it would not do so, however, the EU dropped that demand.

Next, the EU conditioned the deal on Syria making promises to observe human rights. Again, though, since the Syrians refused, the British and French became desperate to concede on that issue as well. Why? In large part, they want to play a bigger role in the region. The Netherlands objected but was assuaged with the pledge that if Syria became far more repressive the agreement might be suspended. Don’t hold your breath.
So finally, on October 26, the deal was going to be signed. With the EU pulling out its pens, the Syrians said: Wait a minute, we want to think about it some more.

What a humiliation for the EU but did anyone notice? A Syrian analyst close to the regime explained that Syria is gambling on EU weakness in hopes of getting an even better deal and to show its own power.

The agreement’s benefits for Syria are clear: more aid and investment; better access to EU markets. Given its own weaknesses, Syria’s Soviet-style economy is in bad shape and really needs the deal. In addition, the link with Europe would be a real political victory and a breakout from the regime’s isolation.

True, there are two problems for Syria in the deal but each of them are sort of exceptions that prove the rule.

First, Syrian companies would face increasing competition from EU imports. This proves, however, that the argument about Syria or Iran making nice with the West in exchange for economic openings is not at all necessarily true. Moreover, the more Western investment and interaction there is the weaker the regime’s hold over its own society.

Second, in order to qualify for the deal, Syria has to drop subsidies and alter its tax structure. These changes didn’t hurt the elite but the majority suffered under rising prices. This shows not only how the dictatorship protects its own but that the EU efforts actually hurt average Syrians rather than helped them.

For more details see here and here.

The bottom line is that the West trades off advantages in exchange for little or nothing in the belief that it will moderate extremists. The radicals won’t give an inch, grabbing the benefits and refusing anything in return. If extremist behavior is met with Western concessions, this enforces radicalism rather than encourages moderation: the exact opposite of the policy’s stated intention.

This reminds me of an old psychiatrist’s joke:

“Hit me,” says the masochist.

“No,” responds the sadist.

Love of the Land: Europe Sells Out to Syria and Gets Slapped: A Middle East Case Study in Begging to Give Something for Nothing

RubinReports: A New Arab Strategy: Israel Gives Up Everything, and Then Maybe Gets Something in Exchange

A New Arab Strategy: Israel Gives Up Everything, and Then Maybe Gets Something in Exchange

By Barry Rubin

There’s been an important new development in Arab strategy toward Israel. Although it was implicit in the Saudi, later Arab, peace proposal it has now become explicit, as in the Turki al-Faisal New York Times op-ed.

He wrote:

"Saudi Arabia ... must therefore refuse to engage Israel until it ends its illegal occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights as well as Shabaa Farms in Lebanon. For Saudis to take steps toward diplomatic normalization before this land is returned to its rightful owners would undermine international law and turn a blind eye to immorality."

This is an open and direct rejection of the Obama Administration policy of seeking confidence-building measures from both sides. Of course, the Administration won't criticize the Saudis for trampling on their policy and will go on insisting that they have received positive responses from Arab states which show that progress is being made.


Yet even more important, the Arab states' position--in part excluding Egypt and Jordan--on the peace process is now this:

First, Israel must withdraw from all territories captured in the 1967 war, meaning east Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. In addition, it must allow all Palestinians who lived or had any ancestor who lived in what is now Israel come and live in Israel without restriction if they want to do so.

Then, Arab states will negotiate about making peace and giving diplomatic recognition. The Palestinian Authority's leader, Mahmoud Abbas, and Syria have taken stances along similar lines.

Read All at :

RubinReports: A New Arab Strategy: Israel Gives Up Everything, and Then Maybe Gets Something in Exchange

RubinReports: The Middle East’s Disease Infects the West; The West Feeds the Middle East’s Irrationalism

The Middle East’s Disease Infects the West; The West Feeds the Middle East’s Irrationalism

By Barry Rubin

If you want to understand the Middle East, don’t read the Western media, read Arab writers like Mshari Al-Zaydi. His September 9, 2009, op-ed in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, "They Feed Our Illusions," is aimed at those who write or speak in Arabic about how all the problems of the Arabic-speaking world is the fault of those who don’t live there (Israel, the West, conspiracies).

If this were to be true a solution would require not reform within the Arab-majority countries (democracy, human rights, equality for women, etc.) but merely a struggle to defeat the external enemies. That is, of course, precisely what happens.

Zaydi is inveighing against conspiracy theories, particularly regarding the September 11 attacks, whose anniversary prompted the article. It speaks volumes, for example, that Muhammad Husanayn Haykal, the Egyptian who many routinely say is the best journalist in the history of the Arabic press, claimed shortly after the attack that it was carried out not by radical Islamist followers of Usama bin Ladin but by Serbian nationalists

Of course, Zaydi says, all societies have conspiracy theorists and irrational people. But:

"Societies that are free of injured pride…and regrets of being backward in civilization do not allow such people to make decisions on important and sensitive issues. In these societies, such issues are studied with complete, or as close as possible to complete, objectivity–so as to protect the state and decision-making from the impact of fleeting emotional [reactions].”

He suggests:

“While facing up to the truth is bitter and painful, it is temporary bitterness and pain that will soon go away–and putting up with that is better and more beneficial than resorting to intellectual drugs and evasion tricks."

Read All at :

RubinReports: The Middle East’s Disease Infects the West; The West Feeds the Middle East’s Irrationalism

RubinReports: How the West's Enemies Are Saving It

How the West's Enemies Are Saving It

By Barry Rubin

When people are very pessimistic, I say to them: Don’t worry our enemies will save us.

By that I mean that the enemies of peace, progress, and democracy—Islamists and radical Arab nationalists, terrorists and silly people in the West alike—are so intransigent, obviously lying, and dangerously wrong about society that they will convince and force most people to reject and combat them.

Even when thrown lifelines, even when confronted with naiveté, they reject concessions, turn up their nose at compromise, go too far, and make their nonsense so illogical and apparent, as to either teach the naïve in political and intellectual power or persuade others push them aside in order to survive.

Today offers some examples of this idea:

The presidency of Barack Obama and the relatively soft stands of European states have given Iran a great opportunity. Tehran could have made a show of flexibility, a strong pretense about being cooperative, and met with Obama. This would have forestalled a higher level of Western sanctions, while Iran could still work secretly on nuclear weapons.

After all, even after a virtual coup by the most hardline faction, the stolen election, the strong repression, the show trials of dissidents, and the appointment of a wanted terrorist as defense minister [that’s a pretty amazing list, isn’t it?], the West was still willing to deal with the regime.

Instead, Iran produced an “offer” to negotiate so minimal that even the Europeans rejected it. While this doesn’t mean all is well—Russia and China will block and sabotage even moderate sanctions; the West Europeans will oppose really strong ones—at least Iran’s last-minute effort to derail the process altogether will fail.

Imagine what the Iranian regime could have done if the ruling establishment had let someone less extreme than Mahmoud Ahmadinejad get elected, then claimed this showed what a moderate and democratic state they were running. A charm offensive could have defused the nuclear controversy and the sanctions would have fallen away. Iran would have been set loose and a few years from now could have finished its nuclear program in a relaxed manner.

But no!

Turn to Lebanon. The Syrians were riding high. A new government was going to be set up in Lebanon with their clients have both thirty percent of the cabinet seats and veto power over all government policies. But when the March 14 coalition, which won the recent elections, presented its own list of ministers, the Syrians and their Hizballah allies rejected it: not subservient enough. March 14, which has been giving ground steadily, was pushed so hard that it dug in its heels and rejected the Syrian demands. The negotiations will now have to start all over again.

Syria could have gotten back around 80 percent of its former total power over Lebanon in one day, but that wasn’t enough for Damascus.

The same applies to U.S. attempts to engage Syria. The Obama Administration was eager for progress, but the Bashar al-Assad dictatorship would even give an inch to gain a yard. The talks have been frustrating for Washington. The Syrians weren’t willing even to deescalate the terrorism in Iraq for a while.

Syria could have gotten out from under U.S. sanctions, reestablished normal relations with Washington, and have the Obama Administration turn a blind eye to its sponsorship of terrorism and subversion throughout the region.

But no!

The same applies to Hamas. It tried a little to pretend to moderate and already Western suckers were swallowing the bait, but it couldn’t—and wouldn’t –sustain the pretense very long. It couldn’t resist going back to its super-hardline statements and actions.

But the Palestinian Authority (PA) offers an even clearer example. Imagine how much it could have obtained if it played along with the U.S. president’s eagerness to help. A show of flexibility, an eagerness to negotiate, and an effort to get a Palestinian state on something approaching reasonable terms real fast probably would have brought success.

Atmost, there could have been a Palestinian state within 18 months on pretty favorable terms for the Palestinians. Or should one say, at most the PA could easily—and I mean easily—engineered a U.S.-Israel conflict unseen in the history of the Jewish state. But from the start PA leader Mahmoud Abbas made it clear that he was asking for everything and giving nothing. His best chance is already past.

And similar things can be said about various Arab countries regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict specifically and also getting in good with the president.generally. They could have rushed to make minor, meaingless gestures toward Israel in exchange for U.S. support on their broader demands.

Can I have a “But no!”?

One more, historic example: Remember Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein? In late 1990 or early 1991 he could have cut a very favorable deal which would have left his country with part of Kuwait, billions of dollars, and the Saudis trembling at his every command. Instead, he refused any deal, kept his army in Kuwait, and suffered a military defeat.

He did the same in the 2000-2003 period when he could have made some kind of bargain for stopping his nuclear program in exchange for all sorts of concessions. Instead, he did the opposite: he pretended to keep up the program even when he cut it back.

It is very important to understand why this kind of thing happens repeatedly and, though ultimately disastrous for Saddam, usually works out pretty well for the dictators or the leaders of powerful opposition movements.

First, all these forces really are radical and extremist. They don’t want a deal; they want total victory, all the disputed land, total rule, complete dictatorship, the expulsion or extinction of their adversaries. And they can also rightly argue: these methods got me this far.

Read All at :

RubinReports: How the West's Enemies Are Saving It