Love of the Land: Israel's Qualitative Military Edge, Part III: The Palestinians

Israel's Qualitative Military Edge, Part III: The Palestinians

JINSA
JINSA Report #: 958
22 January '10

In this decade, threats to Israel from the inner circle of its enemies changed in a qualitative way as Hamas and Hezbollah acquired arms and training from Iran-and in the case of the Palestinians, the United States.

Arafat's Fatah launched the "second intifada" in late 2000 primarily from the West Bank. Hamas was not a real factor and Gaza was relatively quiet. Israel was comfortable in the early years with the Bush Administration's approach to the Palestinian Authority (PA), for example, not meeting Arafat, the June 24th speech, the President's consistent support for Israel's need to defend itself from terror across the borders including 2002's Operation Defensive Shield and the construction of the Security Fence, the 2005 Gaza disengagement, the 2006 Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead against Hamas rocket attacks.

In what turned out to be a mistake of historic proportion, however, Israel and the United States agreed to allow Hamas to run in the 2006 Palestinian election, changing the Palestinian dynamic after the Palestinian civil war and the ouster of Fatah from Gaza. And it was the Bush administration-with Israeli acquiescence and assistance-that undertook training of Palestinian "security forces" under the leadership of an U.S. Army general.

It wasn't the first time.

(Read full report)

Related: QME, Part II: U.S. Arms Sales to the Arabs, and Help (?) for Israel
Qualitative Military Edge, Part I: What it is and Where it Went

Love of the Land: Israel's Qualitative Military Edge, Part III: The Palestinians

Love of the Land: QME, Part II: U.S. Arms Sales to the Arabs, and Help (?) for Israel

QME, Part II: U.S. Arms Sales to the Arabs, and Help (?) for Israel

JINSA
Report #: 957
22 January '10

[Correction to JINSA Report #956: The 1981 U.S. sale to Saudi Arabia was for E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) airplanes, not fighter jets.]

The concept of the Qualitative Military Edge (QME) failed to keep up with the changes in U.S. arms sales and training policy over the decades. It also failed to keep up with the changes in the regional picture of Israel and its adversaries-and the problems the adversaries themselves face. And finally, the Obama Administration posture toward Iran-including diplomatic overtures to the government and failure to obtain allied agreement on meaningful sanctions or other action-appears to have shifted from preventing Iranian acquisition of nuclear capabilities to deciding how to deal with a nuclear Iran. The implications for the security "edge" Israel requires in the face of continued Arab and Iranian rejection are huge.

During the "decade of the oughts" (as it appears to have been retroactively dubbed), the strategic alignment in the region changed from "everybody against Israel" to a "pro-Iran vs. anti-Iran" axis. Israel found itself on the same side of the strategic divide as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Bahrain and Lebanese democrats. On the other side are Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran and, increasingly, Turkey. Iraq appears out of the picture, which is a very big change in historical terms. That doesn't mean Saudi Arabia likes Israel any better, but there is a clearer meeting of the minds on what threatens who and how. Saudi condemnation of Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon war and decision not to give even rhetorical support to Hamas during the Gaza war were demonstrations of the shift; as was passage of an Israeli warship through the Suez Canal during the summer.

(Read full report)

Related: Qualitative Military Edge, Part I: What it is and Where it Went

Love of the Land: QME, Part II: U.S. Arms Sales to the Arabs, and Help (?) for Israel

Love of the Land: Qualitative Military Edge, Part I: What it is and Where it Went

Qualitative Military Edge, Part I: What it is and Where it Went

JINSA
Report #: 956
21 January '10

The Forward started it in December. Ha'aretz picked up the theme this month, writing, "The Bush administration violated security related agreements with Israel in which the U.S. promised to preserve the IDF's qualitative military edge (QME) over Arab armies, according to senior officials in the Obama administration and Israel," and suggesting that National Security Adviser Jim Jones's trip to Israel in mid-January was to discuss the QME. (Actually it was to push Israel into more pointless talks with Palestinians, who declined to cooperate.)

The objective appears to be PR for the Obama Administration, the standing of which is very, very low among Israelis. Trashing the previous administration is a favored tactic - but the truth is both less and more than it appears.

The concept of a QME is "iffy" to begin with;

The Bush Administration did several things that reduced Israel's capabilities against certain of its enemies, while strengthening Israel in other ways;

The Obama administration is repeating the mistakes, doubling down on them and adding its own new ones;

Israel, in very important ways, isn't protesting where it might.

The QME began as a Johnson Administration promise (not a treaty) to maintain Israel's ability to prevail over any reasonable combination of Arab forces in a non-nuclear war. The promise has been repeated by successive administrations-unquantified and unquantifiable. Weapons themselves can be counted, but Israel's edge over Arab armies was always more than that. It was-and remains-a combination of:

(Read full report)

Love of the Land: Qualitative Military Edge, Part I: What it is and Where it Went