Israel Matzav: The 'Palestinians' and the Kosovo model

The 'Palestinians' and the Kosovo model

Two years ago, I warned that the 'Palestinians' may try to adopt the model that Kosovo adopted with the Serbs by unilaterally declaring independence. Here's some of what I wrote in a very lengthy post.

All of which brings us to what Israel's response to Kosovo's declaration of independence ought to be. Here, there is little doubt that Israel ought to refuse to recognize Kosovo for two reasons I have discussed before, namely the implications that the Kosovo situation has for the 'Palestinians' and the implications it has for 'Israeli Arabs.' First, the 'Palestinians':

There is a small piece of disputed land, that is rich in history but poor in everything else. Its preponderant population of two million Muslims wants to turn it into a sovereign state. The United States, the European Union, and much of the 'international community,' are in favor of creating a sovereign state on that piece of disputed land, but doing so would open a Pandora’s Box of geopolitical, legal, moral and security issues, and create a black hole of lawlessness, endemic corruption and jihad-terrorism.

Sounds like Judea and Samaria or Judea, Samaria and Gaza, doesn't it? But it's not. It's Kosovo, the southernmost province of Serbia.

The 'Palestinians' were quick to understand the implications of a western recognition of Kosovo's independence. 'Palestinian' negotiator Yasser Abd Rabbo suggested last week that the 'Palestinians' should follow Kosovo's model and declare their state reichlet unilaterally. But 'moderate' 'Palestinian' President Mahmoud Abbas Abu Mazen was smarter than that.

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas quickly dismissed a top aide's call Wednesday for a unilateral declaration of statehood if negotiations with Israel fail.

The Palestinians are committed to reaching a negotiated peace agreement this year, Abbas said in a statement.

"If we are unable to do that... We will return to our Arab [brothers] to take the appropriate decision," he said.

Abu Mazen is waiting for one of two things to happen. He is waiting either for Israel to recognize Kosovo, which could happen at any time, and which would make it much more difficult for Israel to argue that the 'Palestinians' do not deserve their own state reichlet. Or he is waiting for negotiations to break down completely, which could force the Americans to recognize an independent 'Palestinian' state reichlet due to this statement on Friday by US State Department spokesman Sean McCormick:

Asked why Kosovo had to wait just nine years under UN administration to obtain its independence, while the Palestinians have been waiting since 1948, McCormack said the situations were different.

"The situation in Kosovo had run its course, in terms of trying to find a solution, a negotiated political solution," McCormack said.

"We believe that there still is the possibility of a negotiated settlement" in the Palestinian territories, he said, citing peace talks held in Annapolis, Maryland last year under the auspices of President George W. Bush.

For those who can't read between the lines, Daled Amos explains what this statement means:

So, if it becomes clear that a negotiated settlement is not feasible, would the US likewise contend that the situation "had run its course" and ultimately back the establishment of a Palestinian state?

I think the obvious answer to that question is "yes." And if Israel recognizes Kosovo, that makes it even easier for the US to do so.

Fast forward two years. The 'negotiations' with the 'Palestinians' have broken down to the extent that the parties are no longer able to sit at the same table. The fact that they're not sitting at the table due to new demands by the 'Palestinians,' which were copied from the Obama administration, is almost irrelevant. The fact is that there are no negotiations, and it shows that the 'Palestinians' are now trying to adopt the Kosovar model. That's what the 'Fayyad plan' for a unilateral declaration of a 'Palestinian state' in two years (late 2011?) is all about.

• Mahmoud Abbas' new precondition that the international community recognize the 1967 lines in the West Bank as the new Palestinian border bolsters the assessment that the Palestinians have largely abandoned a negotiated settlement and instead are actively pursuing a unilateral approach to statehood.
• Senior Palestinian officials note that Palestinian unilateralism is modeled after Kosovo's February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia. European and U.S. support for Kosovo's unilateral declaration has led the Palestinian leadership to determine that geopolitical conditions are ripe to seek international endorsement of its unilateral statehood bid, despite the fact that leading international jurists have suggested that the cases of Kosovo and the Palestinian Authority are historically and legally different.
• The Palestinians are legally bound to negotiate a bilateral solution with Israel. Unilateral Palestinian threats to declare statehood have been rebuffed thus far by the European powers and the United States.
• The Palestinian "Kosovo strategy" includes a campaign of delegitimization of Israel, seeking to isolate Israel as a pariah state, while driving a wedge between Israel and the United States. The unilateral Palestinian bid for sovereignty will also likely turn the Palestinians into the leading petitioner against the State of Israel at the International Criminal Court. Although the PA is not a state and therefore should have no legal standing before the court, the petition it submitted to the court after the Gaza war was not rejected by the ICC.
• Finally, a unilateral Palestinian quest for the 1947 lines may well continue even if the 1967 lines are endorsed by the United Nations. The PLO's 1988 declaration of independence was based on UN General Assembly Resolution 181, which recognizes the 1947 partition plan for Palestine, not the 1967 lines, as the basis for the borders of Israel and an Arab state.

Does the fact that the 'Palestinians' are 'legally bound' to negotiate a 'settlement' with Israel really mean anything? For how long are they bound to negotiate? Are they bound to negotiate in good faith? Can they turn the negotiations into a sham by refusing to compromise? Consider this from the same article excerpted above:

In late 2008, the collapse of the Annapolis peace negotiations between Abbas and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who, as Abbas acknowledged publicly, had made unprecedented concessions,6 further motivated the Palestinians to embrace a unilateral approach to statehood as a default option. Abed Rabo confirmed at the time that, "we have another option. Kosovo is not better than Palestine."7

...

Two leading international jurists have suggested that the cases of Kosovo and the Palestinian Authority are historically and legally different.10 However, from a Palestinian point of view, it seems that legal and historical context are less important than the sympathetic political perceptions that can be created in the international community by promoting what appear to be some external similarities.11 The Palestinians liken themselves to Kosovo's profile in the West as a besieged, indigenous population seeking freedom and independence from its brutal Serbian sovereign overlord, which in the Palestinian analogy is the State of Israel's "occupation" of the disputed West Bank.12

True, both Palestinians and Muslim Kosovars enjoy international support for their respective bids for independence.13 Both have established internationally-sanctioned, self-governing authorities, receive European security backing and UN financial support, and work with UN-appointed special envoys, while each has penned a constitution. However, Kosovo enjoys a NATO security presence, which Palestinian negotiators have failed to introduce into the West Bank despite several attempts to do so in past peace negotiations with Israel.14

Another point of similarity between Kosovars and the Palestinians involves territory. The Kosovo model did not require a territorial compromise on the part of the Albanian Muslim Kosavar government to take into account areas where concentrations of Serbian Christian population remained.15 Similarly, the Palestinian leadership has been reluctant to compromise with Israel over Israeli population centers and vital security requirements in the West Bank.

Politically, many in the Palestinian leadership assess that adopting a unilateral "Kosovo strategy" and seeking international legitimacy to impose the 1967 borders on Israel is their best option, which, in their view, would automatically solve the issues of Jewish settlements and the status of Jerusalem without having to negotiate with Israel, while leaving the refugee issue to be decided according to the "agreed-upon solution" specified in the Arab peace initiative.16

...

The Palestinian leadership did not adopt the unilateral "Kosovo strategy" ex nihilo. Leading members of the European Union encouraged the Palestinians to move in this direction. PA chief negotiator Saeb Erekat credited former EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana with engineering the idea.28 In July 2009, Solana told a British forum that after a fixed deadline, the UN Security Council should unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state along the 1967 lines.29 Palestinian unilateralism also received a boost in early December 2009 when Sweden, in the final thirty days of its rotating EU presidency, proposed that EU foreign ministers back its draft proposal recognizing east Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state, thus implying EU acceptance of a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood.30

The EU Foreign Policy Council partly softened its final statement days later. However, as former UN ambassador Dore Gold notes, the final EU statement still retained the proposal that envisioned Jerusalem as the future capital of two states. Additionally, the statement said that the EU "would not recognize any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem," thereby enshrining the 1967 lines - a key Palestinian demand - as a previous political border.31 Palestinian unilateralism has also drawn encouragement from the United Nations itself. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has reportedly issued expressions of support for such moves, according to former PA security chief Mohammed Dahlan and Saeb Erekat in a November 14, 2009, interview with the Palestinian newspaper Al-Ayyam.32

The only thing stopping a unilateral declaration of 'Palestinian statehood' is the fact that the US won't recognize it. If the US would recognize such a declaration, so would the Europeans. I would look for a lame duck President Obama (sometime after the 2012 elections, whether or not he is God forbid re-elected) to recognize such a declaration. That's what the 'Palestinians' are seeking.

Despite Palestinian disenchantment with Washington, there are signs that the Obama administration position supports the Palestinian demand for a state along the 1967 lines and a Palestinian capital in east Jerusalem,39 which are central objectives of the Palestinian "Kosovo strategy." According to one assessment, Obama may have even supplied the Palestinians with a letter of guarantee to that effect.40 While the U.S. is publicly committed to the principle of a negotiated solution between the sides, it has grown impatient with the bilateral process. White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel reportedly expressed deep frustration with both the PA and Israel, which supports the Palestinian sense that they are on the right track in pursuing a unilateral "Kosovo" option.

Is it certain that the 'Palestinians' will succeed in their quest to declare 'statehood' unilaterally? No. But it's far more likely that they will succeed in gaining an endorsement of a 'Palestinian state' declared unilaterally from a lame duck Obama than it is that the current Israeli government will offer them something better than what they turned down from Ehud Olmert last September.

What could go wrong? Read the whole thing.

Israel Matzav: The 'Palestinians' and the Kosovo model