'The only country with a will'
Last week, I asked Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies here, and a former State Department expert on nuclear issues, about where he saw the difficulties converging next year.
He said sanctions by the United States and European Union affecting Iran’s imports of gasoline (the mullahs have oil, but small refining capacities) could be enacted, but he doubted their effectiveness in stopping the Iranian drive towards nukes.
If that is the case, Mr. Fitzpatrick has said “threatening military force” may be the way forward. He told me, “Iran has to know it’s a real possibility.”
This was in the context of circumstances in 2010 that appear particularly sensitive. Mr. Fitzpatrick said if Israel’s obvious red-lines were known to Iran — Iranian expulsion of U.N. nuclear inspectors from its territory or its renunciation the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, for example — the nature of other tripwires that could unleash an attack were deliberately kept unclear by the Israelis.
He believes Iran’s stockpile of low enriched uranium, which he now estimated as sufficient for one and a half bombs when enriched, “will be the equivalent of three or four sometime next year.”
“When is too much too much?” for the Israelis, he asked. Or, if Iran intends to stop its enrichment and possible weapons work in building a nuke at a so-called breakout level, is that “so close that the Israelis can’t wait?”
Mr. Fitzpatrick is no advocate of an Israeli or American military strike on Iran. But if Israel would attack, he said, “I think Israel’s capacity is not insignificant. If the purpose is to take out Iran’s known enrichment-related facilities, I think Israel can do that.”
A good (and unhappy) guess is that by this time next year, we’ll be wondering when that’s going to happen.
If Mr. Fitzpatrick’s doubts about new sanctions’ inconclusive bite are correct, that pretty much guarantees United States and its European friends entering a contain-and-deter-Iran mode.
But can Iran be deterred?
Probably yes when it comes to actually dropping a bomb. On the other hand, unless the United States makes very clear it won’t stand for Iran producing or having the capacity to produce a nuke, the most likely Iranian response to deterrent noises will be stitching up a shroud of ambiguity to obscure its at-the-edge-of-production capabilities.
That would provide the credulous in the West a safe place to avoid a hard decision; and, if America goes along too, effectively turn the matter over to the Israelis.
Mr. Fitzpatrick had a good phrase for describing this approach. He said it would leave things “to the only country with the will” to make up its mind.
What could go wrong?
Israel Matzav: 'The only country with a will'